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INTRODUCTION
B EFORE 1970, prosecutors relied on conspiracy charges to join
large numbers of defendants in a single trial' and to obtain con-
1. Courts have often condemned mass conspiracy trials. See. e.g.. United States
v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 521-24 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely. J., concurring); United States
v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962
(1975); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), affd, 311 U.S. 205
(1940). Justice Jackson described the difficulties accompanying criminal conspiracy
cases in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
"A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be
evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that
birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as
often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each
other, they convict each other." Id. at 454 (Jackson. J., concurring).
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victions based upon weak circumstantial evidence. 2 The liberal stan-
dards of proof and the procedural advantages resulting from charging
this crime were responsible for Judge Learned Hand's description of
conspiracy as "that darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery. '
Prosecutors have not been content with these advantages 4 and have
increasingly employed Title IX 5 of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970,6 popularly known as RICO.7 Although it punishes participa-
2. See generally United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Castanon, 453 F.2d
932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972). In Iannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770 (1975), the Supreme Court approved the use of circumstantial evidence but
cautioned that "[iln some cases reliance on such evidence perhaps has tended to
obscure the basic fact that the agreement is the essential evil at which the crime of
conspiracy is directed." Id. at 777 n.10 (citations omitted).
3. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
4. See Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeer-
ing, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 341, 346-48 (1980). For perhaps the first time since the
federal conspiracy statute was adopted by Congress, commentators have charac-
terized it as "restrictive." Id. at 347. They believe that prosecutors are "severely"
limited by the requirement that a conspiracy be based on a common objective, id. at
347 n.51, a requirement they claim diminishes the "likelihood that multi-faceted,
syndicated criminal activity would be found to be one conspiracy." Id. at 360, The
authors have exaggerated the impact of this requirement; defendants are often found
to be part of conspiracies that include people whom they do not know and whose
functions do not directly affect the success of the defendant's transactions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977);
United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940
(1974). Although these commentators assert that in conspiracy cases the jury cannot
consider the defendant's related offenses, relevant evidence is admissible if offered to
prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). Title IX has been adopted as a model for
some state statutes. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 905.34, 943.46-.464 (West Supp.
1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 842-1 to 842-12 (1976); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann, § 911
(Purdon 1973).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at scattered sections of 18 US.C.
& 28 U.S.C.). Title IX is one of 12 substantive titles of the Organized Crime Control
Act. The purpose of the Act is to deal with the "eradication of organized crime . . .
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime." 84 Stat. 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose). The other titles are: Title
I, Special Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976); Title II, General Immunity,
id. §§ 6001-6005; Title III, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976); Title IV,
False Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976); Title V, Protected Facilities for Housing
Government Witnesses, uncodified; Title VI, Depositions, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976);
Title VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, id. § 3504; Title VIII, Syndi-
cated Gambling, id. § 1511; Title X, Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, id. §§
3575-3578; Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, id. §§ 841-848, Title XII, National
Commission on Individuad Rights, uncodified.
7. RICO is an acronym for the heading of Title IX. "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
[Vol. 49
tion in an "enterprise" through racketeering activity, 8 the enterprise
concept has been construed as little more than a person or group of
persons involved in the commission of two crimes. 9
Until 1975, the complex language of the statute discouraged pros-
ecutions.' 0 The government, encouraged by recent cases broadly
construing Title IX, has ignored the rising chorus of criticism by
employing the statute more frequently and urging even broader con-
structions. 11  RICO violations have been alleged against an astonish-
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
9. See notes 139-41, 191, 259-68 infra and accompanying text.
10. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980);
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68:
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1. 3 n.21
(1978).
11. Although six RICO cases were reported between 1970 and 1974, 31 were
reported between 1975 and 1977, and more than twice that amount have been re-
ported since then. Lavine, Court Blunts Major U.S. Rackets Law, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
17, 1979, at 1, col. 4. The attempts to expand the scope of RICO have incurred sharp
criticism from defense attorneys and judges. E.g., United States v. Anderson, 626
F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Grzvvacz, 603 F.2d 682, 69-2
(7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 100 §. Ct. 2152 (1980); United
States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1979) (ElN, J. dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104. 107-11 (2d Cir.
1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See Ford-
ham Seminar For Corporate Counsel Explores Variety of Criminal Issues, in 26
Crim. L. Rptr.' (BNA) 2302, 2306 (1980) (James Catterson, Jr. described RICO as a
"loose carronade which threatens to hull entities never contemplated in its enact-
ment."); ABA Section of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution and Defense of RICO &
Mail Fraud Cases 4-6 (1980)(Francis Sams observed that a typical RICO indictment
in high visibility cases contains 60 to 80 counts, charges 20 to 30 defendants, and
runs 120 to 150 pages); Nat'l L.J., Sept. 15, 1980, at 3, col. 1 (defense attorney Mark
Slatkin criticized RICO prosecution tactics whereby the government "set out to show
every possible fact that occurred in a five-year period. . . . Where they' could have
paraded four witnesses, they paraded 150."). In United States v. Union Oil, Inc.,
No. H-79-41 (S.D. Tex., indictment filed Mar. 7, 1979), the court dismissed the
RICO indictments, stating that RICO "was designed to keep racketeers out of busi-
ness, not to make racketeers out of business." Yet, proponents of the government's
views have continued to urge even broader constructions. See Blake', Materials on
RICO: Criminal Overview, in 1 Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, Techniques in
the Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime 1. 4. 27 (1980) (urging liberal
construction of RICO criminal provisions and describing RICO as applicable "not just
[to] political corruption and white collar crime, but [to] violent offenses generally");
Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, An Explanation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Statute 2, 34-,33 (4th ed. 1978) (describing RICO as pro-
viding tools for "imaginative prosecutions" and urging a broad reading of the term
"enterprise"); Newsweek, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col. 2 (Attorney General Civiletti
declared that the Justice Dep't would not "shy away from using [RICO] to pursue
corrupt enterprises which do not fit the laynan's view of organized crime."). Despite
these pronouncements, even ardent advocates of broad constructions recognize that
overly aggressive employment of RICO may "kill the goose that potentially can lay
for you a golden egg." Blakey, supra, at 34.
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ing variety of defendants, including members of the Hell's Angels
motorcycle club, 12 a factory worker at General Motors, 13 a large
Japanese corporation manufacturing electrical cable, 14 magistrates,
constables, and employees of the Allegheny 'County court system, 15
and union leaders accused of junketeering. 16 Most defendants
charged with violating RICO could not conceivably be included
within the traditional 17 or newly expanded definitions 18 of organized
crime.
The advantages of charging a RICO violation include (1) multiple
punishment of the same act when state offenses are the alleged rack-
eteering activities; 19 (2) elimination of the statute of limitations on
the racketeering activities; 2 0 (3) expanded doctrines governing admis-
sibility of evidence: 21 (4) availability of enhanced punishment and
novel sanctions; 2 2 (5) injunctions that bar a defendant from using
available assets to obtain legal representation or prepare a defense; 23
and (6) the prejudicial effect on judges and juries resulting from the
use of the pejorative term "racketeering" in RICO indictments. 2 4
12. United States v. Barger, No. CR-79-0226-SC (N.D. Cal., indictment filed
June 13, 1979) (indictment charging Hell's Angels with procurement and distribution
of drugs, intimidation, murder of witnesses, and bribery). Time, May 26, 1980, at 10,
Col. 1.
13. United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (employee col-
lected usurious debts from fellow workers on General Motors premises).
14. United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (defen-
dants alleged to have obtained confidential bidding information by bribing a public
utility).
15. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (bail bond agency
made systematic payments to magistrates and other employees of a count) court in
return for referrals).
16. United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). (union leaders
accused of conducting conventions as excuse for junketeering and of embezzling
union funds).
17. A member of organized crime has been defined as "a prominent figure in a
structured criminal syndicate composed of professional criminals who primarily rely
on unlawful activity as a way of life." Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133, 1135
(D. Conn. 1973).
18. The Organized Crime Control Commission of the California Department of
Justice has urged a broad definition incorporating: -1) Syndicated organized crime
and related illegal enterprises including white collar crime and narcotic trafficking
operations; 2) 'Prison gangs,' which is a misnomer since members are criminally ac-
tive both on the street and in penal institutions; 3) Outlaw motorcycle gangs; and 4)
Terrorist organizations." California Organized Crime Control Comm'n, First Report
11 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
19. See notes 544-57 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 493-95 infra and accompanying text.
21. See generally United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978); Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 4, at 347-48; Newsweek, Aug.
20, 1979, at 82, col 2.
22. See notes 42-54 infra and accompanying text; pt. VII infra.
23. See notes 755-86 infra and accompanying text.
24. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1361 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980);
Newsweek, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col. 2; cf. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp.
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It is questionable whether Congress intended to create such a po-
tent prosecutorial tool. The legislative history of Title LX manifests
only a concern with the infiltration of legitimate business by or-
ganized crime, not an intent to punish participation generally in crim-
inal activity. 25 However, the language of Title IX is sufficiently
vague 26 to support both broad and narrow interpretations.
The major obstacles to an informed understanding of the RICO of-
fense are the complex interrelationships among the various elements
of Title IX and the broader relationships between Title LX and other
statutory and constitutional provisions. This article will provide a
comprehensive discussion of RICO criminal actions and attempt to
clarify these relationships. The analysis is intended to expose the de-
fects in both unnecessarily broad statutory constructions and unduly
restrictive constitutional interpretations and reveal the areas in which
legislative reform is essential.
I. GENERAL SCOPE OF TITLE IX
A. Section 1962
Title IX incorporates a series of substantive criminal and civil stat-
utes as well as innovative remedies and procedures. Its central provi-
sion is 18 U.S.C. § 1962,27 which defines the RICO offense.28 Prior
106, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (deleting prejudicial surplusage from indictment alleging
grand jury investigation into "racketeering and criminal syndicates") retrd on other
grounds sub nora. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 40 2d Cir. 1960). In United
States v. Scotto, Nos. 1131-32 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1980), the defendant proposed an
instruction informing the jury that the word "racketeering" and the prejudicial conno-
tations thereof "should not be regarded as having anything to do with the guilt or
innocence of the defendants." N.Y.L.J., Criminal Trials: Courtroom Techniques in
Representing Clients Accused of White Collar & Racketeering Crimes 304 (19SO).
25. See notes 151-59 infra and accompanying text.
26. See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
28. Section 1962 provides: '(a) It shall be unlawful for an% person wlo has re-
ceived any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated
as a principal within the meaning of section 2. title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such in-
come, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, an
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which -affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer,
or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate famlily.
and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection
of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one per-
cent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not conler, either in law or
in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
1980] RICO
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to the decisions interpreting section 1962, the prevailing view among
commentators was that its subsections defined three distinct oflenses
corresponding with three methods by which organized crime infil-
trates legitimate businesses. 29  Under this view, section 1962(a) pro-
scribed the legal acquisition of a business with money derived from
racketeering or loansharking; section 1962(b) prohibited an illegal ac-
quisition of a business through racketeering 30 or loansharking, and
section 1962 (c) proscribed the operation of a business through rack-
eteering or loansharking. 3' Many decisions have rejected this initial
interpretation. In the structure as modified by these courts, section
1962(a) is still viewed as prohibiting the use ofl"dirty money" for the legal
acquisition or operation of a legitimate enterprise.3 2 The meaning of'
section (b), however, is unclear. Although the small number of cases
construing section 1962(b) have involved extortionate or fraudulent
acquisitions of legitimate businesses, 33 one court has also applied
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's af-
fairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
29. Comment, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)-
Application of RICO in the Third Circuit, 24 Vill. L Rev. 263, 265 n.16 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Third Circuit]; Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration
of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. Pa. L. Rev.
192, 193-94, 202 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime]; Note, Elliott v.
United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through
RICO, 65 Va. L. Rev. 109, 110-11, 117 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy Law];
Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 83 Yale L.J. 1491, 1492-93 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Investing Dirty Money].
30. Racketeering is established by proof of multiple violations of the federal and
state laws enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
31. See D. Cressey, Theft of the Nation 100 (1969).
32. See Comment, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An
Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal for Reform, 33 Vand. L.
Rev. 441, 447 (1980) [hereinafter cited as RICO Analysis]. See generally United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S, 925
(1975).
33. See United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 952 (1978); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Ricciardi, No. 707-73 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1976); United States v.
Quasarano, No. 79-88644 (E.D. Mich., indictment filed Nov. 15, 1979). The large
number of prosecutions under § 1962(c) and the comparatively few prosecutions
under § 1962(b) indicate the government's recognition that § 1962(b) requires a
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section 1962(b) to the acquisition of an interest in illegal organiza-
tions.3 4 Similarly, the majority of courts have held that section
1962(c) is not directed solely at the illegal operation of legitimate
businesses, but also at involvement in illegal activities having little or
no relationship to the traditional concepts of a business.35
B. Influence of Antitrust LUtLr
on Title IX
Title IX seems to have adapted principles of antitrust law to the
problem of organized crime.36 Although one court has emphasized
the similarity of the substantive provision, section 1962, to antitrust
principles, 37 the resemblance is more apparent in the area of rem-
edies. In section 1964, Title IX authorizes civil actions resembling
those traditionally used against antitrust violators against violators of
section 1962.38 A civil judgment under section 1964 can result in the
divestiture of the defendant's interest in the enterprise, the reorgani-
zation of the enterprise, and the award of treble damages to private
parties whose business or property has been harmed.3 9
The civil investigative demand established in section 1968 is
another procedure derived from antitrust law. 40 This demand, an
greater burden of proof than that necessitated under § 1962(c). See Third Circuit,
supra note 29, at 265 n.16 (comments from interview of member of U.S. Attorney's
office in Pennsylvania). Another theory for the disparity in the number of prosecu-
tions under these subsections is the government's belief that § 1962(b) applies only to
illegal conduct in the acquisition of legitimate enterprises. Se' United States v. For-
sythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa.), recd, 560 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 19770.
34. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351. 1358 (7th Cir. 1974). cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975).
35. See pt. III (A) infra.
36. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 136 (8th Cir. 1980). set United
States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720-21 (W.D. Pa.). re'd. 560 F.2d 1127 :3d
Cir. 1977); Organized Crime, supra note 29, at 192. An examination of earlier pro-
posed RICO statutes makes it apparent that antitrust law was a major influence on
the formulation of the RICO statute. Earlier versions were intended as amendments
to the Sherman Act rather than as independent criminal statutes. Antitrust Section of
the ABA, Report on S. 2048 and 2049 (Aug. 26, 1969). reprinted in Measures Relat-
ing to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 97.5, S. 976. S. 1623, S. 1624,
S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subconin. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 556, 557-58 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Measurcs Relating to Or-
ganized Crime]. The Antitrust Section of the ABA objected to the proposals as an
undesirable commingling of goals of criminal enforcement with goals of regulating
competition. Id.
37. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720-21 (\V.D. Pa. , rerd. 560
F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
38. Organized Crime, supra note 29, at 192.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). Another procedure borrowed from antitrust laws is
the expediting certificate authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1966 1976). The government
can obtain an expedited hearing in § 1964 civil suits when the Attorney General files
such a certificate. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964. 1966 (1976).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1976): Investing Dirty Money,. upra note 29. at 1492 n. 10.
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alternative to the grand jury subpoena, permits the Attorney
General to require any person or enterprise to produce any documen-
tary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation prior to the in-
stitution of criminal or civil proceedings. However, the demand may
not compel production of documents that would be unreasonable or
involve privileged material 41 if requested in a subpoena duces tecum
issued by a federal court.
C. Criminal Penalties
While the civil remedies of section 1964 have rarely been used,42
the government has frequently sought to invoke the harsh criminal
penalties imposed by section 1963. 43 These sanctions are imprison-
ment for up to 20 years, a fine of $25,000, or both, and forfeiture of'
any interest in the enterprise acquired in violation of section 1962. 4a
An indirect sanction resulting from a conviction is that the verdict
41. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 18. Atkinson comments that "[alithough the fruits
of an investigative demand would be about the same as those gained through normal
discovery, the [civil investigative] demand gives the Attorney General more au-
tonomy without court supervision." Id. Despite the similarities, the analogy to anti-
trust law has its limits. Generally, civil antitrust actions may be brought when crimi-
nal prosecution is not justified, even though the language of the statute on its face
provides no basis for such a distinction. Organized Crime, supra note 29, at 208.
RICO civil actions, however, involve conduct that is criminal by definition. Id. The
government may be precluded from filing a RICO criminal prosecution not because
of the absence of criminal behavior, but because of the difficulty of proof. Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). Only two published opinions involving government
civil actions have been found. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp.
295 (N.D. 111. 1976).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
44. Id. These penalties have been inaccurately characterized as "the harshest
penalty authorized by Title 18 of the United States Code, except for homicide of-
fenses." Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 4, at 349 (footnote omitted). For example,
in some instances assaults with intent to rob United States postal employees are
punishable by a mandatory prison term of 25 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1976). The
criminal penalties imposed under RICO, however, exceed those imposed for most of
the underlying substantive racketeering activities. See Atkinson, supra note 10, at 15.
Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 110-11, 117. The maximum penalty for two acts
of mail fraud is a $2,000 fine and ten years imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976),
without the additional possibility of forfeiture. In holding that concurrent sentences
are not required for a § 1962(c) conviction and for convictions on the underlying
offenses, one court has said that "the maximum penalties for RICO violations fare]
much less than those that might be obtained for the series of predicate crimes."
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
1345 (1980). The Rone court may have envisaged cases in which numerous predicate
crimes are involved. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976): United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976).
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may result in collateral estoppel against the criminal defendant in any
subsequent RICO civil action. 45
The severe criminal penalties may have been motivated by Con-
gressional concern about the spread of organized crime, 46 a concern
manifested by the statute's repeated use of the term "racketeer-
ing." 47  Nevertheless, a majority of courts have refused to limit
RICO's scope to defendants involved in organized crime. 48 Although
45. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). The applic ition of
collateral estoppel to RICO cases is questionable, however, because § 1964(c) specifi-
cally created a cause of action for private parties while § 1964(d) provides collateral
estoppel only for the government. Failure to include private parties ma' imply a
congressional intent to prevent offensive collateral estoppel by private plaintifls. But
see Wunsch, The Use of a Prior Criminal Judgment as Collateral Estoppel. in 2 Cor-
nell Institute on Organized Crime, Techniques in the Investigation and Prosecution
of Organized Crime 858, 888 (1980). A second indication that Congress did not in-
tend to permit offensive collateral estoppel may be its rejection of earlier bills that
specifically permitted collateral estoppel in all civil suits. See Sullivan, RICO Civil
Remedies and Public Corruption. in 1 Cornell Institute on Organized Crime,
Techniques in the Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime 272, 289 19S0).
46. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452. 84 Stat. 922
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).
47. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
48. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1979). rert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Rubin. 559 F.2d 975, 991 n1 15 (5th
Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded. 439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Campanl,de,
518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1050 (19 761. United States
v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (S.D.XW. Va. 1979); United States v. Chow'ante,
467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997,
1018 (D. Md. 1976). This reading is persuasively supported by Congress' rejection of
proposals to incorporate a definition of organized crime into Title IX. Set 116 Cong.
Rec. 35344 (1970). In addition, congressional opponents of RICO observed that -the
reach of this bill goes beyond organized crime activity." S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 215 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report] (indisidual view s of Sen.
Hart and Sen. Kennedy). Requiring proof of membership in organized crime wiould
also create impossible problems of proof and thus render § 1962 unenforceable. In
construing 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970), the court in United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d
879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971). observed that "ilt would
usually be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual or business was
associated with or controlled by a clandestine criminal organization. It might Aso be
difficult to prove that a particular offense was of the kind conmonlk engaged in b%
organized criminals [in the year the statute was enacted], and, in aun event. such a
restriction upon the statute's coverage would provide an eas\ avenue ror easion
through adoption of new forms and techniques of illicit trafticking." Id. at 885.
quoted in United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41. 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) con-
struing § 1962). Additionally, one commentator has asserted that a proscription on
membership in organized crime would violate equal protection because .an ollense
would be predicated on status. Atkinson, supra note 10. at 18. The impossibility of
precisely defining the term "organized crime" compounds the problem of prtol swe
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997. 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976). and the result-
ing problems of vagueness. See note 138 infra and accompan% ing text. The objections
to the use of the term "organized crime," however, are somewhat overstated. If it is
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their opinions acknowledge that Congress was concerned primarily
with organized crime when it adopted RICO,4 9 these courts have
found that all other indicia of legislative intent militate against the
restrictive construction. 50
The absence of an "organized crime" limitation, although justified
as a matter of statutory construction, undermines the rationale for the
severe RICO penalties. Such penalties could be justified by the seri-
ous threat to society posed by organized crime.5 1 The application of'
these sanctions to individuals engaged in small-scale criminal conduct,
however, punishes defendants who do not pose a similar threat and
raises the issue of cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. 52 Perhaps in response to fears that Title IX will be
employed indiscriminately, the Justice Department has repeatedly as-
impossible to define "organized crime," it is difficult to explain'the use of the lan-
guage "organized criminal activity" in 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1976), the section of the
Organized Crime Control Act dealing with depositions. This statute is limited to
cases in which the Attorney General certifies "that the legal proceeding is against a
person who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity." 18
U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1976). In the RICO context, this approach could have been
employed by requiring that the Attorney General certify that a case involves or-
ganized crime before filing a criminal or civil RICO action.
49. See cases cited note 48 supra. The title, Organized Crime Control Act, man-
ifests this concern. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
50. Senator McClellan, the primary congressional sponsor of RICO, has observed
that although Congress was concerned with organized crime, it chose to confront the
problem by punishing those offenses that are characteristic of organized crime.
McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 142-44 (1970); see United States v. Rubin, 559
F.2d 975, 991 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
51. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1498.
52. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 2, 16-17; cf. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (RICO may be overbroad if applied to individuals en-
gaged in small-scale criminal activity), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). But see
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting eighth amend-
ment argument because maximum sentence not mandatory), cert. deniec, 100 S. Ct.
1345 (1980). The problem is exacerbated by the inclusion of minor offenses as RICO
predicate crimes. For example, manufacturing or importing ten grams of marijuana,
taking property valued at less than $150 by threat, or playing poker in one's own
home are all chargeable under RICO. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 2. Although a
recent Supreme Court opinion has suggested in dicta that disproportionately long
prison terms may be constitutionally valid, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139
(1980) ("the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative"), the Court's refusal to decide the issue may permit lower courts to
strike a RICO penalty disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. See
Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1368-71 (5th Cir. 1980); Downey v. Perini,
518 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration of statu-
tory modification, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910) (referring to "precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportionated to offense").
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sured the public that RICO will be applied cautiously. s Despite the
assurances, the actions of the Justice Department indicate that it will
use the statute aggressively against those who are "in no way con-
nected with organized crime or engaged in what is ordinarily thought
of as racketeering." 5 4  The eighth amendment problem cannot be
dismissed by vague public statements of the Justice Department.
When considering the proper scope of RICO, Congress and the
judiciary should not rely naively on prosecutorial discretion as a
safeguard against excessively broad applications of the statute.
D. Liberal Construction Clause
Congress seems to have invited broad judicial interpretations by
stating that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its reme-
dial purposes." 55 The liberal construction clause has frequently been
53. See Atkinson, supra note 10, at 16: Newsweek. Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col. 2.
Atkinson quotes the chief of the Justice Department task force in charge of RICO
cases as saying: We're not going to power rape nickel and dime cases. It's just
common sense . . .and good judgment .... We will only hit substantial conduct.'"
The task force chief described a process by which proposed RICO prosecutions are
reviewed by the Justice Department before an indictment is sought. This safeguard is
of questionable significance as this review is not governed by any precise guidelines
determining when a RICO prosecution should be initiated. Atkinson, Tupra note 10,
at 16 (footnote omitted). The factors considered in the infornal review process in-
clude legitimate advantages, such as the remedy of forfeiture, gained by alleging a
RICO offense, the seriousness of the predicate offenses, and the "longevity of the
impact on the community." ABA Section of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution and
Defense of RICO & Maii Fraud Cases 4, 27-28 (1980).
54. Miller & Waxman, A Blunt Instrument: Mob Not Only Victim of RICO.
Legal Times of Wash., Nov. 20, 1978, at 14, col. 1. An example of this type of
prosecution occurred in United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 tE.D. Mo. 1978).
In Dennis, the government filed a RICO action against a single defendant who col-
lected usurious debts from fellow employees at a General Motors plant. The court
dismissed the indictment that alleged the defendant operated General Motors* alIfairs
through collection of an unlawvful debt. Id. at 198. The Justice Department's actions
have led some courts to caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking
RICO. In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980), the court warned that "'the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a
danger of abuse where a prosecutor attempts to apply the statute to situations for
which it was not primarily intended." Id. at 395-96. The court cautioned "against
undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO [and) emphasizeld] to the district judges
when RICO is invoked each set of facts must be evaluated independently." Id. at
396. The court in United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980), however, rejected a claim of abuse of prosecutorial
discretion in a RICO case that involved three residential burglaries. The court antici-
pated that "government prosecutorial policy will reserve use of this statute for rack-
eteers, leaving local crimes to local authorities." Id. at 306.
55. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, § 904 (ta, 84 Stat.
947. "The provisions of this title [enacting this chapter and amending sections 1505,
2516 and 2517 of this title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Id.
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cited in support of holdings that expand RICO criminal liability."'
Yet, this use of the clause is questionable on both statutory and con-
stitutional grounds. Significantly, the language of this clause permits
liberal construction only to effectuate "remedial purposes"; it does not
mandate that RICO be liberally construed to determine what conduct
constitutes a violation of Title IX. 57  If the liberal construction clause
is considered applicable to determine the scope of criminal liability
under Title IX, the provision should be declared unconstitutional. 58
In United States v. Anderson, 59 the Eighth Circuit indicated that
this interpretation violates due process. The court noted that the ex-
tent of judicial deference to be accorded the clause was unclear in
view of the traditional rule of statutory construction requiring that
criminal statutes be construed in favor of lenity 60 and that they pro-
56. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246,
1248 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Forsythe, 560
F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v, Parness, 503 F.2d
430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp.
788, 800-801 (M.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 802
(E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978). But see United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976).
57. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976); see United
States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980). It seems likely that Congress intended the liberal
construction clause to apply only to the remedies, considered to be the major innova-
tion of Title IX at the time of its passage. See id. at 691. The introduction of antitrust
civil remedies into this area of law was considered an essential feature of Title IX.
See pt. I(B) supra. The liberal construction clause must be read in light of the legisla-
tive history as well as of the language of the statute. United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d
1065, 1071 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
58. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d
1065, 1069-71 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976); Atkinson, supra note 10, at 14;
Third Circuit, supra note 29, at 276.
59. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
60. Bifulco v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 2247, 2255 (1980); United States v. En-
mons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
Professor Blakey, an outspoken advocate of a broad interpretation of Title IX, has
asserted that the constitutional rule of strict construction is inapplicable to RICO.
Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 4, at 349-50. He contends that RICO's purpose is
merely "to build another remedy upon other criminal offenses," and, for a reason
unexplained by the author, that this purpose removes RICO from constitutional rules
applicable to criminal statutes. Id.; see Magarity, RICO Investigations: A Case Study,
17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 367, 367 & n.6 (1980). Blakey's view is flawed in two respects.
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vide a fair warning of the prohibited activities. 6 ' Recently, in Dunn
v. United States, 62 the Supreme Court observed that the traditional
rule was "rooted in fundamental principles of due process, which
mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indict-
ment, whether his conduct is prohibited." a6 3 Dunn cautioned against
First, the rule against broad construction has been applied to criminal remedy stat-
utes as well as to substantive statutes. See note 711 infra. Second. § 1962 is not
labeled a remedial statute and certainly appears to be a substantive criminal statute.
If § 1962 were merely a remedial statute increasing punishment of the underlying
racketeering acts, there would be no reason for the sentence enhancement provisions
in Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
Under Blakey's view, Congress presumably intended to create two separate sentence
enhancement provisions in two titles of the Act. A more reasonable interpretation is
that § 3575 is the sole remedial provision increasing punishment for multiple crimes,
while Title IX is a substantive criminal offense. One case, United States v. Thevis,
474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), has suggested that the strict construction doctrine
does not apply to § 1961, a statutory provision merely defining terms used in Title
IX. Id. at 139. This distinction is without substance. The policies underlying strict
construction fully apply to a definitional statute because any construction of the stat-
ute will determine the scope of liability under the criminal provisions. If the gov-
ernment adopted Blakey's assertion that RICO is a remedial statute for purposes of
strict construction, it would be manipulating the criminal-remedial distinction. The
government should not be permitted to claim that RICO is a remedial statute that
merely enhances sentences for habitual offenders, if, in other contexts, it claims that
Title IX is a criminal offense distinct from the predicate offenses. An example of the
latter claim has occurred in response to defendants' contentions that a RICO charge
may not include predicate offenses committed beyond the statute of limitations
periods. The government has successfully rebutted these contentions by asserting
that the predicate offenses are not the subject of the prosecution, but are merely part
of a continuing RICO offense that extends into the limitations period. See notes
494-95 supra and accompanying text.
61. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1980). A statute
is void for vagueness if it " 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.' " Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)); accord, United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374 (1978); Bouie v. Co-
lumbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
62. 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
63. Id. at 112. Dunn may be of particular significance in the RICO context be-
cause the Court was construing 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976), another section of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.), of which RICO is a part. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1976). The rule of strict construction is grounded in a second policy
requiring that criminal activity be defined by legislatures rather than courts. In
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), the Court observed that "'becrause of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents
the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity. This policy embodies "the instinctive distaste against men languish-
ing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should."' Id. at 348 (quoting
Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and thc Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196,
209 (1967)).
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statutory constructions that impose punishment for actions that are
not "plainly and unmistakably" prohibited. 64
II. SECTIONS 1962(a) AND 1962(b)
A. Elements of a Section 1962(a) Offense
The first sentence of section 1962(a) sets forth the three elements of
the crime. It must be shown that the defendant engaged in a pattern
of racketeering activity, 65 derived money from that racketeering activ-
ity, and used this money to operate, maintain, or acquire an interest
in a legitimate business. 66 The prohibition on maintaining an in-
terest with racketeering funds significantly broadens the scope of sec-
tion 1962(a). For example, a violation could arise from the use of
racketeering funds to make insignificant purchases for the enterprise,
such as purchases of janitorial supplies. 67 An exception to this of-
fense is the purchase of securities on the open market amounting to
less than one percent of the securities of a class of stock.68
1. Mens Rea Requirement
a. Existence of a Mens Rea Element
A mens rea requirement is conspicuously absent from the listed
elements of section 1962(a). The most serious consequence of this
omission is that a defendant may be convicted for investing tainted
money without knowing that it is derived from racketeering ac-
tivities. 69 Despite intimations that the Constitution may require a
mental element, 70 this problem has been analyzed as presenting a
question of legislative intent. 71 The prevailing approach to constru-
ing statutes without mens rea components focuses on whether the
64. 442 U.S. at 112.
65. The meaning of the term "pattern of racketeering activity" is discussed in pt.
III(C) infra.
66. The text of § 1962 is set out in full at note 28 supra.
67. Punishment for this type of violation could pose eighth amendment problems.
See note 716 infra.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
69. See notes 92-97 infra and accompanying text.
70. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). In Morissette, the Court
said that the effect of eliminating mens rea is "to strip the defendant of such benefit
as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe
the freedom heretofore allowed juries." Id. at 263. This impact was described as a
"manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual." Id.
71. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922). Generally, strict liability
constructions are disfavored. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 437-38 (1978).
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crime involves conduct that is wrong on principle or is wrong for
social policy reasons. 72 Laws dealing with the first type of crime
punish behavior not only because its recurrence must be prevented,
but because the behavior is considered inherently wrong. 73 These
laws are based on the principle of wrongful intent; 74 accordingly,
courts will read mental elements into them. 75 Common law crimes,
such as homicide and theft, fall within this category. 76 The second
class of statutes punishes conduct for policy reasons even if that con-
duct is not blameworthy. 77 When confronted with social policy
crimes, the courts have refused to impose a mens rea requirement
because these laws punish harmful effect, rather than wrongful in-
tent. 7
8
One commentator on section 1962(a) found that the legislative rec-
ord was inconclusive as to whether it is a social policy crime.7 9 In
view of the supposed ambiguity, the author concluded that two prin-
ciples of statutory construction should control. First, he noted that
social policy crimes are an exception to the common law rule requir-
ing proof of mens rea. Because statutes are not to be construed in
derogation of common law in the absence of contrary legislative in-
tent,8 0 the commentator urged that section 1962(a) be presumed to
follow the common law rule requiring intent. 8 ' In addition, he dis-
tinguished section 1962(a), which carries harsh sanctions,8 2 from social
policy crimes, which traditionally impose milder penalties.8 3
This view fails to recognize that Congress would not have created
the one percent stock exception8 4 had it regarded investment of
72. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-61 (1952); United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
73. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1502.
74. Id. at 1503-04.
75. Id. at 1505-06.
76. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246. 251-52 (1952).
77. Id. at 252-53.
78. Cf. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29. at 1505-06 (mental intent attrib-
uted to statutes aimed at benefiting society).
79. Id. at 1507.
80. Id.; see Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
81. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1507-08.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). A second commentator has agreed that § 1962(a)
does not proscribe inherently blameworthy behavior. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO. 65 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 884 (1980). He states
that "[t]o whatever degree society may have been disadvantaged by the original rack-
eteering activity, it is not harmed further by investment of the proceeds .... [The
potential for misuse depends not on whether the funds invested were derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity, but on whether the individual involved is a rack-
eteer ... Thus, subsection 1962(a) [forbids] merely conduct that Congress feared
might later lead to harm." Id. (footnote omitted).
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money derived from racketeering activity as blameworthy conduct.
The exception can be justified only by a social policy of preventing
control of legitimate business by organized crime. 85 This policy is
evident from the last clause of the exception, which proscribes even
those stock purchases of less than one percent if the investor has the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuing corporation.8 0
Although the harsh penalties imposed by Title IX are uncommon in
social policy crimes, the one percent stock exception seems to pre-
clude any contention that section 1962(a) is intended to punish
blameworthy conduct. Nevertheless, rather than characterize section
1962(a) as a social policy crime, the social policy-blameworthiness
analysis should be inappropriate when a crime, regardless of its na-
ture, involves "any major sanction." 87 Eighth amendment considera-
tions alone should mandate a mens rea requirement when severe
penalties are imposed. 8
b. The Appropriate Level of Intent
If an intent element is to be read into section 1962(a), the courts
must determine the standard to be applied. They could require either
the actual knowledge that the invested money is derived from rack-
eteering or the conscious desire to invest this money. The latter stan-
dard is termed specific intent while the forner corresponds with the
concept of general intent.8 9 Generally, the distinction between act-
ing with guilty knowledge and acting with conscious desire is not im-
portant since "'there is good reason for imposing liability whether the
defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the
results."' 90 This observation applies to the section 1962(a) situation.
In theory, there would be a distinction between the two mental states
when an individual derives an equal amount of income from two
sources, one legitimate and the other illegal. That person may know-
ingly use the illegal source to invest but not care which source he
uses because either source is sufficient for the investment purpose.
Although he knowingly uses the dirty money, he does not intend to
violate section 1962(a) by using that money.
85. This policy does not apply to all the subsections of § 1962. If § 1962(c) pro-
scribes involvement in illegal operations, it cannot be based on a policy of protecting
legitimate business from infiltration by organized crime. See notes 70-73 supra and
accompanying text.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
87. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097,
1109 (1952); see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.1 8
(1978).
88. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the relationship between mens rea and the eighth amendment).
89. See Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comment, at 125. (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
90. United States v United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quot-
ing W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 28, at 197 (1972)).
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A specific intent standard, however, is inappropriate because a de-
fendant would have no reason to prefer one source of money over the
other. Investing dirty money in the enterprise does not conceal that
money or transform it into ostensibly legitimate money. The excess of
income earned over legitimate income remains as evidence of illegally
earned income. 9 ' Because a defendant would have no reason to in-
tend to use dirty money to invest in violation of section 1962(a), the
knowledge standard must be the appropriate intent requirement. 92
This standard adequately protects defendants whose funds are so
commingled that he cannot distinguish illegal money sources from
clean money. Although this result means that a defendant with com-
mingled funds may escape prosecution, at least one commentator has
implied that the thrust of the statute is not undermined. 93 He
reasons that section 1962(a) was intended only to aid in situations in
which illegal money actually can be traced. 4
2. Application of Section 1962(a) to Reinvested Money
The intent issue is related to a second problem of statutory con-
struction, the application of section 1962(a) to money derived from
racketeering that is invested within the section 1962(a) exception for
stocks and then reinvested outside the exception after the sale of the
stock. 95 A commentator has urged that RICO should be construed to
prohibit this laundering tactic. 96 This view, however, postulates a
simple situation in which the defendant intends to manipulate section
1962(a). A more common and ambiguous situation would involve a
person who has invested dirty money in a series of legitimate invest-
ments. In this fact pattern, the dirty money is so commingled with
91. The "laundering" of money occurs when the excess of income representing
illegal income ostensibly disappears. For example, defendant S. o. ner of a legitimate
vending machine business, would "launder" profits from illegal gambling by commin-
gling those profits with the income from the vending machine business and claimng
that both legal and dirty money was earned by that business.
92. The knowledge standard is applied in criminal antitrust actions. Sec United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 1978). If the substantive
provisions of Title IX are modeled on antitrust provisions,s we pt ltB) vipra, the
antitrust intent standard would be applicable by analdg.
93. Blake),, Materials on RICO: Criminal Ocertici. in 1 Cornell Institute on
Organized Crime, Techniques in the Investigation and Prosecution of Organized
Crime 1, 17 (1980).
94. Id.
95. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1501-02. The issue ma% be broader
than the 1% exception method of reinvesting. The commentator cited above implies
that § 1962(a) does not extend to expenditures of dirt' mnone% for consumer goods.
Id. at 1501-02 n.45. It would seem that dirty mone% could be reinsested by purchas-
ing jewelry, antiques, or consumer goods, selling them, and then investing the pro-
ceeds in enterprises.
96. Id. at 1502.
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clean money that the accused does not know whether his investment
has been made with dirty or clean money. The prohibition on rein-
vested money does not impose significant hardship on a defendant if
an intent requirement relates to the source of the money. If there is
no mens rea element, however, the prohibition is unfair. The term
"proceeds" 97 then includes money so thoroughly commingled by
means of repeated investments that one cannot recognize it as money
derived from racketeering. While it may be unnecessary both to re-
quire proof of intent and to permit reinvestment, it is essential that at
least one of these positions be adopted.
3. Liability of Recipients of Racketeering
Income
Section 1962(a) arguably extends beyond the investor who partici-
pates in the racketeering activity to an individual who is not involved
in the racketeering but who receives the invested money knowing it
is from an illegal source. 98 This interpretation is based on the phrase
"'any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt," in section 1962(a). 99 This language is followed
immediately by the clause, "in which such person has participated as
a principal," '00 which should limit section 1962(a) to principals in the
commission of the racketeering acts and exclude these recipients,
who would be accessories after the fact. 101 The government, how-
ever, has apparently not applied this interpretation in its prosecution
of RICO violations. 10 2  Possibly based on a theory that the clause
modifies only "the collection of an unlawful debt," and not "a pattern
of racketeering activity," the government's view would extend liability
to the recipient of money who is not involved in the racketeering
activity. 103
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
98. See Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1496.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1976) provides: "Whoever, knowing that an offense against the
United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender
in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory
after the fact. Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an
accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum
term of imprisonment or fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed
for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the principal is punishable by
death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more than ten years.
102. See United States v. Rittenberg, No. 80-0256-S (S.D. Cal., indictment filed
April 21, 1980) (one defendant charged with RICO violations based on investment of
funds from racketeering activity in which he did not participate as a principal).
103. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1496. The commentator offers no
policy justification for limiting the modifying clause to "collection of an unlawful
debt."
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The legislative history indicates that the modifying phrase was in-
serted for the purpose of requiring participation as a principal in a
pattern of racketeering activity.' 0 4  In addition, no policy justification
exists for limiting the application of the "participated as a principal "
clause to the "collection" offense. The absence of this clause in both
sections 1962(b) and (c) indicates that the language was intended to
resolve a problem unique to section 1962(a), rather than any problem
with the "collection" offense. It was unnecessarv' to insert this clause
into (b) and (c) because it is apparent from the face of those subsec-
tions that they are inapplicable to accessories after the fact. These
subsections require that a person acquire or operate an enterprise
"through" a pattern of the predicate offenses. 10 5  Because an acces-
sory after the fact acts only after the substantive crime is completed,
he is not regarded as having committed the crime 1O6 and cannot be
regarded as acting "through" an offense incorporated within RICO. 10 7
B. Proof of a Section 1962(a) Violation
The most significant criticism of section 1962(a) is that a violation is
difficult to prove. The Justice Department has conceded that this is
the most difficult violation to establish because it is necessary to trace
104. The clause was inserted at the suggestion of the Justice Department because
it believed that § 1962(a) was directed at a person who was an active participant in
the illegal activities. See Letter from Deputy Att'v Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to
Sen. John L. McClellan (Aug. 11, 1969), reprinited in Measures Relating to Or-
ganized Crime, supra note 36, at 406.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(c) (1976).
106. United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Virgin
Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 552-54 (3d Cir. 1967.
107. Another indication that the "'accessory after the fact" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3
(1976), is inapplicable to Title LX is that the RICO punishment cannot be computed
for such accessories. Under § 3, an accessory after the fact is only subject to half the
maximum punishment imposed for punishment of the principal. The following
hypothetical illustrates the problem of adapting § 3 to RICO. A defendant is prose-
cuted under § 1962(c) with a pattern of racketeering activity because he is an acces-
sory to a murder and a principal in an arson. No rational method exists by which the
§ 3 half-punishment rule could be applied to RICO. Would the RICO punishment be
halved even though he was an accessory after the fact to only one of the predicate
offenses? Would the RICO punishment be reduced by a quarter under the rationale
that each predicate offense is half of the RICO punishment and that § 3 reduces one
of those offenses by one half? A more difficult issue involves the recipient's liability
under the conspiracy provision, § 1962(d). The recipient might contend that if he
cannot be convicted of a substantive offense, he cannot conspire to commit that of-
fense. See United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 414
U.S. 839 (1973). Many cases, however, have held that an individual in this position
can be guilty of conspiracy. See United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884, 894 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir. 1966). cert dt'ni'd, 3S5
U.S. 1002 (1967.
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the racketeering funds into the enterprise.' 03 When the defendant
has commingled illegitimate money with substantial amounts of
legitimate income, the illegitimate source of the invested money can-
not readily be traced by direct evidence. 1'0 This problem is com-
pounded when a substantial length of time has elapsed between the
racketeering activities and the investment, and when the money has
changed hands frequently."10 The government can avoid these prob-
lems only by relying on inferences."' Yet, unless the defendant
maintains separate accounts, no logical inferences can determine the
source of money for an investment when the defendant receives sub-
stantial amounts of income from both illegal and legitimate sources.
These difficulties are highlighted by a comparison with an analo-
gous problem in community property law. [n community property
cases, a party often attempts to show that a particular piece of prop-
erty was acquired with separate funds, rather than with community
earnings. 1 12 The "family expense" method for tracing the property to
separate funds, when the funds are commingled with community
earnings, determines the amount of community property available at
the time the property at issue was purchased. 1 3  This method is
based on the presumption that family living expenses are paid from
108. Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, An Explanation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute 4 (4th ed. 1978). Professor Blakey, tile
chief counsel to the U.S. Senate subcommittee that drafted Title IX, concedes that §
1962(a) is ineffective because of the difficulty in uncovering evidence of how much
illegitimate income the defendant has gained. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 4, at
357. He asserts that criminal syndicates do not keep records demonstrating that their
income is legitimate. Id Surprisingly, however, some criminals keep precise records
of their illegitimate income and expenses. See, e.g., United States v. Quick, 128
F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1942) (still operator kept books of disbursements made in
connection with operation of still).
109. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1510-11. But see United States v.
McNarv, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980) (in absence of specific tracing, sufficient
nexus existed between illicit money and acquisition; requiring direct use of illicit
income would render statute ineffective in commingling situations).
110. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1511 n.97. Similarly, intent cannot
generally be established directly. Proof that a defendant knew the invested money
was dirty would probably be directly available only through the defendant's own
statements, through wiretaps, or through the testimony of informers, Id.
111. Id. at 1511-12. An inference is permissible only if it is more likely than not
that the inferred fact flows from the proven facts or is obvious from common experi-
ence. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
112. See See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966) (en
bane); Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 264 P.2d 626 (1953), over-
ruled on other grounds in See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d at 785-86, 415 P.2d at 781, 51 Cal.
Rptr. at 893.
113. E.g., Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 126, 264 P.2d 626,
632-33 (1953), overruled on other grounds in See v. See, 64 Cal.2d 778, 785-86, 415
P.2d 776, 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (1966) (en bane).
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community funds. 114 If community earnings are exhausted by family
living expenses before the purchase, the property is deemed to have
been acquired with separate funds. 115 This technique could be
employed in section 1962(a) prosecutions if the government could
eliminate legal income by offsetting it with family living expenses.
There is no justification, however, for assuming that family living ex-
penses are more likely to be paid from legitimate income rather than
from racketeering income. 116 Moreover, when a defendant has made
a series of investments, only some of vhich are within the section
1962(a) exception, the government cannot offset the legal income %ith
the lawful investments because there is no justification for assuming
that the lawful investments are made from the legal source.
Under the "direct tracing" method, another means of identify-
ing separate property, a party can establish that there was sufficient
separate property income to purchase a particular asset and that the
intent was to use the separate income to purchase the asset. 11 7 Ap-
plying this approach to section 1962(a), the government could trace
racketeering income to an interest in an ent.?rprise if it could show
sufficient racketeering income to cover the purchase and an intent to
use that income. Unfortunately, the "direct tracing" method would
require proof that the defendant consciously desired to use racketeer-
ing income. Direct tracing assumes that the investing party can in-
tend to use a particular source and that the existence of this intent
raises the probability that this source wsas used. Although a party. in-
vesting separate income may have a reason to prefer the use of that
source because of his greater interest in it, specific intent is meaning-
less in a section 1962(a) context because a person would generlly
have no reason to prefer using racketeering income rather than
legitimate income."18  This distinction between community property
law and section 1962(a) undermines a fundamental assumption of di-
rect tracing.
When substantial amounts of both clean and dirty' money have
been commingled, section 1962(a) should be enforceable only' if the
114. Id. at 126, 264 P.2d at 632.
115. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 783, 415 P.2d 776, 780. 51 Cal. Rptr. 88s, 892
(1966)(en bane).
116. The merits of the family expense presumption are debatable in a community
property dispute as well. Nevertheless, it may be rational to assume that a person
will pay community living expenses from community funds rather than deplete his or
her own separate property. Thomasset v. Thomasset. 122 Cal. App. 2d 116. 126. 264
P.2d 626, 632 (1953), overruled on other grounds in See v. See, 64 Cal.2d 778,
785-86, 415 P.2d 776, 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888. 893 (1966) (en bane). In a § 1962al
case, however, no relationship exists similar to that between family living expenses
and community income; an individual has an equal interest in both legitimate and
illegitimate sources of income and is not motivated to use one source rather than
another.
117. See In re Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 1975) (en
banc); Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307 t1962).
118. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
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community property tracing methods can be used.119 These
methods, however, incorporate presumptions and requirements that
render them useless in determining the source of an investment in a
RICO enterprise. Consequently, section 1962(a) may be ineffective in
a commingling situation.
Despite these theoretical difficulties, the government successfully
traced income from an illegitimate source to an enterprise in United
States v. McNary. 120 In McNary, the government alleged that the
defendant, a town mayor, received payments from building develop-
ers in return for ensuring passage of favorable zoning ordinances. The
defendant first deposited the proceeds, more than $65,000, in an ac-
count belonging to his business, B & M. He subsequently transferred
over $103,000 from that account to the enterprise, Ports of Call.
Even though the illegal money in the B & M account was commin-
gled with legitimate income, the court held that this indirect invest-
ment was a violation of section 1962(a) because the racketeering pro-
ceeds enabled the mayor to invest the larger amount in Ports of Call,
and the clean money in the account was not sufficient to permit the
defendant to invest without the illegal funds. 12 1 Nevertheless, the
case does not resolve the far more complex problem that occurs, for
example, when $20,000 of dirty money is deposited in an account
with $150,000 in clean money, $25,000 is withdrawn, and then
$40,000 is invested in a legitimate business.
119. In a situation involving commingled money, principles that could be
employed to compute the amount of dirty money possessed by the defendant are of
limited utility. A widely employed concept, for example, is the "net worth" method
developed in c,'iminal tax prosecutions. Under this method, the government attempts
to establish the total net value of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning and at the
end of a given year. The taxpayer's nondeductable personal expenditures are added
to the increase in net value. If this figure is substantially greater than the taxable
income reported by the taxpayer, the excess may be considered unreported taxable
income. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) (approving this rule al-
though urging caution in its application). In a § 1962(a) situation, this approach might
enable the government to establish the amount of legitimate and racketeering income
by computing the increase in the net worth of the defendant's assets, and then add-
ing the defendant's personal expenditures to it. The excess of this sum over the
amount of income from legitimate sources and illegal sources not covered by RICO
would equal the amount of racketeering income. The "net worth" method, however,
can yield a figure representing only the amount of racketeering income. It cannot
reveal whether that income was used to purchase a particular interest in an enter-
prise. But see United States v. McPartland, No. 76-52 (D. Or., indictment filed Mar.
24, 1976) ("net worth" method used to trace finds derived from narcotics sales into a
restaurant business). In McPartland, the defendant's legitimate net worth was com-
puted and found to be significantly lower than the amount of money invested in the
business. The government claimed, therefore, that this finding established the prob-
ability that funds invested in the restaurant were derived from racketeering.
120. 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 628-29.
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C. Proposed Amendments of Section 1962(a)
Congress has considered a number of proposals for the creation of a
single code incorporating federal criminal provisions. The most recent
proposals are S. 1722,122 the Senate version, and H.R. 6915,'2 the
House version. Both versions include subchapters 124 corresponding
to Title IX in which section 1962(a) is transformed into a separate
section 125 incorporating a significant change from the present lan-
guage of section 1962(a). Unlike section 1962(a), neither of the pro-
posed statutes includes a clause limiting liability to accomplices or
principals in the racketeering activity. This change may expand crim-
inal liability to the recipient of racketeering income who is not in-
volved in the underlying racketeering activity. The major difference
between the two versions is the treatment of the mens rea issue.
Section 2702 of the House version requires that the defendant "know-
ingly" commit the offense,126 while section 1803 of the Senate version
is silent on this point.127
D. Section 1962(b)
Like section 1962(a), subsection (b) focuses on the acquisition of an
enterprise. 128  Section 1962(b) differs, however, in that the acquisi-
tion must be accomplished directly through racketeering activity such
as bribery, extortion, or a scheme to defraud, rather than by income
derived from that activity.' 29  Although tracing the acquired interest
to the racketeering activit, is not alwavs simple, it is considerably
easier than proving a connection between the acquired interest and
income under section 1962(a). 130
122. S. 172-2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (available from the Government Printing
Office).
123. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (available from the Government Print-
ing Office).
124. S. 1722 incorporates these provisions in chapter 18, subchapter A, §§ 1801-
07, while H.R. 6915 incorporates them in chapter 27. subchapter I, §§ 2701-07.
125. Section 1803(a) of the Senate bill is entitled "Washing Racketeering Proceeds"
and provides that "[a] Person is guilty of an offense if, by using or investing proceeds
from a pattern of racketeering activity, he acquires or maintains an interest in, or
establishes or conducts, an enterprise." S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1803ta)
(1979). Section 2702(a) of the House version is entitkd "Lundering racketeering
proceeds" and states that "'[w]hoever knowingly uses or invests proceeds from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity and thereby conducts. aquires or maintains an interest
in, or establishes, an enterprise commits a class C felony." H.R. 6915. 96th Cong..
2nd Sess. § 2702(a) (1980).
126. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2702(a) 1980).
127. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1803(a) (1979).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
129. Id. One commentator has said that § 1962(b) refers to cases of "illegal 'take-
overs "' through criminal activit\. RICO Analysi.s. supra note 32, at 447.
130. See pt. 1I(B) supra.
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The situation covered by section 1962(b) is illustrated by the facts
in United States v. Quasarano. 131 Raffaele Quasarano, a.k.a. "Jimmy
Q.," and Peter Vitale allegedly gained control of a Wisconsin corpora-
tion manufacturing mozzarella cheese sold throughout the country.
Through a straw man, the defendants obtained fifty percent of the
common stock of the company by deterring the collection of debts
owed to the former controlling shareholders and by threatening
shareholders with violence. 132
Sections 1962(a) and (b) violations are rarely charged and have not
been analyzed by the courts. 133 Prosecutors have preferred to charge
section 1962(c), as it has been construed to require proof only of
racketeering activity, rather than of both the racketeering activity and
the subsequent acquisition of an interest thereby. 134 This trend may
have been altered, however, by restrictions on the scope of forfeiture
in section 1962(c) cases; the government may choose to allege section
1962(a) violations to forfeit income from racketeering.13 5
III. SECTION 1962(c)
Section 1962(c), 136 the central provision of Title IX, provides that
131. United States v. Quasarano, No. 79-80644 (E.D. Mich., indictment filed Nov.
15, 1979).
132. Id. The defendants' ability to carry out these threats was apparent to the
victims from reports that Quasarano and Vitale had disposed of ten bodies of murder
victims in a large shredder, compactor, and incinerator on their premises, Central
Sanitation Services. Affidavits filed by F.B.I. agents in support of a warrant to search
those premises described those activities as including the disposal of the body of
James Hoffa. S. Brill, The Teamsters 56 (1978). For several years thereafter, Vitale
and Quasarano collected large sums of money for cheese brokerage services that the
government alleged were never performed. See Det. News, Nov. 16, 1979, § B., at
1, col. 3; Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1979, at 27, col. 2.
133. The few cases involving § 1962(a) charges include United States v. McNary,
620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ostrer, 481 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); United States v. McPartland, No. 76-52 (D. Or., indictment filed Mar. 24,
1976); United States v. Alvarado, No. 76-318 (S.D. Cal., indictment filed April 1,
1976). In Alvarado, the defendant, a trustee of the San Diego County Construction
Laborer's Pension Fund, was indicted under § 1962(a). The pattern of racketeering
involved embezzlement from the pension fund whereby the defendants allegedly
voted themselves "deferred compensation" to which they were not entitled, and
charged the fund for fraudulent "expense" advances. The government claimed that
the defendant invested these funds in his company and then arranged for the pay-
ment of large fees by the pension fund to that company for the administration of the
trust fund. Section 1962(b) cases include United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976): United States v. Ricciardi, No. 707-73 (D.N.J., Aug. 10,
1976); United States v. Quasarano, No. 79-80644 (E.D. Mich., indictment filed Nov.
15, 1979).
134. See pt. III(A) infra.
135. See notes 696-705 infra and accompanying text.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
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[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 37
Its broad and ambiguous language has so obscured its meaning, how-
ever, that even the essential thrust of the statute cannot easily be
discerned. 138
A. Limitation to Infiltration of Legitimate
Business
The government has frequently alleged violations of section 1962(c)
based solely on illegal activities unrelated to the acquisition or opera-
tion of legitimate businesses.139 Defendants have argued that RICO
was intended to prohibit only the infiltration and operation of legiti-
137. Id.
138. The "less than pellucid" language of Title IX has precipitated frequent con-
tentions that various portions of Title IX are unconstitutionally vague. See United
States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 298, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980). United States
v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980);
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 441
U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423
U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-
58 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 139-40 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd inen., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. disiisw d. 439 U.S. 801
(1978); United States v. Stofskv, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United
States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-16 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismnissed.
556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882. 8S3-84 tE.D.
Wis. 1974); notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text. Though unsuccessful, some of
these objections have had the salutary effect of requiring the courts to clarify the
broad language of Title IX. See, e.g.. United States v. Thevis. 474 F. Supp. 134,
139-41 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (excluding forfeiture of profits from § 1963 in response to
vagueness challenge); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 83-84 (E.D. Wis.
1974) (adopting "common scheme" construction of "pattern" in response to vagueness
objection to § 1962).
139. See United States v. Sutton, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir.
Dec. 3, 1980) (en banc); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1980) (No. 80-78); United
States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman,
609 F.2d 298, 304-06 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S Ct. 1345 (1980); United
States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345
(1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1978), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379, cert. denied. 444 U.S. 846
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mate enterprises through patterns of racketeering activity 140 and that
section 1962(c) criminal liability should not be imposed on those in-
volved in an enterprise composed of individuals connected solely by
their commission of a series of criminal offenses. The majority of
courts have rejected this argument and agreed with the govern-
ment. 14 ' Judicial support for the more restrictive view has included
recent First and Eighth Circuit opinions,' 4 2 a Sixth Circuit panel
opinion reversed en banc,' 43 a Second Circuit district court opinion
and dicta in a Fourth Circuit opinion, both of which were sub-
sequently overruled sub silentio,' 4 and dicta in a Supreme Court
opinion. 145  However, the restrictive position is the more soundly
reasoned view, based on congressional intent and rules of statutory
construction.
1. Congressional Intent
As with all questions of statutory construction, debate concerning
the applicability of section 1962(c) to illegal operations must focus on
legislative intent. 146 The language of a statute is the starting point
(1979); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (E.D. Pa.
1977). Commentators have unanimously criticized the illegal enterprise theory. E.g.,
Bradley, supra note 84, at 892-93; Comment, United States v. Sutton and the Scope
of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970" The Sixth Circuit's Narrow
Interpretation of the Meaning of "enterprise," 68 Ky. L J. 468, 485-87 (1980); RICO
Analysis, supra note 32, at 456-67; Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 116-21 (1979).
140. See cases cited note 139 supra.
141. See id.
142. United States v. Turkette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980);
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
143. See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing
en banc, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980).
144. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir.), aff'd per
curiain en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980); United
States v. Moeller, 402 F Supp. 49, 58-59 (D. Conn. 1975). Mandel appears to have
been overruled in United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir.
1980). Moeller appears to have been overruled in United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d
104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
145. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). According to the Supreme
Court, Title IX was intended "to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business opera-
tions affecting interstate commerce by individuals who have obtained investment cap-
ital from a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 787 n.19. The Fifth Circuit has
minimized the significance of this dictum, concluding that the lannelli comment was
not a full description of the scope of Title IX. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d
1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
146. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1975); United States v. Tur-
kette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 4 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 & n.11 (8th Cir. 1980). But see United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138 & n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (congressional intent only one
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for determining that intent. 147 Indeed, the absence of any language
in Title IX limiting the term "enterprise" to legitimate organizations
is the only indication that the present majority view might be correct
in its interpretation of the scope of RICO. 148 Although "enterprise"
is defined in section 1961(4),149 neither that section nor section
1962(c) contains any explicit language restricting the scope of the
term. The Sixth Circuit en banc opinion has reasoned that had Con-
gress intended to qualify section 1962(c), it easily could have done so
by modifying "enterprise" with the word "legitimate." 150
Although the broad language of Title LX appears to include en-
terprises engaged solely in illegal activities, this analysis is not dis-
positive of the issue. In addition to focusing on statutory language to
determine legislative intent, the courts are required to examine the
object and policy of a statute as reflected in its legislative history. 151
The legislative history of Title IX is replete \with references to the
congressional concern with the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime.152  The Congressional Statement of Findings and
factor to consider in construing statute; court is not bound by desire of Congress).
Sharply criticizing Thevis, the Anderson court stressed the paramount importance of
congressional intent in interpreting RICO and stated that expanding the scope of a
statute "beyond congressional intent is judicial legislation violative of the separation
of powers doctrine established in the United States Constitution." United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366 n.11 (8th Cir. 1980).
147. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 642 (5th Cir. 1975): see United States %.
Turkette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 4-6 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980); United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980).
148. Courts refusing to restrict the scope of § 1962(c) have frequently pointed to
the absence of any explicit limitation in the language of § 1962(c). See United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1979). cert. denied. 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 124849 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied,
441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott. 571 F.2d 880, 897 n.17 (5th Cir.). cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104. 106 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
149. An "enterprise" is defined as "'any individual, partnership, corporation, as-
sociation, or other legal entity, and an% union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
150. United States v. Sutton, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir.
Dec. 3, 1980) (en banc); see United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 10O s. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104,
106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Castellano,
416 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). If. however, § 1962(a), which lacks the word
"legitimate," applies only to investment in legitimate enterprises, United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 9"25 (1975),
the absence of the word "'legitimate" in § 1962(c) should not control.
151. E.g., Ozava v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922); United Stales v.
National Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 390-91 12d Cir. 1961). see
United States v. Turkette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 4 (1st Cir. Sept. 23,
1980).
152. United States v. Turkette, Nos. 79-1545. 79-1546, slip op. at 10-11 (1st Cir.
Sept. 23, 1980); cf. United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.11
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Purpose, 153 Senate and House Committee reports, 154 and Justice
Department testimony before the House Judiciary Committee 15 5 es-
tablish that prevention of this infiltration was the principal goal. This
view was also expressed repeatedly by congressmen in floor de-
bates. 156 Indeed, few statements in the legislative history rebut the
(9th Cir. 1980) ("We believe anyone who reads the legislative history must be struck
by the singlemindedness with which Congress drafted RICO. Congress declared over
and over again that its purpose was to rid legitimate organizations of the influence of
organized crime. This purpose must be the linchpin of any construction of RICO.").
153. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23.
Findings (3) and (4) state: "(3) this money and power are increasingly used to infil-
trate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the
stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens."
154. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee declared that Title IX "has as
its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." Senate Report, supra
note 48, at 76; accord, H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as House Report], reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News
4007, 4032-34. The Senate Report, supra note 48, at 81-82, indicates that the "illegal
enterprise" issue is related to the question whether § 1962 is a remedial statute
rather than a penal statute for purposes of strict construction. See note 60 supra. The
Report contends that Title IX is remedial because it is not intended as a penalty
against an individual but as "a protection of the public against parties engaging in
certain types of business after they have shown that the) are likely to run the organi-
zation in a manner detrimental to the public interest." Id. at 82. If the "illegal enter-
prise" theory is adopted, Title IX punishes individuals and cannot be regarded as
remedial.
155. The Justice Department's position was that "Title IX is designed to inhibit
the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and . . . to reach the crim-
inal syndicates' major sources of revenue .... The statute would also proscribe the
acquisition, maintenance, or control of any interest in a business enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debts. Here the emphasis
is against illegally acquired ownership or control of businesses by members and as-
sociates of the Mafia .... " Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 and Related
Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 170 (1970) (statement of Att'y Gen. Mitchell) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]. The original bill (S. 1861) was called "[a] bill . .. to prohibit the infiltra-
tion or management of legitimate organizations by racketeering activity." S.1861, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 9512 (1969).
156. See, e.g., 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id. at 603
(remarks by Sen. Yarborough); id. at 607 (remarks by Sen. Byrd); id. at 953 (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 35193 (remarks by Rep. Pofi); id. at 35196 (remarks of
Rep. Celler); id. at 35200 (remarks of Rep. St. Germain); id. at 35201 (remarks of
Rep. McCullock); id. at 35206 (remarks of Rep. Kleppe); id. at 35304 (remarks of
Rep. Railsback); id. at 35318-19 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). Representative Poff
noted that "Title IX of S.30 provides the machinery whereby the infiltration of rack-
eteers into legitimate businesses can be stopped and the process reversed when such
infiltration does occur." Id. at 35295. In a law review article, Senator McClellan, the
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restrictive view.' 57  One commentator has suggested that the very
selection of crimes "adapted to commercial exploitation" as predicate
offenses158 further indicates that Congress was primarily concerned
with the infiltration of legitimate organizations.159
2. Rules of Statutory Construction
In addition to examining the legislative record, courts have at-
tempted to discern the scope of section 1962(c) by analyzing various
judicially created rules of statutory construction that aid in deter-
mining intent. 160 However, cases extending section 1962(c) to illegal
enterprises have rejected or ignored canons of construction that in-
dicate this subsection should be narrowly construed to proscribe only the
infiltration of legitimate businesses.' 6 ' These rules include a pre-
original sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act in the Senate, observed that
"Title IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations.-
McClellan, supra note 50, at 141. He further commented that unless an individual
uses a pattern of racketeering to obtain or operate an interstate business, no prosecu-
tion is possible under Title IX. Id. at 144.
157. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1371 n.20 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Organized Crime, supra note 29, at 204-05). Two isolated statements in the congres-
siona record intimated that Title IX could be employed in a situation other than
infiltration of legitimate business. 116 Cong. Rec. 35328 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Meskill); id. at 844 (remarks of Sen. Magnuson). The court in United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), did cite to
legislative history to support the inclusion of illegitimate enterprises within the scope
of § 1962(c). Unfortunately, the material quoted by the court, Senate Report. supra
note 48, at 73, referred not to Title LX, but to Title VIII, which prohibits gambling in
18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976). Bradley, supra note 84, at 852-53.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976). Bradley, supra note 84, at 852-53.
159. McClellan, supra note 50, at 161-62. Additionally, the promulgation of new
remedies such as forfeiture furthers the view that Congress did not intend to prose-
cute illegitimate enterprises, but acted to prevent racketeering influence on legiti-
mate business. The Senate Report on the Organized Crime Control Act stated that
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) would free the channels of commerce from
racketeering influence by removing "the leaders of organized crime from the sources
of their economic power" by preventing "their positions [from] being filled by succes-
sors no different in kind." Senate Report, supra note 48, at 80.
160. The courts are authorized to examine legislative intent under the firmly estab-
lished rule "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and vet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); accord, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201 (1979); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.11 (8th Cir.
1980). But see United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979) (courts not
required to analyze legislative history if no ambiguity is apparent on face of statute),
cert. denied, 100 S..Ct. 1345 (1980).
161. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-06 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir.
1979), cerl. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
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sumption against statutory constructions that disturb federal-state re-
lationships by expanding federal jurisdiction; 162 a due process re-
quirement that criminal statutes be construed in favor of lenity; 163
and the rule of ejusden generis, which cautions against expansive in-
terpretations of the broad definition of enterprise contained in section
1961(4). 14
1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 9,33 (1979); United States v.
Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 590
F.2d 1379, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979); United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
162. See generally Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1979); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971). Defendants have contended that prosecutions of purely illegal enterprises
under § 1962(c) would extend federal jurisdiction to virtually every crime by effec-
tively transforming a single person who has committed two state violations into a
RICO enterprise. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 56, 59 (D. Conn. 1975). Such an extension would consti-
tute a serious intrusion on state criminal jurisdiction since the Title IX definition of
racketeering activity in § 1961(I)(A) encompasses nearly all major state crimes.
United States v. Turkette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 23,
1980); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980); 542 F.2d at
107; 402 F. Supp. at 59, Atkinson, supra note 10, at 6.
163. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text. The majority of courts have
applied the liberal construction clause of Title IX and ignored this constitutional doc-
trine. See United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, [248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
164. The rule of ejusdem generis cautions against expansive interpretation of broad
language that immediately follows narrow and specific terms and admonishes courts
to construe "the broad in light of the narrow." United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204,
206 (5th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 566 (7th Cir.
1973). Applying ejusdem generis to § 1961(4), defendants have argued that the gen-
eral language, "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity," should be construed to describe enterprises similar to the preceding
specific terms, "individual, partnership, corporation, association." Therefore, if the
specific language refers to legitimate organizations, the general terms should be con-
strued as referring only to other forms of legitimate organizations. See United States
v. Turkette, Nos. 79-15,15, 79-1546, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980); United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366 (8th Cir. 1980); Conspiracy Law, supra note
29, at 119-20. Courts permitting § 1962(c) prosecutions of illegal enterprises, how-
ever, have emphasized only the broad language of § 1961(4), which defines enterprise
as "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity,"
and have ignored the preceding language. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v.
Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
The major obstacle to an ejusdem generis construction of § 1961(4) is that the rule is
riddled with vague and conflicting exceptions. One case has held that the rule is
inappropriate if the specific terms vary in meaning and refer to different objects.
Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F.2d 133, 137-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
837 (1930). Another court has observed that the rule is inappropriate because the
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The fourth, and most significant, applicable rule of statutory con-
struction is that a statute must be read as a whole, giving some effect
to each element of the crime defined in the statute. 165 Applying
section 1962(c) to illegal operations violates this rule by eviscerating
the term "enterprise." The term "enterprise" retains independent
significance within the statute only if section 1962(c) is limited to
legitimate enterprises. The legitimate enterprise is then an entity
separate from the racketeering activity, but one whose affairs are
conducted by individuals through that activity. When section 1962(c)
is applied to illegal enterprises, an individual or group of individuals
is transformed into an enterprise by the performance of a pattern of
racketeering.166 Therefore, section 1962(c) becomes a simple pro-
scription against the commission of a pattern of racketeering, effec-
tively eliminating the enterprise element. 167
terms preceding the general language are also general and "'contain no particular
aspects of diversity of meaning." United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 567 (7th
Cir. 1973). A third case has rejected the rule, emphasizing "the contrast between the
narrow scope" of the specific terms and "the enlarged grasp" of the general language.
United States v. Davis, 231 U.S. 183, 188 (1913). The combined impact of these
cases is that application of ejusdem generis is a subjective matter that renders the
doctrine useless as a tool of statutory analysis.
165. E.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633
(1973); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); see Administrator,
Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 261 (1975).
166. If an organization formed solely for illegal purposes is considered a RICO
enterprise, the enterprise element of a RICO offense can be proved merely by evi-
dence of a simple association to commit the racketeering acts. United States v. An-
derson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1368 (8th Cir. 1980). This type of proof would be the same as
that required to prove a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.§ 1962(d) (1976). Id. at
1368-69. The Anderson court pointed out that "Congress's inclusion of subsection (d)
.... indicates that Congress intended to establish two distinctly separate offenses in
subsections (c) and (d). If a simple criminal conspiracy to commit the predicate
crimes were to fulfill the "enterprise" element of a section 1962(c) violation, then a
conspiracy to commit a 1962(c) violation would be defined as when a person, as-
sociated with a conspiracy to commit criminal acts, conspires to conduct those crimi-
nal acts. The awkwardness and duplication inherent in the structure of this articula-
tion of the offense should be sufficient to suggest that we search for an alternate
interpretation." Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
167. United States v. Turkette, Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Sept.
23, 1980); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1980).
Bradley, supra note 84, at 854; see United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 266 (6th
Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing en bane, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th
Cir. Dec. 3, 1980). The panel opinion in Sutton commented that a simple prohibition
on patterns of racketeering was unlikely because "the draftsmen would not have
opted for so complex a formulation if the legislative purpose had been merely to
proscribe racketeering, without more. A straightforward prohibition against engaging
in 'patterns of racketeering activity' would have sufficed, and there would have been
no need for a reference to 'enterprise' of any sort." Id. at 266. The Anderson court
stated that "[t]he term 'enterprise' must signifiy an association that is substantially
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Permitting punishment of illegal enterprises under section 1962(c)
also distorts the meaning of that subsection within the context of sec-
tion 1962 as a whole because the scope of the word will vary from
one subsection to another. In United States v. Sutton,' 68 the panel
opinion relied on the one percent exception for purchases of corpo-
rate stock in enterprises as an indication that the section 1962(a) of-
fense encompasses only legitimate enterprises. 169 If section 1962(a)
refers only to legitimate enterprises, it is doubtful that section 1962(c)
employs the term "enterprise" in a different sense.170 This result
cannot be reconciled with the existence of section 1961(4), 171 a defini-
tion of "enterprise" that is applicable to all subsections of section
1962.172
3. Eighth Circuit Approach to
Illegal Enterprise Problem
Because an "illegal enterprise" allegation can have the paradoxical
effect of eliminating the independent significance of the "enterprise"
element, the Eighth Circuit 173 and a Fifth Circuit district court 174
permit only formally structured illegal enterprises. In United States
v. Anderson, 175 the defendants, two county administrators in Arkan-
sas, allegedly received kickbacks from a person selling goods to two
different from the acts which form the 'pattern of racketeering activity'. A contrary
interpretation would alter the essential elements of the offense as determined by
Congress." United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980) (footnote
omitted).
168. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing en bane, Nos. 78-5134 to
-5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980).
169. Id. at 268-69; see United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
170. Organized Crime, supra note 29, at 201-03. In United States v. Sutton, 605
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing en banc, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139,
78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980), the panel opinion asserted
that "[s]ubsection (a) is talking about legitimate enterprises only. Logic dictates that
the provisions which follow- subsection (b), prohibiting the use of racketeering to
,acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any enterprise,' and subsection
(c), prohibiting 'the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activit-'-should be read in pari materia." Id. at 269.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
172. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366 n.12 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing en bane,
Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980); United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 110 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafbiland, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); see Bradley, supra note 84, at 853 n.88; Organized
Crime, supra note 29, at 201-02.
173. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. In United States v. Drummond Coal Co., No. 79-M002765 (N.D. Ala. July 8,
1980), the court dismissed the RICO charges because "the alleged racketeering of
itself could not constitute an 'enterprise.' " Lempert, Judge Braves Tide with Narrow
RICO Reading, Legal Times of Wash., July 28, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
175. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
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counties in return for the defendants' approval of payment for goods
those counties never received. The court held that an enterprise must
have "an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of main-
taining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an exis-
tence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate
acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activitv." ' 176  Because
the alleged enterprise was a group of individuals, the two defendants
and a prosecution witness, the illegal enterprise allegation failed to
satisfy the formal structure requirement, and the court reversed the
convictions.
The Anderson court was motivated by concern about the implica-
tions of the expanding scope of the RICO statute; it warned that
"[b]road interpretation and simplistic resolution of the complicated
statutory language pose the danger of enhancing this popularity
beyond the intentions of Congress by bringing within the sphere of
RICO minor offenses and by intruding on state power."177 The
court feared that the effective elimination of the enterprise element,
resulting from a broad illegal enterprise theory combined with the
broad range of racketeering acts, would permit "greater and more
pervasive intrusion upon state and local law enforcement author-
ity." 178
B. Enterprise
1. Illegal enterprise
The majority of courts have not adopted the view that section
1962(c) is limited to infiltration of legitimate business. 179 Therefore,
the subsequent discussion of the elements of section 1962(c) assumes
that it includes illegal enterprises.
Proving the existence of an illegal enterprise is not difficult. Based
upon the broad definition of enterprise in section 1961(4) as "any in-
dividual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not" a
legal entity," 18 0 the enterprise concept has been liberally construed
176. Id. at 1372.
177. Id. at 1364.
178. Id. at 1370.
179. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-06 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980). United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 441 U.S. 933 (1979). United States v.
Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978). affd on rehearing en bane, 590
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979). United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104, 106-07, (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1039 (1977; United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). In United States v. Forsythe. 429 F. Supp. 715
(W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). the court described an enterprise as
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to encompass any conceivable combination of individuals or groups of
individuals. 181
Courts' have rejected arguments that a RICO enterprise must be a
formal, legally recognized entity.' 82 For example, in United States
v. Elliott,183 the Fifth Circuit interpreted this language to include any
informal, loosely organized, de facto association,18 4 and held that six
co-defendants had participated in an enterprise encompassing twenty
distinct aspects of criminal conduct. 185 Although one defendant was
implicated in all of the criminal conduct, none of the crimes involved
all the defendants; none of the defendants knew every other member
of the enterprise or their activities, nor were they united by a com-
mon objective.' 86 One explanation offered for this broad construc-
tion is that the list of entities in section 1961(4) is not exhaustive
because the statutory definition uses the word "includes" rather than
..a separate and independent unit in the marketplace, discerned operationally through
its behavior or functioning, regardless of its legal or proprietary structure." Id. at
721.
181. Many courts have commented that the word "enterprise" is a broad term
that should be liberally construed. See United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436,
441-42 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Frumento, 426 F.
Supp. 797, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1072 (1978); notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text; note 191 infra and
accompanying text.
182. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Thevis, 474
F. Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797,
802 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); see cases cited note 179 supra.
183. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
184. Id. at 897-98. Elliott did not acknowledge two elements that might limit the
extent to which an enterprise can be informal and diverse. One is that the term
,.pattern" may require that a common scheme, plan or motive underly the enterprise.
Id. at 899 n.23; see notes 241-49 infra and accompanying text. Elliott also did not
discuss whether a mens rea requirement exists in § 1962(c). To require knowledge of
the existence and general scope of the enterprise, however, would place sonic practi-
cal limit on the extent of diversity because a defendant could not be liable for all
enterprise encompassing acts beyond the scope of the enterprise of which he has
knowledge.
185. 571 F.2d at 911. The conduct included burning an unoccupied nursing home,
furnishing counterfeit titles and stealing cars, stealing a truckload of meat, attempting
to influence the outcome of the stolen meat trial, theft of a truck, murder, intimida-
tion of a witness, theft of additional meat and dairy products, theft of a forklift, theft
of a truckload of shirts, and various illegal drug transactions.
186. Id. at 898.
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the term "means." '8 7 The Supreme Court has characterized the word
"'includes" as signifying "a general class, some of whose particular
instances are those specified in the definition." 188 In contrast,
"'means" is a more narrow term indicating that "the term and its def-
inition are to be interchangeable equivalents." 189 Employing this
distinction, courts have rejected arguments that a particular entity is
not within the literal terms of "enterprise." 190
a. Single Person Enterprise
The most controversial form of illegal enterprise, one consisting of
a single person, has been approved in dictum by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. 19' This view is based on the words "[e]nterprise includes
any individual" in section 1961(4).192 The single person enterprise
concept, however, distorts the meaning of section 1962(c). A defen-
dant violates section 1962(c) only when he is "'employed by or as-
sociated with" the enterprise. 193 If the enterprise is the defendant,
187. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 445
U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
188. Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121. 125 n.1 t1934). Although Helrer-
ing has been cited by a court construing § 1961(4), United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979), there is an obvious distinction. Heltering wvas ap-
plying a rule for construing civil and tax statutes. The rules governing construction of
criminal statutes ma' differ as due process requires narrow construction of criminal
statutes to avoid vagueness. See notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text. The word
"includes" contained in a criminal statute must be read in this light and cannot au-
thorize broad construction. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
189. Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.l (1934).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980): United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138 (N.D.
Ga. 1979). In Huber, the defendant contended that a group of corporations could not
constitute an enterprise because § 1961(4) defines enterprise in the singular by refer-
ring to any "corporation." He also contended that the term "group of individuals
associated in fact" cannot be a group of corporations since the definition of "person"
in § 1961(4) distinguishes between an "'individual" and an "entity." Noting that §
1961(4) is not exhaustive, the court rejected this reasoning. 603 F.2d at 393-94. In
Thevis, the indictment alleged an enterprise consisting of "a group of individuals
associated in fact with various corporations to operate a pornography business
through certain unlawful means." 474 F. Supp. at 137. The defendant claimed that
§ 1961(4) did not specifically include an enterprise as alleged in the indictment. The
court dismissed his contention, relying on use of the word "'includes" in § 198114).
Id. at 137-38.
191. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 767 n.8 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 n.18 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Ohlson. 552 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134. 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See also Atkinson,
supra note 10, at 14-15. However, a recent First Circuit opinion seems to condemn
single person enterprises. See United States v. Turkette. Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip
op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
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he is convicted for employing himself or associating with himself. Ac-
cordingly, the language implies that at least two parties are neces-
sary. 194
Prosecution of single person enterprises also raises eighth amend-
ment problems to the extent that it permits RICO to be used against
individual burglars, gamblers, or other minor criminals. The severe
penalties imposed by RICO may be difficult to justify in these situa-
tions. 195 The statutory and constitutional defects in the single person
enterprise concept should discourage these prosecutions.
b. Effect of Broad Construction of Enterprise
The majority view permitting the allegation of an illegal operation
as an enterprise 196 has the practical effect of causing the "enterprise"
element to disappear, leaving only the question whether the govern-
ment can establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 197  Combining
this view with the courts' refusal to require that an enterprise have
any elements of formality or continuity results in granting the gov-
ernment virtually unlimited freedom to allege any one of the many
possible enterprises that may arise in a particular fact pattern. 19 8 As-
194. This point can be analogized to the principle in conspiracy law that a person
cannot conspire with himself; therefore, a conspiracy requires the agreement of two
persons. See United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 387
U.S. 907 (1967); Poller v. C.B.S., Inc., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
195. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
196. See pt. III(A) supra.
197. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on re-
hearing en banc, Nos. 78-5134 to -5139, 78-5141 to -51,3 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980);
Bradley, supra note 84, at 854. In United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 193
(E.D. Pa. 1977), the defendant contended that an enterprise must be "characterised
by continuity and structure [that renders] them recognizable as businesses." The
court, however, held that RICO does not "impose a continuity requirement, except
to the extent necessary to show a 'pattern of racketeering activity."' Id. In illegal
enterprise cases, the converse situation may occur, that is, "pattern" issues may be
treated as an "enterprise" problem. In United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 60
(D. Conn. 1975), the court held that "enterprise" could not be interpreted to cover
a venture designed to result in a single criminal episode. Normally, this analysis is
directed at the question of what constitutes a pattern. See notes 259-68 infra and
accompanying text. Likewise, in a subsequent case, United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 298, 308 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980), the court incor-
rectly decided that certain evidence was relevant to corroborate an "enterprise rela-
tionship." Relationship is also an issue in deciding whether a pattern existed. See pt.
III(C)(2) infra.
198. This freedom relieves the prosecution of deciding whether and when to use
the RICO statute; its most difficult decision becomes the manner in which the statute
should be employed. Magarity, RICO Incestigations: A Case Study, 17 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 367, 368 (1980).
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sume, for example, that two defendants, "X" and "Y", join in bribing
public officials to gain favors for their two legitimate businesses, "X"
Corporation and "Y" Corporation. At least seven enterprises can be
alleged against "X" and "Y": (1) "X" is the enterprise w ith which "Y"
is associated; (2) "Y" is the enterprise with which "X" is associated; (3)
"X" and "Y" together are the enterprise; (4) -X" Corporation is the
enterprise with which "X" and "Y" are associated, (5) "Y" Corporation
is the enterprise with which "X" and "Y" are*associated; (6) -X- Cor-
poration and "Y" Corporation are the enterprise with which -X" and
"Y" are associated; and (7) "X" Corporation, "Y" Corporation, "X,'"
and "Y" are the enterprise. The choice of enterprise may be dictated
by considerations such as venue, scope of forfeiture, 199 and differing
proof requirements.2 0
2. Foreign Enterprise
Another question arising under section 1962(b) is whether the word
"enterprise" was intended to encompass foreign enterprises. In
United States v. Parness,201 the defendant contended that section
1962(b) was not intended to include acquisitions of foreign businesses
through criminal conduct committed in the United States. 20 2 Rely-
ing on Labor Management Relations Act 203 cases holding that federal
law may not be applied to foreign businesses unless "the affirmative
intention of Congress [is] clearly expressed,"' 204 he asserted that a
!99. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). Allegation of an illegal enterprise will often re-
duce the impact of forfeiture under Title IX. The capital investment in an illegal
enterprise may be difficult to forfeit because of the absence of specific evidence re-
flecting the full extent of the defendant's capital interest. See note 10S mIpra.
200. The government is confronted with a tactical choice. If it alleges that a corpo-
ration is the enterprise, it must establish a nexus between the affairs of the enterprise
and the defendant's racketeering activities, but it need not show that the racketeering
activity affected interstate commerce as long as the enterprise's activities did. Se', pt.
III(E) infra; notes 367-72 infra and accompanying text. Conversely, if the govern-
ment alleges an illegal enterprise, it need not prove a nexus between the enterprise
and the racketeering, but it may have more difficulty establishing impact of the rack-
eteering on interstate commerce. See pt. III(G) infra.
201. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
202. Parness involved a complex fraudulent scheme. Milton Parness gained control
of a 90% stock interest in an Antillean hotel and casino by withholding debts owed to
the hotel. His failure to pay those debts forced the victim to borrow from third
parties to meet the hotel expenses. Id. at 434-35. Through straw men, Parness
loaned funds to pay the third-party obligations, hd. The straw men then foreclosed
and Parness obtained control of the hotel-casino, Id. at 435.
203. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-191 (1976).
204. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957; accord,
Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). These cases in-
volved application of the Labor Management Relations Act to aliens aboard foreign
vessels operating in United States territorial waters.
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foreign corporation was not an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO. 205 The court rejected this argument, holding that the legisla-
tive history manifested Congress' intent to apply Title IX to foreign
enterprises. 20 6  It characterized that history as supporting a policy of
broad construction of the term "enterprise" 20 7 and reasoned that
Title IX was directed at the problem of organized crime in the United
States and not merely the infiltration of domestic enterprises.20 8
This logic has been undermined by subsequent cases permitting
the government to allege that defendants' illegal activities are a sec-
tion 1962(c) enterprise. 20 9 The issue is not, as the Parness court per-
ceived, whether the defendants could avoid RICO liability by acquir-
ing a foreign enterprise because the defendants themselves could
constitute a punishable enterprise under section 1962(c).210 There-
fore, the ability of the prosecution to charge an illegal enterprise
would satisfy the supposed congressional intent to prohibit organized
crime activities directly. 211
In light of the expansive interpretations of section 1962(c) to in-
clude illegal enterprises, the foreign enterprise question requires a
narrower inquiry. The focus of the analysis should not be whether a
defendant's activities are exempt from Title IX, but whether the gov-
ernment should prosecute this activity by alleging a foreign business
as an enterprise. The principal advantages of alleging an enterprise
are the remedies that can be applied. The government can seek for-
feiture of a convicted person's interest in that enterprise under see-
tior, 1963(a), 212 or it can divest that interest and reorganize or dis-
solve the enterprise in a civil suit under section 1964(a).213 Absent
treaty arrangements, however, a foreign country would not be re-
quired to accept the judgment of an American court that dissolves or
205. 503 F.2d at 438-40.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 439. Parness relied on a statement in the legislative history of § 1962
that "any acquisition meeting the test of subsection (b) is prohibited without excep-
tion." House Report, supra note 154, at 57, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 4033. Parness, however, ignored the necessity of first determining the
scope of the term "'enterprise" before determining whether the acquisition meets the
test of subsection (b).
208. 503 F.2d at 439; accord, RICO Analysis, supra note 32, at 469. To support
this reasoning, Parness cited the Statement of Findings and Purposes of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
209. See pt. III(A) supra.
210. The court was concerned that limiting Title IX to infiltration of domestic en-
terprises "would permit those whose actions ravage the American economy to escape
prosecution simply by investing the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains in a foreign
enterprise." 503 F.2d at 439.
211. See notes 206-08 supra and accompanying text.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
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reorganizes a corporation established and operated under that coun-
try's laws. 214  Moreover, the foreign nation could refuse to compel or
even permit its corporations to comply with a forfeiture or divestiture
judgment of the United States. 21 5 Even if the remedies could be
enforced, they have the disturbing potential for creating international
friction.21 6  When the limited advantages of the foreign enterprise
theory are weighed against the interests of international relations, the
use of the foreign enterprise allegation should not be permitted.
3. Government Enterprises
The government has persistently prosecuted government corrup-
tion cases under the theory that the public office is the enter-
prise.2 17  Generally, the courts have accepted this theory and re-
jected contentions that a government entity is not an enterprise within
the meaning of Title IX. 21 8  These decisions have focused on the
214. Although American courts will not examine a taking by a foreign sovereign of
United States property within its own territory, thev" permit confiscations of property
within the United States only if thev do not conflict with United States law and
foreign policy. Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1027 (5th Cir.)
(citing Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47. 51 (2d Cir. 19G5), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972). Employing a simi-
lar principle, a foreign country could refuse to accept an American decree imposing
dissolution or reorganization on the grounds that it affects property in that foreign
state.
215. See note 214 supra.
216. Cf. Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 14, 1980, at 24. col. I (Great Britain opposed application
of antitrust laws to British companies).
217. United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Baker, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980): United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Grzvwa, 603 F.2d
682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980): United States v. Frumento,
563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United
States v. Dozier, 493 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. La. 1980); United States v. Sisk, 476 F.
Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); United States Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.W. Va.
1979); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), afrd inein.. 605 F.2d
1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1072 (1980): United States v. Mandel, 415
F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
218. This contention was adopted only in United States v. Mandel. 415 F. Supp.
997, 1020-22 (D. Md. 1976). To the extent that it precluded all governmental enter-
prises, however, Mandel was overruled in United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060
(4th Cir. 1980), and in United States v. Altomare. 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980). The
government has succeeded in alleging the following government organizations as en-
terprises: (1) police departments, United States v. Grzy%acz. 603 F.2d 682, 6S4-87
(7th Cir. 1979) (officers received bribes in exchange for protection of illegA activities
including prostitution and operation of taverns after closing hours), cert denic'd, 100
S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 412. 415-16 5th Cir. 1977
(similar facts), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); (2) state administrative agencies.
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977) (employees of
Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes received bribes to permit im-
portation of untaxed cigarettes), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). United States v.
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immaterial issue of whether Title IX was intended to prevent corrup-
tion of government agencies. 219 It cannot be disputed that Title IX
is directed at corruption of government organizations; this is evident
from the inclusion of bribery under state and federal law within the
definition of "racketeering activity" in section 1961(1).220
Nevertheless, the definition does not resolve the government
enterprise issue. The question is not whether public officials are im-
mune from RICO criminal actions, but what is the appropriate
enterprise to be alleged. Even if a government entity were not
considered an enterprise under Title IX, corrupt public officials
would not escape prosecution under RICO because the prevailing law
would permit the prosecutor to charge that the parties to the bribery
constituted an illegal enterprise in violation of section 1962(c). 221 In
Dozier, 493 F. Supp. 554, 554 (M.D. La. 1980) (Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture);
United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.W. Va. 1979) (West Virginia
Alcohol Beverage Control Commission); (3) governor's office, United States v. Sisk,
476 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) ("Governor's office of the State of
Tennessee"); (4) city traffic court, United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 444-45,
450 (3d Cir. 1979) (employees of Philadelphia Traffic Court received bribes), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1094-97
(E.D. Pa.) (defendant, Presiding Judge of Philadelphia Traffic Court received bribes
in exchange for appointing people to serve arrest warrants), aff'd inein., 605 F.2d
1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980); (5) county sheriffs office,
United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (Sheriff of Wilson
County, N.C. arranged for bribes in return for protecting prostitution); and (6)
county prosecutor's office, United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir, 1980)
(Prosecuting Attorney of Hancock County, W. Va. attempted to elicit false testimony
and facilitate illegal gambling).
219. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1091 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d
407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v.
Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.W. Va. 1979). These cases cited the State-
ment of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. Finding (3) refers to the tendency of organized crime
"'to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes." 84 Stat. 923. Judge Swygert's
dissenting opinion in United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980), minimized the significance of these findings. Id. at
690 n.1 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Other authorities have contended that from a policy
standpoint, it is logical to apply RICO to government organizations. They reason that
the need to remove racketeering activity from government is as compelling as the
need to remove this activity from private business. United States v. Frumento, 426
F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1072 (1978); Atkinson, supra note 10, at 13. In United States v. Mandel,
415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), the court responded that government entities have
more adequate resources to combat corruption than private businesses, which need
the protection of RICO. Id. at 1021.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976). The court emphasized this fact in United
States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
221. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976). The Mandel court
noted that its holding "does not, as the government contends, provide some immu-
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this context, it is difficult to discern any legislative intent to include
government units as enterprises. Indeed, the legislative history con-
tains no explicit references to government bodies as enterprises
within Title IX. 222
In addition, the government cannot obtain any significant advan-
tage by alleging a government enterprise rather than an illegal enter-
prise. Indictment of legitimate entities normally benefits the govern-
ment by triggering the operation of various remedies that affect the
organization alleged as the enterprise. Use of the government enter-
prise theory does not offer this advantage because section 1964(a) civil
remedies and section 1963 forfeitures are inappropriate when applied
to government organizations. 223  If applied to a state government of-
fice, these remedies would raise serious constitutional questions con-
cerning Congress' authority under the commerce clause "to structure
the integral operations .. . of traditional [state] governmental func-
tions." 224
nit, from prosecution to a public official that would be unavailable to a private part\.
As the Court has previously noted, whoever engages in prohibited patterns of rack-
eteering activities comes within the purview of the statute, including public officials.'"
Id. at 1022.
222. RICO Analysis, supra note 32, at 474. Some cases approving the government
enterprise theory have acknowledged that no specific reference to government enter-
prises appears in the legislative history. See, e.g., United States v. Fnmento, 563
F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). United States v.
Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 186 (S.D.W. Va. 1979). The opinion in United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020 (D. Md. 1976) and Judge Swygert's dissenting opin-
ion in United States v. Grzvwacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. dhenied,
100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980), emphasized the absence of such references in the 2,097 pages
of hearings, two congressional reports, and Title LX itself. These opinions view.ed this
silence as undermining any inference of authority to include government enterprises
within Title IX.
223. United States v. Grzv)wacz, 603 F.2d 682, 691 t7th Cir. 1979) tSw\xgert, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980). United States v. Barber. 476 F.
Supp. 182, 189 (S.D.W. Va. 1979). Judge S\wvgert's dissent in Gr"ywarze concluded
that, because of the importance Congress attached to the novel remedies created b%
Title IX, the inapplicability of these remedies indicated that Congress did not intend
to punish government enterprises. 603 F.2d at 691 (S\s.gert, J., dissenting). Barber,
however, found no connection between the inapplicability of remedies and the in-
applicability of substantive provisions. It cautioned that the characterizAtion of the
remedies as combating "takeovers of private businesses through illegal activity" did
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that "had Congress specifically addressed the
question, it would have excluded public entities from the substantive provisions of
section 1962." 476 F. Supp. at 189. Barber failed to consider that Title LX emnploys a
uniform definition of "enterprise" that should not vary from one section to another. If
Congress did not intend to include public entities as enterprises for remedial pur-
poses in §§ 1963 and 1964, it could not have intended to include them within the
definition of "enterprise" in § 1962. See notes 170-72 rzpra and actompaning text.
224. See National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 833. 852 1976i. The Su-
preme Court limited the application of federal minimum hour provisions to state
employees, holding that Congress does not have authority under the commerce
clause to regulate the integral operations of traditional state governmental functions.
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The government enterprise issue is also closely related to the per-
missible scope of the enterprise. If, as mardated by the prevailing
law, the prosecution can charge an illegal enterprise composed of any
conceivable combination of individuals and corporations, the govern-
ment enterprise concept does not significantly benefit the prosecu-
tion. On the other hand, if the illegal enterprise alternative is un-
available to prosecutors, the allegation of government enterprises may
be the only means of furthering the legislative purpose of combating
corruption in state government.
4. Enterprise Pleading Problems
One of the few limitations on the "enterprise" term is that it may
not be unnecessarily vague.2 25 For example, United States v. Vi-
gnola,226 distinguished a valid enterprise, the Philadelphia Traffic
Court, from an enterprise described as the "State of Maryland" on
the grounds that the latter was a "totally amorphous and intangible
notion."' 227  Even if an imprecise description of the "enterprise" is
not impermissibly vague, the lack of precision may result in the re-
versal of a conviction if at trial the government establishes a different
enterprise from that alleged in the indictment. 228
Id. at 852-53. The "authority to make ...fundamental employment decisions," id. at
851, is one of these functions. Mandatory forfeiture or divestiture of state offices
under Title IX would obviously deprive the state of its authority to make "fundamen-
tal employment decisions." These remedies are a far greater intrusion on state
sovereignty than the restrictions on wages and hours involved in Usery.
225. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
226. 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd iner., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
227. Id. at 1096 n.17 (citing United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D.
Pa.), rev'd and remanded, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978);. In United States v. Baker,
617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980), the alleged enterprise was a county sheriff's depart-
ment. The court distinguished United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md.
1976), on the ground that Mandel involved an allegation that a state was the enter-
prise. 617 F.2d at 1061. This distinction may impliedly adopt the Vignola criticism of
the "State of Maryland" form of allegation.
228. The government may not allege an enterprise and then prove a different one
at trial. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (variance between
pleading and proof destroyed defendant's right to be tried only on charges in indict-
ment). Few RICO cases have considered in detail the problem of proof at trial that is
at variance with the indictment, and none have explicitly reversed convictions on that
basis. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 480 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 126 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v.
Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Stipp.
609, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Some cases assumed such a variance is impermissible, but
held that variance did not occur in the particular case. See United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979) ("While the government might be faulted for im-
precise language on occasion, it is clear that the indictment was predicated on a
one-enterprise theory, and that that was the basis on which proof was offered and on
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C. Pattern of Racketeering
1. Continuity Analysis of "Pattern"
To the extent that courts permitting illegal enterprises have
eliminated the enterprise element from section 1962(c), they' have
transformed that subsection into a direct prohibition against the
commission of a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt. 229 Section 1961(5) does not actually define a "'pattern
which the jury was charged."), cert. denied. 445 U.S. 927 (1980). United States v.
Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1976). aff'd. 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977) ("The Government never suggested at trial, either by proof or argument, that
there was any enterprise other than the Bureau upon which this prosecution w'as
based. The Government's pleading and proof were in confornity."), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978). In addition, the Government can prove violations only of the pred-
icate acts alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Thevis. 474 F. Supp. 117.
126 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Stofskv, 409 F. Supp. 609. 620 (S.D.NY.
1973). A variance as to the enterprise does not occur when the enterprise established
at trial consists of fewer individuals than those alleged in the indictment- United
States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 480 (5th Cir. 1976).
229. An alternative to proving a pattern of racketeering is proving that an enter-
prise was acquired or operated by means of collection of an unlawful debt defined in
§ 1961(6) as "a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling aetivit\ wdlich %%as in
violation of the law of the United States, a State or politicral subdi ision thereof, or
which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal
or interest because of the laws relating to usur., and tB) which .%s incurred in
connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States.
a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of
value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at
least twice the enforceable rate." The term "business" is not defined, although it
implies that the defendant was earning some amount of income from one of these
illegal activities. Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice. Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Statute 48 (4th ed. 1978). The defendant may argue that the
term "business of gambling" should be defined by analogy to the term "illegal gam-
bling business" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) 01976). If that definition w ere
applied, the government would be compelled to establish the existence of i gambling
business that involves five or more persons and that has been or is "'in substantially
continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day." 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(iiii t1976). But we United States v.
Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 853 (7th Cir. 1977) (§ 1955 definition of illegal gambling
business not applicable to § 1962), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 951 k197 8 . Although the
government may' contend that imputing the § 1955 definition to § 1962 %'ould effec-
tively merge the two statutes, a distinction remains if Title IX is limited to infiltration
of legitimate businesses. Section 1955 would apply to businesses organized for the
purpose of conducting illegal gambling. In contrast, § 1962(c) would apply to a
legitimate business that has been modified to facilitate gambling. Tile most convinc-
ing argument against incorporating the § 1955 definition is based on an analogy to the
reasoning in United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978, affd vub
non. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), ccrt h'nied. 49 U.S.L.V.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62). In rejecting tile imputation of tile definition of
"pattern" in 18 U.S.C. § 35 75(e) to Title IX. DePahna reasoned that, had Congress
intended such a definition for Title LX, it would have specificrall included it. Id. at
784. It seems reasonable to assume, as the DePabna court did. that wshen Congress
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of racketeering activity," 230 but states that it "requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years
* . .after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 231
includes language in one statute but not in another statute-particularly one passed
in the same legislative act-it did not intend that the language apply to the latter.
See note 251 infra and accompanying text. Few reported cases employ this alterna-
tive and none discuss its requirements in significant detail. See United States v.
Salinas, 564 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977);
United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). A significant difference
between a pattern of racketeering and the collection of unlawful debts may be that no
explicit requirement exists that the defendant perform two or more acts involving
collections of unlawful debts. One collection may be sufficient, while at least two acts
of racketeering are required. This conclusion is questionable, however. The Senate
Report on RICO, Senate Report, supra note 48, can be characterized as excluding
isolated or sporadic collection activity as well as isolated racketeerin*, activity because
it states that "[t]he target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity.' Id. at 158, see
notes 232-34 infra and accompanying text. It could be argued that, if a single rack-
eteering act does not justify severe RICO penalties, neither should a single collec-
tion. Nevertheless, the response to this contention is that even one collection is not
isolated or sporadic because the debt must be incurred in connection with an ongoing
business of either gambling or usurious lending. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976).
230. Although § 1961 is titled "Definitions," § 1961(5) is not actually a definition.
In United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.DN.Y. 1977), the court
pointed out that, rather than define "pattern," § 1961(5) explains how to prove it. The
phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" is vulnerable to constitutional challenges on
vagueness grounds. The commonly applied constitutional standard for vagueness is
that a criminal statute is void when it fails to give "a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that this contemplated conduct is forbidden." Palmer v. City of Euclid,
402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)); see note 61 supra. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that, if "pattern of
racketeering activity" were undefined, the term would be unmanageable. United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976). This court asserted that any ambiguity was cured by the definitions of "pat-
tern" and "racketeering activity" in § 1961. Id. However, it ignored the fact that
§ 1961(5) does not actually define "pattern." United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp.
1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). Title IX may violate the constitutional prohibition
on ex post facto laws, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, because it permits the prosecu-
tion of activities that occurred prior to its effective date. See United States v. Her-
man, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 418-21 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 357, 365 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd inem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
This contention has been rejected based upon a statement in a Senate Report on
Title IX: "One act in the pattern must be engaged in after the effective date of the
legislation. This avoids the prohibition against ex post facto laws, and bills of attain-
der." Senate Report, supra note 48, at 158; see United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d
407, 417 n.19 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976). Another case con-
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In accordance with section 1961(5), the courts have insisted that one
isolated racketeering act does not constitute a "pattern. " 232 How-
cluded that the ex post facto clause is not violated because the RICO offense is not
complete until a racketeering act occurs after the effective date. United States v.
Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mm., 578 F.2d 1371 02d Cir.,
cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). Field reasoned that the statute theoreticallv
notified a defendant who committed racketeering acts prior to that date that a further
act will violate Title IX. Id. Unfortunately, this "notice" argument is meaningless in
illegal enterprise cases if no intent requirement or meaningful common scheme ele-
ment exists. See note 2 supra; pt. III(C)(2) infra; pt. III(F) infra. The
hypothesized notice, for example, would not inform the defendant whose proscribed
act occurs after the effective date, if he does not know that his diverse criminal
activities constitute an enterprise. RICO conspiracies raise more complex ex post
facto questions. Unlike the § 1962(c) offense, which is complete upon the commission
of two racketeering acts, one occurring after the effective date, a RICO conspiracy is
complete upon agreement. See United States v. Forsythe. 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 n.2
(W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977. If the agreement
occurred prior to the effective date, the crime was committed prior to that date. Never-
theless, courts have held that a RICO conspiracy formed prior to the effective date
can be punished if it continues after that date. See United States v. Pantone, 609
F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 19 79 ), United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 t3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). United States v. Canpanale, 518 F.2d 352,
365 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). The reasoning is that §
1962(d) does not punish acts committed prior to the effective date. rather, the defen-
dant who is put on notice that subsequent acts would combine to produce the pro-
scribed pattern of racketeering is convicted for performing acts in furtheranc,e of the
conspiracy after that date. The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach but reversed con-
victions hecause the trial court had failed to instruct the jury that the conspiracy
must continue after the effective date. United States v. Brown. 555 F.2d 407, 419-20
& n.26 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). This analysis, however, is
based on the erroneous assumption that § 1962(d) punishes acts perfonlll after the
effective date; in fact, it punishes only the agreement. An acts in furtherance of the
agreement are merely evidence of that conspiracy and are not elements of the crime.
Furthermore, in a jurisdiction following the Elliott view of eonspiracy. United States
v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 953 (1978), the Caipanalh
theory is meaningless because a defendant can be convicted even if he does not know
that his acts are part of a § 1962(d) conspiracy. See notes 433-37 infra and accoin-
panying text. Elliott can be read in a manner that substantially alleviates the ex post
facto problem. Elliott punishes those who agree to "'participate. directly and indi-
rectly, in the affairs of the enterprise by committing two or more predicate crimes."
571 F.2d at 902. It therefore effectively punishes an agreement to commit the ele-
ments satisfRing the pattern requirement, and an element of a pattern is that one of
the acts occur after the effective date. It is logical to construe § 1962(d) as requiring
that each defendant agree and intend to commit a racketeering act after the effective
date. Accordingly, a defendant could not be convicted merely because the conspiracy
continued past the effective date if he did not commit any overt acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy after the effective date. If one accepts the view that § 1962(d) requires
the actual commission of racketeering activities. RICO can be regarded as punishing
acts performed after its effective date. See note 488 infra and accomp.m1 ing text.
232. See United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436. 442 (5th Cir. 1976. United States
v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 n.32 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49. 58, 60 & n.9 (D. Conn. 1975).
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ever, the more significant and complex question that arises is whether
the commission of two or more acts of racketeering will always consti-
tute a "pattern." The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
the proposed Organized Crime Control Act233 cautioned that "[t]he
target of Title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering ac-
tivity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this
factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern." 234
It is easy to conceive of a defendant who has committed two acts of
racketeering that can be characterized as "sporadic activity." The two
acts might be widely separated in time from one another and from
the date of the indictment. The length of time from the last rack-
eteering act to the indictment is particularly important as the passage
of time may be sufficient to remove "the threat of continuing activ-
ity." 235  If this situation occurs, the finding of a "pattern" would re-
quire the assumption that, once he commits the two acts, a defendant
perpetually poses "the threat of continuing activity." 236 Most cases,
however, have involved patterns arising from the commission of many
racketeering acts in relatively short periods of time.2 37  Con-
233. Senate Report, supra note 48. The report has been a major influence on
courts construing the meaning of the term "pattern." See United States v. Morris,
532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363
n.32 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. DePalma,
461 F. Supp. 778, 783 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub non. United States v. Weis-
man, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980)
(No. 80-62).
234. Senate Report, supra note 48, at 158 (emphasis added). The report cautioned
that "[o]ne isolated 'racketeering activity' [is], though, insufficient to trigger the rem-
edies provided under the proposed chapter, largely because the net would be too
large and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense." Id. Sen.
McClellan vigorously asserted that the commission of two racketeering acts does not
establish a pattern in the absence of a relationship between the acts. 116 Cong. Rec.
18940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see House Hearings, supra note 155, at 664
(statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Wilson).
235. Cf. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The lan-
guage of the Act, which makes a pattern of conduct the essence of the crime, .clearh'
contemplates a prolonged course of conduct.' " (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 120 (1970)), aff'd inemn., 578 F.2l 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
801 (1978). But see United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (assuming that only two acts constitute a pattern), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
236. Diligent application of the "threat of continuing activity" language might as-
suage the fears of those who contend that the government could "collect a batch of
minor crimes and call it general racketeering." Newsweek, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col.
2; id. at 83, col. 1; see lncesting Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1492 n.10,
237. See United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (several illegal
card games within 19 months found to be a pattern and riot merely sporadic activity);
United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (acceptance of four
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sequently, the effect of the "continuity factor" has not vet been tested
in a borderline situation involving two acts widely separated in time
from one another and from the date of the indictment. United States
v. DePabna 238 most closely resembled this borderline fact pattern.
The case involved a securities fraud in 1973 and a bankruptcy fraud in
1977, both of which occurred in the operation of a legitimate busi-
ness. The court held that the two fraudulent schemes constituted a
pattern within the meaning of the continuity criterion of the Senate
Report. 239
In terms of a "continuity" analysis, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the DePalma situation involving illegal operation of a legiti-
mate business and one involving an illegal enterprise. In the former,
the continuity is supplied by the continuing corporate existence of the
legitimate business as a vehicle for the criminal scheme. As long as
the legitimate enterprise exists, the defendant poses a "threat of con-
tinuing activity." In contrast, an illegal operation generally includes a
group of people with a constantly changing membership, a loose or-
ganizational structure, and a stop-and-start existence.2 40 Frequently,
the mere existence of an illegal enterprise does not supply continuity
because, unlike a stable, continuing business, the parties to an illegal
operation are likely to come together temporarily for single-purpose
ventures.
2. "Common Scheme" Analysis of "Pattern"
Some authorities have not emphasized the continuity factor, and
have construed "pattern" to require proof of a common scheme, plan,
or motive connecting the racketeering acts.24 1 Under this approach,
bribes over a two and one-half year period sufficient to establish a pattern. United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (14 separate acts within four
year period constituted pattern), aff'd mere.. 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. disins-
sed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Stofsk-, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 tS.D.N.Y.
1973) (two separate acts within a one and one-half year period could constitute pat-
tern).
238. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub norm. United States v. Weisman,
624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 49 U.S.L.\. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7. 19S0) iNo.
80-62).
239. 461 F. Supp. at 783 n.6.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) cert denied. 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
241. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855. 860-61 (7th Cir.) cert. denied. 434
U.S. 921 (1977); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609. 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974). we H. Devitt &
C. Blackmar, 2 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §§ 56.20. 56.23 (3d ed. Supp.
1979); Atkinson, supra note 10, at 11; RICO Analysis. supra note 32, at 452-5.3. In
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1980). the court stated that
"the ordinary and natural meaning" of "pattern" requires a relationship between the
acts. The government also seems to recognize the existence of the common scheme
element. See Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of justice. An Explanation of Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute 22. 24. 26 t4th ed. 1978). Some
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the word "pattern" requires more than accidental or unrelated in-
stances of proscribed conduct. 242 The origin of the common scheme
approach cannot be found in any explicit reference in the language of
Title IX, although there is some support for it in the legislative his-
tory.243 Courts requiring a common scheme have based their ap-
proach on a general understanding of the term "pattern," 244 the need
for such a requirement to prevent the use of section 1962(c) against
"the isolated acts of an independent criminal," 245 and an analogy to a
separate provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.240
That provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3575,247 includes the phrase "pattern of
conduct criminal under applicable laws" as a predicate for the special
offender status that is used for sentencing purposes. The definition of
pattern of criminal conduct in section 3575(e) embraces "criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
or methods of commission, or otherwise Ire interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 248  One court
has reasoned that the definition in section 3575(e) is applicable to
Title IX because statutes that are part of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act are to be construed similarly under the principle of in pari
materia.249
courts, however, have refused to read this element into the statute. United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 139 n.7
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
242. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
243. United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62).
244. In United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the court
asserted that in common usage the term "pattern" connoted a "combination of qual-
ities or acts forming a consistent or characteristic arrangement." Id. at 883. The use
of "pattern" in the context of § 1962 suggested "that the two must have a greater
interrelationship than simply commission by a common perpetrator" and must be
"part of a particular continuing criminal activity." Id.; accord, Investing Dirty Money,
supra note 29, at 1499. The racketeering acts in White involved, inter alia, mail
fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property.
245. United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 834 (E.D. Wis. 1974); accord,
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In White, the court
reasoned that, "[ajbsent a showing of a 'pattern' or interrelatedness of such activity,
§ 1962(c) could be used against the isolated acts of an independent criminal; such, was
not the intended target of the challenged statute." 386 F. Supp. at 884.
246. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
& 28 U.S.C.); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
248. Id.
249. United States v. Stofksy, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court
noted that, '[wihile § 3575 concerns a pattern discerned for post-conviction purposes
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a. Criticism of "Common Schene" Approach
The most extensive criticism of the common scheme approach is
found in United States v. Weisman. 250  Weisman rejected the analogs
to section 3575(e), noting that, when Congress chooses to include lan-
guage in one statute and not another, it does not intend that the
language apply to the latter provision.2 51 This argument has consid-
erable merit. The analogy to section 3575(e) is a misapplication of in
pari materia because that doctrine is to be used to construe only the
same ambiguous term within the same statute. 252
Weisman offered a second, broader criticism of the common
scheme view. The court asserted that Congress had supplied the in-
terrelationship element by requiring that the "pattern" be related to
the affairs of an enterprise; accordingly, the term "pattern" does not
require any relationship between the two acts 25 3 beyond the re-
and thus involving considerations somewhat different from those involved in § 1961
et. seq., the policies which have led Congress to create a separate crime for a pattern
of criminal activity are not very different from those which ha'e led it to create
increased penalties for a pattern of conduct which is criminal. Without opining
whether § 3575(e) is sufficient for its purposes, it would seem that it may be used to
cast light on the word "pattern" as used in § 1961." Id. In pari nat'ria is defined as
-upon the same matter or subject." Black's Law Dictionary 898 (Rev. 4th ed. 1951).
The rule is "applicable when construing contemporaneous legislation concerned uith
a specific subject," Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States. 156 F.2d 346, 350 t7th Cir.
1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 248 (1947), and is used only when the meaning of the statute
is "ambiguous or doubtful." Id.
250. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. ). cert. deni'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62).
251. Id. at 1122-23; see General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135,
138 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
252. See General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 3S3 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 i5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968): Northern Pacific Rv. v. United States,
156 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1946), affd, 330 U.S. 248 (1947L The analogy fails
because it inserts the specific language of another statute.
253. 624 F.2d at 1122-23. The lower court reasoned that "[tlwo significant
amendments to the definition of pattern of racketeering, prior to the enactment of
the statute, lend further support to this view. Prior to these amendments the defini-
tion was as follows: 'The tern pattern of racketeering activity includes at least one act
occurring after the effective date of this chapter.' Since *the term "pattern" indicates
that what is intended to be proscribed is not a single isolated act of "racketeering
activity," but at least two such acts' the statute w%-as amended to read as follows: 'The
tern "pattern of racketeering activity" means at least two acts, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this chapter.' There was no requirement that the twvo acts
... even be related in time. This was the cause of some concern to those who
commented on the proposed bill. Such concerns led to the enactment of the ten year
limitation in the statute. It was this ten year limitation that provided any require-
ment of nexus between the two predicate acts. In its final form the statute simplk
required that the person commit at least two acts of racketeering activity wvithin a ten
year period." United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778. 782 tS.D.N.Y. 1978)
(citations omitted).
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quirement that they occur within ten years of each other.254 By re-
quiring that the pattern be related to the enterprise, Weisman's
reasoning is applicable only when a legitimate enterprise is involved.
This point is facile, however, in view of the majority rule that an
illegal operation can constitute an enterprise, an interpretation that
effectively eliminates the enterprise element and transforms section
1962(c) into a prohibition of patterns of racketeering activity.25 5 In
illegal enterprise cases, the interrelationship of the pattern to the en-
terprise is not apparent because the enterprise has no independent
existence.
An advantage of the common scheme approach is that it effectively
precludes the government from compiling all crimes committed by a
person and prosecuting the individual as an illegal enterprise under
section 1962(c). This advantage results because a series of unrelated
crimes could not be charged as a pattern in the absence of a common
scheme, plan, or motive. In contrast, the "continuity" analysis would
not remedy this problem because it does not require a relationship
between the acts except that the racketeering activity be of sufficient
quantity and character to pose a threat of continuing activity. How-
ever, the government could be prevented from alleging unrelated
crimes without construing "pattern" to require a common scheme if
the courts read a mens rea requirement into section 1962(c) so that
knowledge of the existence and general scope of the pattern were
required. 25 6 The government would have difficulty satisfying the
mental element when the acts are unrelated because the defendant
could not reasonably know that unrelated acts are part of a pat-
tern. 257 Therefore, analyzing the problem of unrelated racketeering
activities as an intent issue is a viable alternative to a common
scheme interpretation of "pattern." 258
b. Single Transaction Illegal Activity
A major defect in the common scheme approach to "pattern" is that
it does not resolve the issue whether a pattern is formed from acts
254. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880, 899 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
255. See pt. III(A) supra; notes 355-60 infra and accompanying text.
256. See pt. III(F) infra.
257. It is possible that courts adopting the common scheme approach assume that
no mens rea requirement exists. If there were a mens rea requirement, there might
be no need to require a "pattern" element relating to the racketeering activities.
258. It is arguable that even the common scheme interpretation of "pattern" does
not ensure anv, meaningful relationship between the acts. The "pattern" definition in
§ 3575(e), supposedly applicable by analogy, extends beyond common scheme, plan,
or motive, to include the "same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission.- 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976). Rarely would two acts be so
unrelated that no pattern could be found under the broad standard of § 3575(e).
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that are so closely related in time and space that they are part of the
same transaction. 259 The clearest example of the single transaction
problem is found in United States c. Moeller. 26 °  In that case, the
two racketeering acts, burning a factory and kidnapping three
employees, occurred at the same place, on the same day, and in the
course of the same criminal episode. Although previous cases consid-
ering the single transaction problem had held that a pattern can be
composed of closely related racketeering acts, 261 Moeller questioned
these holdings. The court believed that a "common sense interpreta-
tion" of "pattern" implies acts "occurring in different criminal
episodes, episodes that are at least somewhat separated in time and
place yet sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity
of activity." 2 6 2 Because it was precluded by Second Circuit authoritY
from adopting this construction, however, the district court found
that a pattern could be based on the two acts in the arson scheme. 263
The Moeller analysis is essential if section 1962(c) is to be rationally
applied. Generally, any racketeering act can violate at least two of the
federal and state offenses incorporated into Title IX. Therefore, ab-
sent a requirement that the two racketeering acts be part of different
transactions, a single criminal act could often be sufficient for pros-
259. This issue is most often litigated in prosecutions of alleged patterns consisting
of two violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). in furtherance of
a single scheme to defraud. See United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595.
601-02 (7th Cir. 1978): United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa.), aff d mDem.. 5M8
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978). The preponderance of mail fraud cases may confuse tie law
in this area. Statutes such as § 1341, requiring some act in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud, are difficult to apply in the context of Title IX. The difficulty is evident in
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975), which involved violations of a statute similar to the mail fraud statute. In
Parness, the defendant was charged with multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1976) based on acts of interstate transportation in furtherance of a scheme to de-
fraud. The defendant argued that the "pattern" element was unconstitutionally vague
because he could not know whether the RICO requirement of racketeering acts re-
ferred to two fraudulent schemes or two acts of transportation during a single
scheme. The court assumed arguendo that, under some circumstances, ambiguity
might exist. 503 F.2d at 442.
260. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
261. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). United
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Salvitti, 451
F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd iner.. 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978).
262. 402 F. Supp. at 57 (emphasis deleted).
263. Id. at 58. While criticizing single transaction patterns. Mh'ller was controlled
by the decision in United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. de-
enied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975), which upheld such patterns.
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ecution under RICO, 264 and the congressional condemnation of pat-
terns based on isolated or sporadic activity would be undermined.2 65
The "common scheme" construction of "pattern" does not remedy
the single transaction problem. Indeed, United States v. Weather-
spoon 266 asserted that a common scheme element is inconsistent with
a requirement that the racketeering acts be part of different transac-
tions. The court reasoned that the defendant's challenge to the single
transaction pattern "would require a showing of separate and unre-
lated schemes." 267  While the common scheme element may not
compel a single transaction pattern as Weatherspoon contended, it
does not preclude this type of pattern because there is no require-
ment of any temporal or spatial separation between the racketeering
acts. In contrast, the continuity analysis adequately deals with the
troublesome single transaction issue. Using this mode of analysis, the
264. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 11-12. Fearing that "pattern" would be reduced
to a single criminal act, the commentator endorsed the Moeller view. Id. at 12, Even
if a single act did not violate different statutes, the pattern could be supplied by a
single act and offenses concealing that act. Enumerated as racketeering acts in §
1961(1)(B), the concealment offenses are obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1976), obstruction of criminal investigations, 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976), and obstruc-
tion of state or local law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976). The Fourth Circuit
opinion in United States v. Altomare, 625 F,2d 5, 8 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1980), seems to
permit the government to allege patterns including an obstruction act committed to
conceal other racketeering acts in the pattern. Cf. United States v. Fineman, 434 F.
Supp. 189, 195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (government must allege and prove obstruction of
justice activities directed against witness who is not member of enterprise). A pattern
consisting of a single act and a concealment offense may involve more than one trans-
action and may have more continuity than the pattern consisting of a single act violat-
ing two statutes. Arguably, the concealment pattern, like the single transaction pat-
tern, does not pose a threat of continuing criminal activity. If the concealment is
successful, the criminal activity of the enterprise ceases and the threat disappears. If
the concealment is unsuccessful, only the threat of continued concealment remains
rather than the threat of independent criminal activities. In either case, it is difficult
to justify the imposition of harsh RICO penalties for one criminal act and conceal-
ment activities generally occurring in criminal ventures. Cf. Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (concealment activities do riot extend the duration of a
conspiracy for purposes of the statute of limitations and the co-conspirator non-
hearsay rule because all conspiracies involve some form of concealment).
265. Congress cautioned that, in light of the harsh penalties imposed, one isolated
activity is insufficient for the RICO offense. Senate Report, supra note 48, at 158; see
notes 233-34 supra and accompanying text.
266. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
267. Id. at 601 n.2. See also United States v. Choanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Weatherspoon concluded that a common scheme, plan, or motive
interpretation might be required to prevent the RICO statute from being attacked on
constitutional grounds of vagueness. 581 F.2d at 601 n.2. Weatherspoon, however, is
a mail fraud case that should be assessed with caution because of the difficulty in
applying that statute to Title IX. See note 259 supra.
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defendant can contend that, even though one criminal transaction
produced two racketeering acts, those acts were merely sporadic and
do not pose a threat of continuing activity. 26
3. "Common Scheme" and Joinder
The deficiency of the "common scheme" approach in relation to the
single transaction issue, together with the absence of support for that
construction in both the statutory language and the legislative history,
might undermine the validity of that construction. There is, however,
a broader question of the relationship between section 1962 and rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(a) permits
joinder of an individual defendant's offenses only if they "are of same
or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on
two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan." 269
Application of this standard to a RICO offense for which no com-
mon scheme or other relationship between the racketeering acts is
required could produce considerable confusion. If a defendant were
charged with a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of two unre-
lated offenses, joinder of the two offenses and the RICO count in a
single trial might be barred. 270 Two alternative conclusions are pos-
sible. One is that Congress intended to create a RICO offense that
precludes joinder of unrelated predicate offenses in a single trial. A
second, more logical hypothesis is that Congress intended that section
1962(c) racketeering acts be sufficiently related so that joinder of the
predicate offenses in the crime is possible.
The common scheme construction of "pattern" is a useful approach
to reconciling RICO with the joinder rules. If this analysis is adopted,
however, the "pattern" definition must also resolve the "single trans-
action" problem by requiring that the racketeering acts be separated
from one another by a substantial period of time. This could be ac-
complished by adopting the "series of transactions" language of rule
8. A pattern would be composed of two or more transactions that are
part of a common scheme or plan, but not so closely related in time
as to be part of the same transaction. This formulation may ensure
that the defendants' activities are characterized by sufficient con-
tinuity to pose the serious threat to society that jusiifies the imposi-
tion of severe RICO penalties.
268. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975) (em-
phasizing the "continuity" element in the legislative history as support for its criti-
cism of single transaction patterns), see notes 232-34 supra and accompanying text.
269. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
270. The two offenses are not transformed into connected transactions under rule
8(a) merely because RICO incorporates them into a single offense. Rule 8(b) contains
the language "constituting an offense," which would support this construction. Rule
8(a), however, contains no such language. See notes 595-96 infra,
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D. Racketeering Activity
The racketeering acts 271 forming a pattern must come within the
definition of "racketeering activity" in section 1961(1). That definition
includes eight state offenses and twenty-four categories of federal of-
fenses. 272
1. Incorporated Federal Offenses
Few significant issues relating to the federal offenses described in
section 1961(1) have been litigated. 273 One problem has been the
271. A person can only be charged with those racketeering acts in which he par-
ticipated as a principal, that is, when he commits an offense or aids and abets its
commission. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, racketeering acts cannot be imputed to a person through vicarious liabil-
ity. See United States v. Cryan, 490 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-43 (D.N.J. 1980). Cryan
rejected the vicarious liability doctrine in the context of a discussion of RICO
conspiracy and evidentiary principles. See notes 480-83 infra and accompanying text.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). Section 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" as:
"(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
erv, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), . . . sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section
501(C) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
bankruptcy, fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, im-
portation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States." Different
rules of statutory construction apply to §§ 1961(1)(B) and (C), which refer to specific
incorporated statutes, and subsections (A) and (D), which employ general references
to incorporated offenses. If a statute enumerated in (B) and (C) is or has been
amended or repealed after October 15, 1970, the effective date of Title IX, the courts
may be required to ignore those developments and apply the law existing on that
date. This approach follows from the rule of statutory construction providing that
when a statute specifically incorporates another statute an amendment to the incorpo-
rated statute will not affect the adopting statute unless contrary legislative intent is
clearly shown. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938). Because of the absence of'
a clear congressional intent to the contrary, statutes enumerated in § 1961(l)(B) and
(C) must be construed as if no amendments had occurred after October 15, 1970. In
contrast, amendments to the offenses mentioned in § 1961(1) (A) and (D) would be
effective for purposes of Title IX because those subsections refer to the law generally
relating to a particular subject. See generally Professional and Business Men's Lite
Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 294 (1). Mont. 1958).
273. One litigated issue concerned § 1961(I)(C), defining racketeering activity its
any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186." In
United States v. Kave, 556 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921
(1977), the defendant unsuccessfully pointed out that - violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(b)(1) is a misdemeanor and, as such, was not intended to fall within the scope of
the term "indictable." He described the inclusion of § 186 into § 1961(1)(C) its a
mistake and asserted that § 186 should be stricken from the statute. In rejecting this
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puzzling insertion of parentheticals in section 1961(1)(B) and (C) ex-
plaining the nature of the crimes set forth in the enumerated stat-
utes.2 74  These summaries have caused difficulties when the indict-
ment alleges actions that would normally constitute violations of the
predicate offense but that do not violate the statute as described in
the parentheticals. 275  The Fifth Circuit has held that the summaries
were merely intended to aid in identiR'ing the enumerated statutes,
not to limit the scope of those offenses. 276  Unfortunately, the court
neither explained why an aid to identification is needed nor consid-
ered rules of statutory construction that discourage interpretations
rendering statutory language redundant or superfluous .277 Neverthe-
less, the brief descriptions are unnecessary to express the intent of
argument, the court noted that misdemeanors are indictable in the sense that, under
Fed. R. Crim. P.7(a), they, can be prosecuted either by indictment or information.
556 F.2d at 859-60. A more significant issue may arise from attempts by the govern-
ment to include nonenumerated offenses within the broad language of predicate
crimes such as mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). and interstate transportation of
stolen property. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (1976). For example, the government has
alleged that violations of copyright laws. which are misdemeanors, constituted trans-
portation of stolen property. United States v. Gottesman. No. 80-59 (S.D. Fla., in-
dictment filed Feb. 12, 1980). In Gottesman, a defendant was accused of pirating
video cassettes and charged with a RICO violation under the theory that the pirated
movies were stolen property. Id.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976); see note 272 supra.
275. See United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1979) cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980). In Herring. the predicate offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1976), was described in § 1961(1) with the following summary: "'tRelating to in-
terstate transportation of stolen property)." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1 (1976). The indict-
ment, however, alleged a violation of § 2314 resulting from interstate transportation
of property concerted or taken by fraud rather than interstate transportation of vtoh'n
property. The defendant contended that, even if the alleged conduct %%as a violation of
§ 2314, the description of § 2314 in § 1961(1) limited its use, for RICO purposes, to
transportation of stolen property. 602 F.2d at 1223.
276. See United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980). Herring contrasted the language in § 19611 limiting
the incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 659 offenses with the language in § 2314 and said
that "[i]f Congress had intended to exclude the interstate transportation of property
obtained by fraud from its definition in section 1961, it specifically could have limited
the incorporation of section 2314 as it did the incorporation of section 659, where
only felonious acts under section 659 are included." 602 F.2d at 1'13.
277. The courts have often held that, if possible, all parts of an act are to be given
effect. See, e.g., Administrator, Federal Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 4"22 U.S. 25.5,
262 (1975); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott and Dunning. Inc.. 412 '.S. 609, 634
(1973). This rule cautions against a construction that renders any wsords and prosi-
sions redundant, superfluous, or insignificant. E.g.. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961): Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe. 5:36 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). Generally, courts are reluctant to assume that a legislative body employed
accidental or careless language. Griffin v. United States, 537 F.2d 1130, 1136 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Johnson. 462
F.2d 423, 428 (3d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 11973).
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the statute and should be regarded as mere surplusage without sub-
stantive effect. 2 78
a. Marijuana Offenses
A more significant ambiguity in the definition of "racketeering ac-
tivity" involves the question whether Title IX applies to marijuana
offenses. Although the government is prosecuting marijuana activities
as RICO violations, 279 section 1961(1)(D) merely states that Title IX
incorporates "any offense involving .. . the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs." 280  Narcotic and
dangerous drugs are not defined. The absence of the word
"marijuana," together with specific references to that drug at various
stages of RICO's legislative history, strongly indicates that section
1961(1)(D) does not encompass marijuana offenses. For example, an
early RICO proposal. S. 2049,281 prohibited the acquisition of a busi-
ness with income derived from "criminal activity" and the agent of a
corporation from authorizing the corporation to engage in "criminal
activity."' 2 2  The term "criminal activity" included federal offenses
specifically involving "narcotic drugs or marihuana, language that ap-
peared in eleven subsequent RICO proposals." '2 3  Additionally,
278. Words that are unnecessary to express the intent of the act can be regarded
as surplusage if the intent of the legislature is clear. Young v. Brashears, 560 F.2d
1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1977). In the case of Title IX, the inclusion of the title and
section numbers of the incorporated statutes would have been completely adequate
to identify the offenses.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Rittenberg, No. 80-0256S (S.D. Cal., indictment
filed April 21, 1980); United States v. Sneed, No. 79-10-CR (E.D. Tex., indictment
filed July 10, 1979).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976).
281. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Measures Relating to Or-
ganized Crime, supra note 36, at 37.
282. Id. §§ 2(a), (b), reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra
note 36, at 39-40.
283. Id. § 1(1), reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note
36, at 37. The eleven proposals were: S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969),
reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 36, at 37; H.Ri.
10077, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 155,
at 919, 919-20; H.R. 9710, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 155, at 910, 910-11; H.R. 9327, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 155, at 872, 872-73; H.R. 7596, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 155, at 846,
846-47; H.R. 5216, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 155, 808, 808-09; H.R. 2774, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted
in House Hearings, supra note 155, at 774, 774-75; H.R. 2697, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 155, at 765, 765-66; H.R. 2154,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 155, at
745, 745-46; H.R. 760, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 155, at 731, 731-32; H.R. 326, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted
in House Hearings, supra note 155, at 719, 719-20.
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when a subsequent RICO proposal, S. 1861,284 was introduced, the
Justice Department suggested that the definition of "racketeering ac-
tivity" include acts involving "narcotic drugs, marihuana or other
dangerous drugs." 28 5
Outside the legislative history, the only source of enlightenment as
to the meaning of "narcotic or other dangerous drugs" are other def-
initions provided in the United States Code. The definition of "nar-
cotic drug" in 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) does not include marijuana. 286
Moreover, many courts refuse to characterize marijuana as a "narcotic
drug." 287 Although the term "dangerous drugs" is not used in any
other federal statute, it is unlikely that marijuana is sufficientlY
hazardous to fall within the category of dangerous drugs. 8  Even
Professor Blakey, a leading proponent of broad construction of Title
IX and thought to be the principal draftsman of the statute, has con-
ceded that marijuana violations are not punishable under RICO. 289
284. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 9512 (1969).
285. Letter of Deputy Att'v Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to Sen. John L_ McClel-
lan (Aug. 11, 1969), reprinted in measures Relating to Orgcanized Crime. wupra note
36, at 405. The courts have held that Congress' rejection of specific language indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to incorporate the proposal in the final statute
See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 460-61 (1974).
286. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (1976). The "narcotic drug" definition in § 802(16) is
limited to "opium, coca leaves, or opiates" and their derivates. Marijuana is sepa-
rately defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) (1976).
287. See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir., cert. denied, 441
U.S. 831 (1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743. 745 (D. Conn. 1973).
People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); People v. Sinclair, 37
Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972).
288. See generally National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforce-
ment Admin., 559 F.2d 735, 749, 751 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Kiffer,
477 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973). People v. Sinclair,
387 Mich. 91, 104, 194 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1972). The phrase, "dangerous drugs," is
commonly used to describe prescription drugs and hallucinogenic's that are diverted
from domestic supplies. Marijuana is not regarded as a dangerous drug because it is
smuggled from abroad and has been historically subject to different forms of regula-
tion. See President's Advisory Comm'n on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, Final Report 35
(1963); President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, The Chad-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society 214-16 (1967).
289. In a lecture delivered on August 9, 1979 to the Cornell Institute on Or-
ganized Crime Summer Program on Labor Racketeering, Professor Blakey asserted
that the statute includes "narcotics and other dangerous drugs. it does not include
marijuana. [The] language is such that you cannot infer that marijuana is a dangerous
drug [under] RICO. There are no federal RICO marijuana prosecutions. There may
be some state ones, but there's not going to be any federal ones, and that wvas a
conscious policy choice by the Congressmen involved." Blakey. Materials on RICO:
Criminal Overciew, in 1 Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, Techniques in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime 24 (1980). The increasing number
of marijuana related RICO prosecutions indicates that the prosecuting authorities are
not overly concerned with Congress' policy decision.
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b. Conspiracy as a Predicate Offense
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Weisinan 290 sig-
nificantly expanded the scope of the term "racketeering activity"
when it held that a conspiracy may be a predicate offense under sec-
tion 1961(1)(D). 29' The court reasoned that conspiracy was included
in the category of "any offense involving" securities fraud, bankruptcy
fraud, or felonious dealing in narcotic and other dangerous drugs, 2 2
although the holding was expressly limited to the section 1961(1)(D)
offenses. Conspiracy could not be alleged for the (B) and (C) oflnses
because those subsections apply to "any act which is indictable tin-
der" certain enumerated statutes.29 3 Therefore, unless one of' those
statutes incorporated a conspiracy provision, the act of conspiracy
would not be indictable under those statutes.
A more difficult question is whether conspiracy can be a predicate
offense under section 1961(1)(A), which refers to "any act or threat
involving" eight crimes under state law. 294 Certainly, a conspiracy
can be regarded as "involving" these crimes. The issue, however, is
whether it is significant that section 1961(1)(A) uses the term "act or
threat" while section 1961(D) uses the term "offense." Arguably,
while an agreement to commit a crime is an "offense involving" that
crime, it is legally distinguishable from the act of committing the
crime and is therefore not an "act or threat involving" the state
crimes.
2. Incorporated State Offenses
Section 1962(1)(A) sets forth the state offenses that constitute "rack-
eteering activity" and defines that activity to include "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which
is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year. " 295 This language establishes a three-pronged
test requiring that the act or threat involve the crimes set forth, that
the act be "chargeable" under state law, and that the act be punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year.
a. Generic Designation of State Offenses
A major difficulty is that a state may have both common law and
statutory criminal offenses that resemble the enumerated crimes. If,
290. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1980) (No. 80-62).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976).
292. 624 F.2d at 1123-24 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976)).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(B), (C) (1976),
294. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976) (emphasis added).
295. Id.
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for example, the state has a "bribery" statute that does not impose
more than one year of imprisonment as required by section
1961(1)(A), the government will attempt to find a common law or
other statutory offense that can be considered "bribery" and that im-
poses a prison term longer than one year. 296  Holding that "[sItate
offenses are included by generic designation," the courts have permit-
ted the government to rely on those alternative offenses. 297 This ap-
proach is supported by the legislative history underlying Title IX
which states that "[s]tate offenses are included by generic designa-
tion." 298
The generic designation test to determine whether activity can be
prosecuted under RICO focuses not on "the manner in which States
classify their criminal prohibitions but whether the particular state
involved prohibits the . . . activity charged." 29 9  Under this test, the
court must determine "whether the indictment charges a type of ac-
tivity generally known or characterized in the proscribed cate-
gory." °3 00  Applying this test to the briben example, the Third Cir-
cuit has held that common law briben and the statutory offense of
296. The bribery' hypothetical discussed in the text is derived from United States
v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir.), recv' 429 F. Supp. 715 W, D. Pa. 1977).
involving a bail bond agency making systematic payments to magistrates and other
employees of a county court in return for the referral of defendants. The § 1962(c)
charge was based on violations of a state bribery statute that did not impose more
than one year of imprisonment and thus did not satisfy the § 1961)ltA) test. The
district court thus concluded that some defendants could not be prosecuted for rack-
eteering activity under that state statute. 429 F. Supp. at 722-23. The appellate court
reversed, however, noting that other state statutes, not termed "briber statutes, co-
vered this conduct and prescribed more than one year of imprisonment. 560 F.2d at
1137-38.
297. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137-38 (3d Cir,). rer 429 F.
Supp. 715, 722-23 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (quoting House Report, supra note 154. at 56.
reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4032): accord. United States v. Salinas,
564 F.2d 688, 689-91 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 951 (1978). United
States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977). ef Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 (1979) (18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976) includes all state crimes
within generic designation).
298. House Report, supra note 154. at 56 reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 4032.
299. United States v. Forsvthe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286. 295 (1969)).
300. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977). This test is
extremely vague. The "generally known or characterized'" language fails to clarify
which group of people have such knowledge or to make such a characterization. It
seems unlikely that the general public would know what constitutes a category of-
fense or would be able to draw fine distinctions between offenses that fall within the
category and those that do not. With no standards for determining when such con-
structions are too broad, the "generic designation" test seems to invite federal courts
to construe a generic category as broadly as they wish. It is arguable, for example,
that anyone contributing money to an election campaign in excess of the limits estab-
lished b state election laws has committed an act within the generic category of
bribery.
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soliciting public officers to influence their actions are within the
generic category of "bribery" for purposes of Title IX. 301
b. Applicability of State Procedure
The major issue arising from the incorporation of state offenses into
Title IX is whether state procedural statutes govern RICO prosecu-
tions. Frequently, this issue is raised by defendants who claim that
the expiration of the state statute of limitations precludes the prosecu-
tion of state offenses under RICO. 30 2 Citing the requirement in sec-
tion 1961(1)(A) that the act be "chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," 30 3 they have
contended that the act must be chargeable and punishable at the time
of the indictment; therefore, after the expiration of the state statute of
limitations period, the state offense is no longer chargeable or
punishable. 30 4
301. 560 F.2d at 1136-38; see United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194
(E.D. Pa. 1977). Neither Forsythe nor Fineman considered the problem arising from
the inclusion of common law crimes within the generc designation of bribery. One
difficulty stems from the lack of any common law offenses against the United States.
United States v. Harold, 588 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1979); Dickey v. United
States, 404 F.2d 882, 883-84 (5th Cir. 1968). It could be argued by extension that a
federal offense may not incorporate state common law offenses as predicate offenses.
A second problem is determining whether the common law offense carries a prison
term of more than one year. A statutorily prescribed prison term for the common law
offense probably would not exist. Nevertheless, if the statutory offense is not within §
1961(1)(A) because it does not impose more than one year of imprisonment, it is
difficult to understand whv the term should be longer for the common law offense.
302. United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1978), United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 418 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194-95 (E.D. Pa.
1977). A similar argument has been advanced regarding a state speedy trial rule
whose time period had expired. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757-58
(5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 846 (1979). Defendants have requested instructions on state law matters
such as lesser included offenses, United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947, 952 (3d
Cir. 1979), and corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. United States v. Brown,
555 F.2d 407, 418 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). They have
also contended that an acquittal in state court precludes the use of the state offense
as a racketeering activity in federal court. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748,
757 (5th Cir.), affd on. rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 43. U.S. 1072 (1978); see notes 548-57 infra and accompanying
text. In each of these cases, the court rejected the defendant's arguments.
303. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976) (emphasis added).
304. See United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F.
Supp. 189, 194-95 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d
1083, 1097 (3d Cir. 1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (acquittal on state offense should
preclude the charging or punishment of the conduct), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978).
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The courts have uniformly rejected this contention, holding that
the reference to state law in Title IX exists for the purpose of defining
prohibited conduct and not for incorporating state statutes of limita-
tions or other procedural rules. 305  The Third Circuit has reasoned
that the Congressional intent expressed in RICO was not to punish
state law offenses, but to punish the impact on commerce caused by
conduct that meets the section 1961 definition of racketeering activ-
ity.3 0 6  The courts have further responded that "chargeable" and
"punishable" apply to the time when the offense was committed.3 0 7
This construction effectively eliminates the impact of any state pro-
cedural rule that would bar a prosecution in state court.30 8
305. See United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748. 757 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehear-
ing en bane, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 846 (1979). United
States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1977), United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 418 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 435 U.S. 904
(1978). These courts rely by analogy on the holding in United States v. Revel, 493
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975). Revel deternined tlut, in
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976), the reference to state law was to define the conduct prohib-
ited and was not meant to incorporate the state statute of limitations or procedural
rules. The court in United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 n.11 t3d Cir.
1977), applied the Revel holding, reasoning that, since Title IX and § 1955 were
enacted together within the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, they should be
construed in pari materia.
306. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127. 1135 (3d Cir. 1977). This argument
is seriously flawed. If RICO was intended to punish the impact on commerce, it is
difficult to comprehend why so little evidence is needed zo establish an impact. See
pt. III(G) infra. Additionally, RICO cannot be viewed as focusing on the impact on
interstate commerce, because conduct with an equal impact on commerce is
punished differently due to variations in the laws of the states dealing %%ith the of-
fenses enumerated in § 1961. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 7. A similar objection can
be made to the assertion that the application of a state statute of limitations would
result in "unequal enforcement of a federal statute because of variations between the
statutes of limitation in force in the various states." Id. at 8. The commentator fails to
recognize that Title IX initially ensures unequal enforcement by incorporating state
substantive laws that van' from one state to another.
307. United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
836 (1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194-95 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
308. Judge Aldisert's concurring opinion in United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065,
1068-71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 836 (1978). sharply criticized the insertion
of "at the time the offense was committed" into the statute as "a judicial, not legisla-
tive, definition of criminal activity, a genre of statutor, interpretation outlawed by a
host of Supreme Court decisions." Id. at 1069 (Aldisert, J.. concurring temphasis
deleted). Judge Aldisert found that "[t]his semantic excursion ignores the precise
language Congress utilized in § 1961(I)(A), to-wit, 'an% act or threat involving ...
briber' . . . which is chargeable under State law . . . .' The present tense of the
copulative verb 'is' was used. The use of the present tense indicates that this provi-
sion is to apply only to those acts chargeable and punishable at the time of the
indictment. Had Congress intended othervise it just as easily could have added *was
or has been'; indeed, Congress could have used the words tle majority has added to
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The rationale of the cases rejecting state procedural rules is ques-
tionable because of the facile distinction between substantive and
procedural laws. 30 9 The prevailing position assumes that substantive
statutes can be appropriated and all statutes labeled as procedural can
be ignored. The difficulty is that substantive statutes may incorporate
elements that could be regarded as procedural. For example, the
"pattern" component of section 1962, an element of the RICO sub-
stantive offense, could seemingly be characterized as procedural. If
RICO were a state statute incorporated within a federal statute, a
court could conceivably find that the rule requiring that the rack-
eteering acts occur within ten years of one another and that one act
occur after the effective date is a procedural rule analogous to a stat-
ute of limitations. Despite the problem of determining which rules
are procedural, the structure of Title IX is inconsistent with the ap-
plication of a state statute of limitations because the ten year re-
quirement of the "pattern" definition would be undermined. If, for
example, a RICO indictment alleging state offenses committed in
1979 and 1972 were returned in 1980, a five year statute of limita-
tions would eliminate the 1972 offense, even though it occurred
within the ten year period. 310
E. Relationship Between Illegal Activity and the
Affairs of the Enterprise: The "'Through"
Element
Ostensibly, section 1962(c) requires that an enterprise's affairs be
conducted "through" a pattern of racketeering activity or the collec-
tion of an unlawful debt.311 If a legitimate enterprise is alleged, the
majority of courts have required a substantial nexus between the pro-
hibited activity and the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. 312 In con-
the statute: 'is chargeable under State law at the time the offense was committed.
But Congress did not add these words, and we cannot." Id. at 1069 (Aldisert, J.,
concurring) (emphasis deleted).
309. In other contexts, federal courts have encountered considerable difficulty in
distinguishing between substantive and procedural law. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem as it discussed Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
310. This conflict may be the problem the court in United States v. Fineman, 434
F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977), referred to when it noted that application of a state
statute of limitations would "render the definition of 'pattern' essentially meaning-
less." Id. at 194.
311. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
312. United States v. Scotto, Nos. 1131-32, slip op. at 5374 (2d Cir. Sept. 2,
1980); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1374-76 (4th Cir.), af'd per curaln
en bane, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980), United
States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (E.D. Mo. 1978); United
States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); see United States v.
Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1977) (assumed without deciding that such a
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trast, this nexus is irrelevant when illegal enterprises are involved
because the enterprise itself is the pattern or the collection.313
1. Private Business Enterprises
The failure to establish this nexus resulted in the reversal of a sec-
tion 1962(c) conviction in United States' v. Nerone.3 14 The govern-
ment had alleged that the defendant conducted the afiirs of an en-
terprise, a corporation operating a mobile home park, through illegal
gambling. However, the only proof of a connection between tile
gambling and the corporation was that the gambling occurred on
property owned by the corporation. Holding that the prosecution
failed to satisfy the "through" element, 15 the court adopted the posi-
tion that the word "through" requires proof of a nexus between the
nexus exists), vacated and remanded. 439 U.S. 810 (1978). The Southern District of
New York has repeatedly rejected a nexus requirement. See United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (enterprise included broker who did
not manage or operate enterprise): United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55. 58
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no relationship required between defendant's acts and union activ-
ity), aff'd mer., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.). cert. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
United States v. Stofsk', 409 F. Supp. 609. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (RICO does not
require that racketeering act play any role in the usual operation of the enterprise).
The question of the existence and extent of the "'nexus" requirement is significantly
related to the "common scheme" interpretation of pattern. A decision rejecting the
-common scheme" method of relating racketeering acts reasoned that the only requi-
site relationship was that of the predicate crimes to the affairs of the enterprise.
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.'23 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). Under this rationale, courts rejecting the "common scheme" analysis
should stringently apply the "nexus" element. See notes 469-77 infra and accompany-
ing text.
313. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358. 1366 n.13 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (if government had al-
leged illegal gambling operation as the enterprise, case would not have been re-
versed for failure to establish connection between racketeering and corporation al-
legedly used as "front"), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
314. 563 F.2d 836, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 951 (1978)
315. Id. But cf. United States v. Swiderski. 593 F.2d 1246. 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
§ 1962 (c) conviction upheld when defendant owned all stock of corporation operat-
ing restaurant and narcotic trafficking occurred in room of restaurant in wshich corpo-
rate records were kept), cert. denied. 441 U.S. 933 t19 79). The performance of illegal
activity on property owned by the enterprise w%-as lso held insufficient to support a
1962(c) charge in United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). In
Dennis, the government alleged that the defendant, a non-managerial employee at a
General Motors factory, collected unlawful debts from co-employees on the premises
of the factory. The clharged enterprise was General Motors Corporation. The court
dismissed the RICO count, reasoning that although there was a nexus between the
defendant's alleged activities and the enterprise itself, the allegations uere insutffi-
cient to establish a relationship with the conduct of the enterprise. 458 F. Supp. at
199. Dennis drew an important distinction. Its nexus requirement focused on the
conduct of the enterprise's affairs as it relates to the prohibited activity, it did not
focus on the enterprise itself. Id.
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prohibited acts and the operation of the enterprise. 316 It further
suggested three ways in which this relationship could have been es-
tablished: (1) investment of the gambling proceeds in the legitimate
enterprise; (2) channeling of gambling revenues into the enterprise;
or (3) use of gambling revenues to pay persons to perform services for
the enterprise. 317
Applying this nexus requirement, the Fourth Circuit concluded in
United States v. Mande1318 that the defendant's transfer of approxi-
mately half of his interest in the Security Investment Company to the
Governor of Maryland 319 failed to satisfy this requirement. 320  The
word "through" in section 1962(c) was cited as support for the re-
quirement that the racketeering acts must involve some form of active
operation or management of the enterprise.^2 1
A more complex problem involving the relationship of illegal acts to
the activities of the enterprise arose in United States v. DePalma . 322
The indictment alleged securities and bankruptcy fraud violations in
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, the Westchester Premier
Theatre Corporation. The defendant challenged the securities fraud
316. 563 F.2d at 851. The court adopted the definition of "through" found in
Black's Law Dictionary 1652 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968): "[Bly means of, in consequence of,
by reason of." The court held that this meaning required proof "that the affairs of the
charged enterprise were conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity." 563
F.2d at 851.
317. Id. While Nerone correctly reversed the conviction for lack of proof of the
"through" element, its standard is not sufficiently stringent. As required in the union
cases, see pt. III(E)(2) infra, the "through" element should demand some perform-
ance of one's duties in the legitimate enterprise through racketeering. Nerone held
that the use or investment of racketeering income in the legitimate enterprise is
sufficient to satisfy the § 1962(c) "through" test. This standard is clearly erroneous
because that type of conduct is covered by § 1962(a). Section 1962(c), however, is
aimed at the operation of an enterprise through racketeering, not racketeering in-
come. Consequently, the "through" element must require that the racketeering occur
during the performance of one's duties as an employee or owner of the legitimate
enterprise, a standard adopted in union cases. See notes 339-45 infra and accompany-
ing text.
318. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980).
319. In return for this transfer, and a 15% interest in another corporation, Rays'
Point, Inc., Governor Marvin Mandel allegedly used his influence in the Maryland
legislature to help a race track obtain more racing dates. Id. at 1354-56.
320. Id. at 1375. To support its decision, the opinion adopted the district court's
analysis: "[W]hile Congress specifically outlawed the acquisition of a business through
a pattern of racketeering activity it did not specifically proscribe the transfer of an
interest in an enterprise. Second, transfer of an interest in a business is the antithesis
of operating it. Third, . .. Mandel's interest was purely passive, and that he was not
entitled to any management role and did not have any. Finally, . . . the charged
enterprise [was] merel) a front for racketeering activity." Id. at 1376.
321. Id. at 1375. The court observed that this requirement was necessary in light
of the mandatory forfeiture penalties. Id.
322. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub non. United States v. Weisman,
624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No.
80-62).
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allegation by asserting that the sale in question did not occur in the
conduct of the enterprise's affairs because it was completed before the
formation of the corporation. The court disagreed, noting that the sale
occurred after the business had been incorporated. 323 The court -also
dismissed as frivolous an argument that the commission of bankruptcy
fraud did not occur in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, and
noted that the racketeering acts need only involve the affairs of the
enterprise, not the "day to day business operation" of the enter-
prise. 324
In addition to DePalma, three other opinions from the same district
have refused to apply the "nexus" requirement strictly'.32 United
States v. Chovanec,328 for example, rejected the restrictive view re-
quiring that the illegal activities occur in the operation or manage-
ment of the enterprise. The Chocanec court held instead that an in-
dependent broker's activities constituted indirect participation in the
affairs of the enterprise. 327
2. Union Enterprises
The remaining cases construing the "through" element of section
1962(c) have involved abuse of union 328 or government offices. 329 De-
323. Id. at 785. If the racketeering act occurred before incorporation, the defend-
ant would undoubtedly contend that he could not have participated in an enterprise
that did not exist. This position is somewhat analogous to the principle in conspiracy
law that the acts and declarations of alleged co-conspirators are not admi.ssible against
a defendant if those acts and declarations occurred prior to the formation of the
conspiratorial agreement. See Minner v. United States, 57 F.2d 506, 511 tl0th Cir.
1932). A conceptual difficulty is inherent in this position, however. Because a pre-
incorporation agreement is not binding on a corporation unless and until the corpora-
tion ratifies or adopts that agreement, Air Traffic & Serv. Corp. v. Fa%. 196 F.2d 40.
42 (D.C. Cir. 1952), the government could claim that a sale of securities that oc-
curred before incorporation is complete upon ratification or adoption and that, there-
fore, the fraudulent sale actually occurred while the corporation enterprise w aN in
existence.
324. 461 F. Supp. at 786.
325. See United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y 1977), aff'd mim.. 578 F.2d 1371 12d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Stofsk\. 409 F. Supp.
609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
326. 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
327. Id. at 44.
328. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977). racah d and rtnandd,
439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 tS.D.N.Y. 1977). aff'd
mere., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 (1978). United States v.
Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The most complex "'union enterprise" case involved Anthony
Scotto, president of Local 1814 of the International Longshoremen's Association
(ILA). Scotto was convicted of receiving numerous unlawful pa, ments totalling over
$300,000 from employers of union members. These paytments \%ere made to redutce
the number of fraudulent and exaggerated accident claims b\ ILA wvorkers against
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fendants have contended that Title IX is not directed at individuals
who take advantage of these posts for their personal gain, but rather,
the requirement of a nexus to the enterprise's affairs limits section
1962(c) to unions or government entities whose activities were actu-
ally conducted illegally. 330 One response to this argument has been
the rejection of any "nexus" requirement. For example, two cases in-
volving union enterprises have held that the government need not
offer any proof "regarding the advancement of the union's affairs by
the defendant's activities, or proof that the union itself is corrupt, or
proof that the union authorized the defendant to do" the racketeering
acts. 331 United States v. Salvitti,332 which involved the alleged re-
ceipt of bribes by a government official, 333 recognized the nexus ele-
ment but held that it was satisfied because the receipt of a bribe in
connection with the official's duty was sufficiently related to the affairs
of the governmental enterprise. 33
4
Three cases involving alleged corruption by union officials indicate
that the "nexus" requirement is not invariably satisfied when a
defendant uses a position for gain. In United States v. Rubin,335 the
defendant claimed that section 1962(c) required the government to
establish that he acquired or maintained his labor union position by
the alleged acts of embezzlement, or that those acts furthered his
ability to participate in or conduct the affairs of the union. The gov-
ernment contended that it was sufficient to establish the defendant's
commission of two offenses during the course of his employment with
the enterprise. 336 Although the court assumed, without definitely
their employers; to prevent employers from losing waterfront related business; and to
secure additional business in exchange for payments to Scotto. United States v.
Scotto, Nos. 1131-32 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1980): Welling, On the Waterfront Front
Maine to Texas, a Crescent of Corruption, Barron's, Jan. 21, 1980, at 4, col. 1; id. at
5, col. 1; id. at 8, col. 3.
329. United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa), aff'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir. 1978).
330. See id. at 199; United 8tates v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd mee., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
331. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mer., 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); accord, United States v.
Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also United States v. Scadzitti,
408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-16 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 569 (3d
Cir. 1977). Stofsky concluded that, although no particular degree of interrelationship
is required in the statute, § 1962(c) is not unconstitutionally vague as to the requisite
nexus.
332. 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978).
333. The official was the Executive Director of the Redevelopment Authority of'
Philadelphia, who allegedly received bribes in return for settlement of a legal dis-
pute. Id. at 198-99.
334. Id. at 199.
335. 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
336. Id. at 989-90.
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deciding, that some relationship betveen the prohibited acts and the
maintenance of a union position is required, 337 it found the evidence
sufficient "to support a conclusion that appellant's embezzled funds
served his position in the union organizations." 338
The most stringent interpretation of the "nexus requirement was
applied in United States v. Ladmer,339 in which the government al-
leged that the defendants used their union positions for private gain
by charging the union for personal entertainment expenses at union
conventions. The Ladmner court established a "relationship" standard
that required a connection between the racketeering activity and the
"essential functions that the union served in the regular conduct of
union affairs." 340  "[I]rregularities committed in the course of the
otherwise lawful conduct of an enterprise" were distinguished from
the conduct of the enterprise in its essential functions. 341 Therefore,
the junketeering was held to be "a very small and infrequent part of
the conduct of union affairs" that did not satisfy this definition of the
relationship element. 342
A third union case, United States r. Gibson,343 rejected Ladiners
"restrictive interpretation," 344 but nonetheless dismissed the charges
for failure to satisfy the "nexus" element. The court held that embez-
zlement of union funds, resulting from three joy rides in a union
plane and a girl friend on the union payroll who may not have
worked full time, showed that the defendant had conducted his per-
337. Id. at 990. The court cited the Congressional "'Statement of Findings and
Purpose" of the Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91452, 84
Stat. 922, as well as the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). A recent Second Circuit
opinion, United States v. Scotto, Nos. 1131-32 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1980), seems to
adopt the compromise view expressed in Rubin. It required proof that the predic ite
acts are related to the enterprise or to the defendant's position %%ithin it. but it
rejected the defendant's instruction requiring that the acts be related to the operation
or management of the enterprise. Id., slip op. at 5373-75.
338. 559 F.2d at 990.
339. 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
340. Id. at 1243-45.
341. Id. at 1244.
342. Id. Based on the face of the statute. Ladinur may not be correct in distin-
guishing between affairs of the enterprise that are part of its essential functions and
those that are not as long as a racketeering act involved the conduct of the enter-
prise's affairs. From a policy standpoint, however, Ldiner may be regarded as an
indirect method by which the courts can preclude imposing draconian RICO penal-
ties for the commission of misdemeanors under 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976. Cf United
States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (conimon scheme construc-
tion required because of severe punishment of § 186 misdemeanors).
343. 486 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
344. Id. at 1243-44.
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sonal affairs, not the union's affairs, through a pattern of racketeer-
ing. 34 5
The conflicting views on the "nexus" requirement stem from a di-
lemma not expressly recognized in cases involving allegedly corrupt
government or union officials. The courts are understandably reluc-
tant to accept the position that Title IX is not aimed at individuals
who exploit their union or government posts for personal gain. This
approach would leave no situation in which the receipt of bribes
would be related to an enterprise, an absurd result in view of the
inclusion of bribery and embezzlement as RICO predicate offenses in
section 1961.346 Yet, the courts that have adopted the "nexus" re-
quirement have responded to an equally pressing concern that can be
illustrated by adapting the facts in United States v. Nerone 347 to a
union setting. Assume that a union official conducts illegal gambling
activity in his off-hours on property owned by the union, and that no
other connection exists between the gambling and the union. Unlike
bribery and embezzlement, which involve some performance of the
official's duty, the illegal gambling may be unrelated to his duties or
work. To hold that the defendant conducted the union's affairs
through gambling would distort the language of section 1962(c) by
implying that the defendant was conducting the union's affairs rather
than his own, and that the union's affairs were conducted through
gambling even though those affairs were not involved.
This distortion can be resolved by requiring that the illegal activity
occur while the defendant acts under color of authority as an
employee of the business, union, or government agency. 348  The
government would be required to prove, for example, that a union
official was acting or purporting to act as a union official at the time
he committed the racketeering acts. 349 If he was merely acting in his
individual capacity, the "through" element would not be satisfied.3 50
345. Id. at 1244-45.
346. Bribery, under state law is an underlying offense included in § 1961(1)(A),
while bribery under federal law is included in § 1961(1)(B). Embezzlement of union
funds is included in § 1961(1)(C). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A)-(C) (1976).
347. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978): see notes
314-16 supra and accompanying text.
348. An analogous test is the "color of law" standard in 18 U.S.C. § 2,2 (1976),
which punishes those who deprive others of their civil rights while acting tinder color
of law. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(B)(2) (1976) (definition of extortion includes obtain-
ing of property under "color of official right").
349. Cf. Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 1947) (A person acts
under color of law when "he acts, or purports, or pretends, to act pursuant to his
authority.").
350. This requirement would not unduly restrict RICO prosecutions because the
government could eliminate the relationship problem by alleging that the defendant
is an illegal enterprise. The "relationship" requirement merely prevents the applica-
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F. Mens Rea
The most significant ambiguity in section 1962(c) is its failure to
explicitly provide a scienter standard. 351 Surprisingly, few cases have
directly considered whether an intent requirement exists.35 2 In two
cases, the Second Circuit, without discussion, held that " '[t]he RICO
count does not include a scienter element over and above that re-
quired by the predicate crimes."' 35 3 One commentator has argued
that courts should adopt an element of scienter because of the severe
penalties imposed by Title IX. 354 Rather than focusing on the sever-
ity of the penalties, however, the commonly applied analysis of mens
rea reads a mens rea element into the statute if it punishes conduct
that is "wrong on principle," but not if it prohibits behavior to effect
some social policy. 355
If section 1962(c) were limited to the infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness, it could plausibly be contended that it is a social policy
tion of remedies such as forfeiture, dissolution, and divestiture to situations in w'hich
the enterprise is only marginally involved in the illegal activity.
351. See pt. II(A)(1) supra (mens rea in § 1962(a)).
352. United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Scotto, Nos. 1131-32, slip op. at 5377-78 (2d Cir. Sept. 2. 1980); United States v.
Bovlan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882). A few courts have noted in passing that there was suffi-
cient evidence of intent, although they did not decide whether an intent element
actually exists. See United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. McLaurin. 557 F.2d 1064, 1078
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978). Another RICO case admitted
evidence of similar uncharged crimes "to show [the defendant's] knowledge or intent
concerning the crimes charged, especially in light of his defense that he had been
drawn into these transactions." United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980). A possible explanation for the judicial
silence on the scienter issue is that the "common scheme" construction of pattern
operates as a substitute for an intent requirement, allbeit an inadequate one. See
notes 256-58 supra and accompanying text.
353. United States v. Scotto, Nos. 1131-32, slip op. at 5377 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1980)
(quoting United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 355, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882)). But see United States v. Pal-
meri, 630 F.2d 192, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1980). The Scotto court stated that the district
court had actually erred in the defendant's favor by implying in the charge to the
jury that specific intent was required. Nos. 1131-32, slip op. at 5378.
354. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 4-5. He further asserted that charging individual
enterprises would undermine a scienter requirement because "bv redefining the en-
terprise involved, . . .the prosecutor can allege that the individual defendant consti-
tuted his own enterprise and engaged in a small-scale illegal activity, of which the
defendant obviously was aware." Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). This fear is somewhat
overstated. This tactic would be of limited practical utility in multi-defendant enter-
prise cases because the intent of all defendants other than the one alleged to be the
enterprise must be established. The government could not merely allege that each is
a separate enterprise because defendants can be joined at a single trial only if they
are part of the same enterprise. See notes 582-600 infra and accompanying text.
355. See notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.
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crime. 35 6 One policy would be to prevent enterprises from using
illegal activities to gain a competitive advantage over law-abiding
businesses and drive them out of the market. This reasoning, how-
ever, is unsupportable in view of the courts' acceptance of the illegal
enterprise concept. A consequence of these holdings is that section
1962(c) sweeps far too broadly to characterize it as a social policy
crime. The application of section 1962(c) to purely illegal operations,
therefore, establishes that it punishes conduct because it is wrong in
principle. This conclusion requires that a mens rea element be read
into section 1962(c).
If a scienter element exists, the standard could be either general
knowledge that one is participating in an enterprise through illegal
activity or specific intent to participate in an enterprise through il-
legal activity, although the distinction between the two standards is
ordinarily not significant. United States v. Bailey 3 57 described two
categories of crimes to which a specific intent standard applies, one
composed of offenses, such as murder and treason, involving
"heightened culpability" and the other including inchoate offenses
such as attempt and conspiracy.3 58  Neither category accurately de-
scribes section 1962(c). Although the RICO offense carries severe
sanctions, murder and treason are obviously more serious. Nor is
section 1962(c) an inchoate crime because it requires the actual com-
mission of a pattern of racketeering activity. 359 In the absence of a
compelling rationale for imposing a specific intent requirement, the
statute would come within the broader category of general intent of-
fenses involving knowledge of the elements of the crime. 360
356. The Senate Report on RICO, Senate Report, supra note 48, indicates that
Title IX was regarded as a social policy crime because it was limited to the illegal
operation or acquisition of legitimate businesses. It states that "the courts have em-
phasized that the prohibition is not a penalty against any, individual. It is instead a
protection of the public against parties engaging in certain types of businesses after
the%" have shown that they, are likely to run the organization in a manner detrimental
to the public interest. In the spirit of this background, title IX, it must be again
emphasized, is remedial rather than penal. It is based upon the judgment that parties
who conduct organizations affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of crimi-
nal activity are acting contrary to the public interest. To protect the public, these
individuals must be prohibited from continuing to engage in this type of activity in
any capacity." Id. at 82: see note 154 supra.
357. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
358. Id. at 405.
359. Cf. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 29, at 1509 (discussing § 1962(a)).
360. This is the standard applied in criminal antitrust actions. See United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-45 (1978). If the substantive provisions
of Title IX are modeled on antitrust provisions, see pt. I(B) supra, the antitrust intent
standard is applicable by analogy.
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G. Impact on Interstate Commerce
1. Necessity of Proof of Interstate Commerce
Effect
The final element of a section 1962(c) offense involves proof that
the activities of the enterprise affected interstate commerce. 361 Rely-
ing on an analog)
, to cases holding that proof of that jurisdictional
element is unnecessary in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1955,362
which punishes certain illegal gambling businesses, the government
has often argued, without success, that it is not obligated to establish
an impact on interstate commerce. 3 3  The courts have distinguished
section 1955 cases on the grounds that section 1955 is silent as to any
interstate commerce element 36 while section 1962 includes that lan-
guage, 365 and that unlike section 1962, section 1955 was accompanied
by special findings of Congress that the prohibited activity involved
the widespread use of, and impact on, interstate comnerce. 366
2. Connection Between Illegal Activity and
Interstate Commerce
Although the courts have required proof of the interstate element,
they have been generally unreceptive to interpretations that place a
substantial burden on the government. For example, they have re-
jected the contention that Title IX requires proof not only of a con-
nection between the enterprise and interstate commerce, but also of
361. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
362. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976): sec United States v. Hunter. 478 F.2d 1019, 1021
(7th Cir.) (construing Perez v. United States. 402 U.S. 146 (1971)). cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230. 233-34 (2d Cir. 1972), va-
cated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
363. E.g., United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836. 853 (7th Cir. 1977). crt. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
364. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979). acrt denied.
100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980): United States v. Malatesta. 583 F.2d 748, 754 tSth Cir. 1978).
aff'd on rehearing en banc. 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.). ert- dehnhed, 444 U.S. 846
(1979): United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1977. cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978), United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 ,i.22 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd mein., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979). cert. denicd. 444 U.S. 1072 1980.
365. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on re-
hearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 846 j1979). United
States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091. 1097 (E.D. Pa.). affd inen., 60.5 F.2d 1199
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
366. United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1977. -rt dented.
435 U.S. 951 (1978). In United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1091 7th Cir.). c'rt.
denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), a § 1955 case, the court einphasized the 19, 35 special
legislative findings and concluded that the- were *'sufficient to support the statute
even when applied to individual members of the class whose own activities ,nay not
have any demonstrable impact on interstate commerce." Id. at 1021.
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an impact on the interstate commerce by the pattern of racketeering
or collection of unlawful debts. 36 7  Consequently, the government
has been required to establish only that the activities of the enter-
prise affect interstate commerce. 368 One case, United States v. Vi-
gnola,36 9 focused on language in section 1962 referring only to the
requirement that the enterprise be "engaged in, or [its] activities...
affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 370  The court commented
that this language, combined with the absence of any language con-
cerning the impact of patterns of racketeering or collections on com-
merce, was a persuasive indication of legislative intent. 371 The court
367. See Third Circuit, supra note 29, at 275.
368. United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 8 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980);
United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-1100 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mere., 605
F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
369. 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd inem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979).
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
370. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
371. 464 F. Supp. at 1097. The Vignola court also abserved that, if Congress had
intended that the racketeering activity affect commerce, it would have been unneces-
sarv to include extortion as a RICO predicate offense because extortion affecting
commerce was already prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 '1976). 464 F. Supp. at 1097
n.19. The court engaged in a second stage of analysis to determine whether Congress
could constitutionally punish racketeering activity that is purely local in effect. Using
a "class of activities" test, the court determined what class of activities Congress
regulated and whether that class was within reach of federal power. Id. at 1098. The
analysis was limited to "determining whether Congress had a rational basis for finding
that the regulated activity affects commerce, and, if it had such a basis, whether the
means selected to regulate the activity are reasonable and appropriate." Id. The court
described the class of activity regulated by, Title IX as "that class of racketeering
activity engaged in by persons associated with enterprises whose activities affect in-
terstate commerce." Id. The court found that RICO was reasonable and appropriate
to regulate that activity, and concluded that, because the defendant's racketeering
activities were within the class regulated by RICO, it was irrelevant that the bribery
was purely local. Id. at 1099. One commentator has sharply criticized Vignola on
constitutional grounds. Third Circuit, supra note 29, at 275. Pointing out that stat-
utes enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, gener-
ally- require some nexus between the defendant's activities and interstate commerce,
he asserts that Congress would overreach its commerce power if there were no re-
quirement that the racketeering activity have some effect on interstate commerce.
Third Circuit, supra note 29, at 275. He further notes that Vignola cited only crilmi-
nal statutes that actually require some nexus between the defendant and interstate
commerce. Id. The incorporation of state offenses as predicate crimes raises the ar-
gument that Congress exceeded its authority under the commerce clause by usurping
state law enforcement power. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 5-6. Although it is likely
that this challenge would be rejected, id., one court has expressed the perhaps un-
founded expectation "that government prosecutorial policy will reserve use of this
statute for racketeers, leaving local crimes to local authorities." United States v. Ale-
man, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
[Vol. 49
assumed a Congressional finding that all patterns affect commerce:
therefore, the government need not prove that the pattern -affected
commerce. In contrast, the court determined that Congress made no
such finding with respect to RICO enterprises.3 72
This distinction breaks down if, as is assumed by the majority of
courts, Congress also intended to apply Title IX to illegal enter-
prises. 373 The practical effect of the illegal enterprise concept is that
the enterprise is nothing more than the pattern of racketeering or
collection of unlawful debts.374 In illegal enterprise cases, therefore,
the effect of the interstate commerce element of Title LX is to require
that the pattern or collection affect commerce.3 75  If Congress had
intended both the illegal enterprise concept and the Vignola 376 con-
clusion, it would have had to find that patterns or collections always
affect commerce when associated with a legitimate enterprise, so that
the need for proof of impact is eliminated. In addition, it would have
had to find that such patterns or collections do not always affect
commerce when they are part of an illegal enterprise, so thiat proof
that the acts affect commerce is necessary when alleging illegal enter-
prises. Therefore, the illegal enterprise theory limits the impact of
the Vignola view because, in cases involving illegal enterprises, the
government would nonetheless have to establish that the pattern of
racketeering or collection of unlawful debts affected interstate com-
merce.
377
A second restriction on Vignola arises from the elements of an un-
derlying offense enumerated in section 1961, which may require that
the racketeering activity affect or involve interstate commerce.3 7 8 The
impact of that offense on interstate commerce would have to be es-
tablished in addition to the section 1962 interstate commerce ele-
ment.
3. Standard of Proof
The effect of the interstate commerce element has been further
undermined by special standards of proof adopted by the courts.
When courts review the evidentiarv sufficiency of a jury's finding of
372. 464 F. Supp. at 1100.
373. See pt. III(A) supra.
374. See id.
375. Third Circuit, supra note 29, at 275.
376. 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), affd mere.. 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
377. See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 854-55 t7th Cir. 1977 (conviction
reversed because government alleged an illegal gambling operation as enterprise but
failed to offer proof that it affected interstate commerce), cert. ch'ni'd. 435 US. 951
(1978).
378. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 1084, 1343. 1951 (1976).
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an impact on commerce 3 79 or consider a pretrial motion to dismiss an
indictment for insufficient allegation of this impact, 380 a minimal im-
pact is sufficient to support the finding or indictment, or to support
the denial of the motion. 381 The "minimal impact" test is illustrated
in United States v. Nerone,3 82 which held that the test was satisfied
when the enterprise provided rental space for trailers manufactured
out of state and the residents of the trailer park purchased mobile
homes manufactured in other states.383 Government enterprises in
particular should always satisfy this standard because their activities
tend to include at least one action affecting out-of-state residents. For
example, in United States v. Altomare,38 4 a county prosecutor's office
regularly placed interstate telephone calls, purchased supplies from
other states, and involved non-residents within the state in its inves-
tigations- and litigation. The court found that these activities had a
sufficient impact on commerce.385
The standard for appellate review must be distinguished from the
government's burden of proof at trial. The effect on commerce is part
of the definition of the RICO offense and, like all elements of a
crime,38 6 must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.3 87  Courts,
379. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1979) (impact
of arson and mail fraud established by payment of insurance claims by companies in
other states), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980); United States v. Gambino, 566
F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1977) (New York garbage collection enterprise obtained
equipment from Texas and arranged to dump garbage in New Jersey), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 952 (1978); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851, 854-55 (7th Cir.
1977) (enterprise providing rental space for out of state trailers and for residents of
trailer park who purchased mobile homes manufactured in other states found to have
impact on interstate commerce), cert. denied. 435 U.S, 951 (1978); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n.11 (2d Cir. 1974) (requisite effect of foreign enterprise
established where it was owned by American citizens, financed by American banks,
had American creditors, and primarily served American tourists), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975).
380. See United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
381. See cases cited notes 379, 380 supra. In United States v. Fineman, 434 F.
Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court applied the minimal impact test to a § 1962(c)
case charging a scheme involving parents who bribed a state legislator to facilitate the
admission of their children into graduate schools. Id. at 195. The requisite effect on
interstate commerce was established because payments were made interstate; one
individual traveled interstate in order to make a payment; the graduate schools were
involved in interstate commerce; the admissions decisions affected persons in several
states; and at least one student withdrew from a foreign medical school to enroll in a
Pennsylvania medical school under the alleged payoff arrangement. Id.
382. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
383. Id. at 850-51.
384. 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980).
385. Id.
386. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-69 (1970).
387. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 1978), affd on re-
hearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979); accord,
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however, have occasionally confused the appropriate jury instruction
concerning burden of proof with the standard for appellate review of
the sufficiency of the evidence. 388
Several decisions have also questioned the proposition that impact
on interstate commerce is an element of the offense to be determined
by the jury and have assumed that the commerce effect is, to a con-
siderable extent, a question of law to be decided by the judge. 38 9
This supposition is inherent in cases upholding instructions informing
the jury that the requisite effect on interstate commerce is estab-
lished if the jury finds certain facts to be true.390 The result of this
approach is a substantial intrusion on the jury's role, effectively re-
ducing their determination on the issue to a special finding of fact and
eliminating any discretion to determine whether the defendant's acts
actually had an impact on commerce. Moreover, special findings or
verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal cases 391 because they
unduly interfere with the function of the jury as the conscience of the
community to "look at more than logic. " 392
4. Pleading of Interstate Commerce Element
A defense to the interstate commerce element is undermined by
indictments alleging that element in the most general terms possible.
This indictment format was approved in United States c. Diecide,393
in which the Fifth Circuit asserted that the indictment need only be
sufficiently specific to satisfy the defendant's constitutional right to
know what offenses have been charged. 394 The court concluded that
the allegation of specific acts affecting commerce would contribute
nothing to the defendant's understanding of the nature of those of-
fenses.3 95 It noted that the defendants were not "surprised or in any
2 H. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 56.25 (3d ed.
Supp. 1979).
388. E.g., United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381-82 t5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (condemning use of slight evidence standard of appellate review in a jury in-
struction on the defendant's connection with conspiracy), cert. deied. 444 U.S. 846
(1979).
389. See United States v. DiFrancesco. 604 F.2d 769. 775 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980): United States v. Rone. 598 F.2d 564, 573 t9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
390. See United States v. DiFrancesco. 604 F.2d 769, 775 t2d Cir. 1979). Cert.
granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980): United States v. Rone. 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
391. United States v. O'Loonev, 544 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1023 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1976).
392. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165. 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
393. 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
394. Id. at 546-58: see United States v. Ostrer. 481 F. Supp. 407, 412-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
395. 603 F.2d at 547.
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way prejudiced by the generality of the interstate commerce allega-
tion or evidence subsequently introduced to establish it." 396  By al-
leging the interstate element in general terms, the government gains
an important advantage because, in the absence of prejudice, it can
prove acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment without risk-
ing a reversal on the grounds of variance. 397
5. Federally Created Jurisdiction
An interstate commerce defense resembling entrapment may exist
in the Second Circuit, although that court has not yet applied it in a
RICO case. In United States v. Archer,398 the government had inten-
tionally made phone calls to create the interstate element of an 18
U.S.C. § 1952 399 bribery offense that would otherwise have been a
local crime. These tactics were condemned by the court as having
produced a "federally provoked incident of local corruption."' 40 0
The Second Circuit subsequently rejected a defense based on
Archer in the context of a RICO case. In United States v. Gam-
bino,40 1 the defendants claimed that only the activities of a
396. Id. at 547-48. The defendant may be able to remedy this generality by seek-
ing a bill of particulars under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). The granting of a motion for a
bill of particulars is within the discretion of the trial court. 603 F.2d at 563. How-
ever, courts have denied these motions on the grounds that the RICO indictment
was sufficiently clear. United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp. 241, 250-51 (E.D. Pa.
1979), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 771 (1980); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41,
46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 123-27 (N.D.
Ga. 1979), the court granted requests for disclosure of all undisclosed and unindicted
members of the enterprise, the connection between forfeitable property and the en-
terprise, and the interest of the defendant that was subject to forfeiture. Thevis
adopted a two-part analysis of a motion for a bill of particulars. First, the court must
determine from the face of the motion whether nondisclosure would result in preju-
dicial surprise or preclude meaningful defense preparation. If so, the motion for a bill
of particulars must be granted. Id. at 123. If it cannot make such a finding on the
face of the requested particular, "the Court must balance the competing interests of
the defense and the government." Id. at 124. At this stage, the defendant has the
burden of showing by motion, affidavit, or other means that the bill requests informa-
tion necessary to investigate the charges. Id. The defendant is not required to offer
"formal, legal proof," but only a logical probability of prejudicial surprise or preclu-
sion of a meaningful defense, and in areas of doubt, the defendant's interest must
prevail. Id.
397. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on
rehearing en bane, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979). In
the absence of a showing of prejudice, the government is permitted to prove acts
falling within the kind described by a general allegation; however, if the government
specifically alleges the acts underlying an element of the offense, it is precluded from
establishing other acts. id.
398. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
399. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). This statute proscribes travel or transportation in aid
of racketeering offenses.
400. 486 F.2d at 683.
401. 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
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government-formed corporation created jurisdiction for purposes of a
section 1962(b) charge that involved the use of extortion to acquire
control of private sanitation districts in areas of New York City. Re-
jecting this argument, Gambino distinguished Archer on the ground
that even if the federally created jurisdiction elements were excluded
from consideration, the enterprise had a sufficient impact on in-
terstate commerce. 40 2  The question remains whether this defense
would be accepted if a court found no such impact by the enterprise.
H. Proposed Amendments
Both Senate and House versions of the most recent proposed fed-
eral criminal code create separate crimes resembling section 1962(c).
Section 1801(a) of the Senate bill, S. 1722,403 prohibits a person from
organizing, controlling, financing, or participating in a supervisor%
capacity in a racketeering syndicate. 40 4 Section 1807(g) defines
"racketeering syndicate" as a "group of five or more persons who,
individually or collectively, engage on a continuing basis in conduct
constituting racketeering activity,. '405 H.R. 6915,406 the House bill,
establishes a similar crime in section 2701(a)(1), 40 7 although it differs
from the Senate version in that it includes a scienter requirement of
"knowingly." 408
The Senate and House bills also incorporate provisions that com-
bine the existing subsections 1962(b) and (c). Section 1802 of the Sen-
ate version provides that "[a] person is guilty of an offense if, through
a pattern of racketeering activity, he acquires or maintains an interest
in, or controls or conducts an enterprise." 40 9 The Senate bill, how-
ever, differs significantly from the present statute. Its pro-
posed definition of "pattern" in section 1807(e) includes a common
scheme requirement and resolves the "single transaction" pattern
problem by requiring two or more "separate acts of racketeering ac-
402. Id. at 419.
403. S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
404. id. § 1801(a).
405. Id. § 1807(g). Section 1801(b) states that prima facie evidence of culpable
participation in a syndicate is established by "proof that a person has shared in the
proceeds from a racketeering syndicate to the extent of S5,000 or more in any thirty
day period." Id. § 1801(b).
406. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
407. Id. § 2701(a)(1). Under this section, an offender is one who knovingly "or-
ganizes, owns, controls, finances, or otherwise participates in a supervisory capacity
in a racketeering syndicate." Id. § 2701(a)(1). The definition of syndicate in § 27078)
is virtually identical to that contained in the Senate version. S. 17"22, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 1807(g) (1979).
408. Id. The House bill -also omits the prima facie case provision of S, 1722. Set'
note 405 supra.
409. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1802 (1979).
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tivity."' 410 In addition, this provision focuses only on patterns of
racketeering; a separate crime for collection of an unlawful debt is
established in section 1804.411 Furthermore, S. 1722 expands the
scope of RICO by incorporating new offenses such as aggravated bat-
tery, commercial bribery, and criminal copyright infringement within
the definition of "racketeering activity" in section 1807(f).4 12
In all other respects, the Senate bill is either more ambiguous than
the present statute or retains its flaws. Like section 1962, S. 1722 is
silent on the scienter issue. Unlike the existing law, it omits any
mention of effect on interstate commerce, fails to define the term
"enterprise," and omits the requirement that racketeering activities
occur within ten years of each other. 413 In contrast, the House pro-
vision improves present law by explicitly resolving issues rather than
remaining silent. Although section 2701(2) of H.R. 6915 states an of-
fense similar in form to the Senate's section 1802,414 it incorporates a
scienter requirement of "knowingly"' 415 and, in section 2701(b), re-
quires that the enterprise affect commerce. 416
The most significant distinction between S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 is
the latter's inclusion of a definition of "enterprise." That definition,
contained in section 2707(3), describes an enterprise as "a business or
other similar business-like undertaking by an association of persons,
and includes a government or government agency." 4 17  This provi-
sion has three significant aspects: it includes government agencies as
enterprises; it seems to exclude enterprises consisting of one person,
as it refers only to groups and organizations; and its language of "bus-
iness or other similar business-like undertaking" implies a more for-
mal organizational structure than that of "individuals associated in
fact."
410. Id. § 1807(e). Section 1807(e) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as
"'two or more separate acts of racketeering activity, at least one of which occurred
after the effective date of this subchapter, that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
411. Id. § 1804.
412. Id. § 1807(o.
413. The omission of the 10 year requirement compounds the due process prob-
lem of defending against charges that occurred several years before the indictment
but that have not expired under an) state or federal statute of limitations. See notes
302-10 supra and accompanying text; notes 492-95 infra and accompanying text.
414. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2701(a)(2 ) (1980) (imposes criminal sane-
tions on one who "knowingly engages in a pattern of racketeering activity and
thereby . . . (A) acquires or maintains an interest in, or control of an enterprise: or
(B) conducts or participates in the conduct of an enterprise"), Like S. 1722, the
House bill makes the collection of an unlawful debt a separate crime. Id. § 2703. The
H.R. 6915 definition of "pattern of racketeering activit)" in § 2707(6) closely resem-
bles the Senate definition. See note 410 supra.
415. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2701(a) (1980).
416. Id. § 2701(b).
417. Id. § 2707(3).
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Although H.R. 6915 does not explicitly resolve the problem of al-
leged enterprises that are engaged only in illegal activities, section
2704, an offense entitled "It]ravel or transportation in aid of rack-
eteering,- 4 1 8 indicates that it probably contemplates that an illegal
operation can be an enterprise. Moreover, section 2704(b) defines
"unlawful activity" as "any enterprise involving conduct which vio-
lates section 2741 . . . or any of sections 2711 through 2714," and as
"an enterprise involving prostitution offenses, or narcotics or con-
trolled substances." 4 19
IV. SECTION 1962(d)-RICO CoNsPircy
Section 1962(d) proscribes conspiracies "to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c)." 420  If the government alleges a
conspiracy to violate subsection (c), for example, it must show that an
individual agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of
an enterprise through the commission of a pattern of racketeering
activity. 421
A. The Elliott View of RICO Conspiracy
1. United States v. Elliott
The most controversial case interpreting section 1962(d) is United
States v. Elliott,4 22 in which the Fifth Circuit construed section
1962(d) as establishing an offense fundamentally different from the
traditional form of conspiracy. In Elliott, six co-defendants partici-
pated in more than twenty diverse criminal acts, each of which in-
volved an offense enumerated in section 1961. These acts included
burning an unoccupied nursing home, stealing meat, attempting to
influence the outcome of the stolen meat trial, selling stolen cars,
stealing a truck, murdering an informer, and selling illegal drugs. 42
Many defendants participated in only a few of the criminal transac-
tions, and only one defendant was implicated in all of them. 424
The court acknowledged that the section 1962(d) charge could not
have been successfully prosecuted as a single conspiracy under the
general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371.42 Although the
418. Id. § 2704.
419. Id. § 2704(b).
420. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
421. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880. 903 (5th Cir.) curt. dhenied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978): United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975).
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
422. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
423. Id. at 884-95.
424. Id. at 884-96.
425. Id. at 902 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976)).
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Supreme Court's opinion in Blumenthal v. United States 426 permits
the government to charge all defendants pursuing a common objec-
tive in a single conspiracy count under section 371, the Elliott court
interpreted Blumenthal and another Supreme Court case, Kotteakos
v. United States,4 27 to mean that a single conspiracy does not exist if
its members "are not truly interdependent or where the various ac-
tivities sought to be tied together cannot reasonably be said to consti-
tute a unified scheme." 428  The Elliott court conceded that the al-
leged section 1962(d) conspiracy would not satisfy the requirement of
a common objective under Kotteakos and Blumenthal because some
of the defendants had no contact with one another and the activities
were too diverse to be tied together by one agreement. 42 9 Despite
this apparent bar to prosecution, the Elliott court held that Kotteakos
and Blumenthal were not controlling. It reasoned that RICO was in-
tended to authorize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diver-
sified conspiracy by replacing the principles established in Kotteakos
and Blumenthal with the concept of the enterprise. 430 Characterizing
the substantive RICO offense as the means by which diverse parties
426. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1947). In this
case, the evidence established the existence of a chain conspiracy involving illegal
sales of liquor and consisting of the owner, wholesalers, and salesman. Although the
owner concealed his activities so it appeared to the salesman that there was no
further link beyond the wholesaler, the Court included all the participants within the
conspiracy. It found knowledge of the owner's identity irrelevant to the basic plan
because all the participants had attempted to further a common goal, overcharging
for sales of whiskey. The activities were held to be sufficiently complex and continu-
ing so that each member should have been aware that the knowing participation of
the others was essential. Id.
427. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
428. 571 F.2d 880, 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). In Kotteakos,
the Court reversed convictions because the proof at trial disclosed multiple con-
spiracies at variance with the single conspiracy in the indictment. The evidence es-
tablished a "wheel" conspiracy consisting of a central figure (the hub) who acted as a
broker for at least eight separate fraudulent loans from the government. There was
no connection between those procuring the loans (the spokes) other than that they
transacted business with the hub. The Court analogized this situation to a wheel
without the rim needed to enclose the spokes, and thus not sufficient to establish a
single conspiracy. 328 U.S. 750, 754-55 (1946). See also United States v. Bertolotti,
529 F.2d 149, 155-57 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-,14
(7th Cir. 1969); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 948 (1961).
429. 571 F.2d at 902. Judge Simpson, the author of the Elliott opinion, omitted
any reference of an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion in which he had joined, United
States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 64 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974),
that criticized and discarded many of the pre-RICO conspiracy concepts established
in Kotteakos. Although Elliott described traditional conspiracy law as adopting a
"chain-wheel" dichotomy, 571 F.2d at 900-02, Perez had refused to apply that dis-
tinction, reasoning that "[it only confounds the law to try to characterize this in the
figure of spokes, wheels, hubs,"rims or chains." 489 F.2d at 64.
430. 571 F.2d at 902.
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and crimes could be joined together, the court regarded the section
1962(d) conspiracy as relating to an agreement to participate in the
enterprise's affairs, rather than an agreement to commit all of the
predicate crimes constituting the enterprise. 431 This construction was
based solely on a general expression of congressional intent that the
Act was designed "to seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime." 432
The Elliott interpretation of section 1962(d) emphasizes that the
RICO conspiracy provision reaches even remote associates of an en-
terprise. 43 3 As the Elliott court metaphorically declared, "the RICO
net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally
involved with the enterprise." 43 4 These remote associates are guilty,
even though they do not know the full scope of the conspiracy, be-
cause Elliott requires knowledge only of the essential nature of the
enterprise, described by the court as making money from repeated
criminal activity.43 5  For example, this knowledge requirement was
satisfied because one defendant knew that the enterprise was ongoing
and "bigger than his role in it." 4 36  It was immaterial that he was
unaware of activities bearing little relationship to his own. 43 7
431. Id. at 902-03. The court commented that '[t]he gravamen of the conspiracy
charge in this case is not that each defendant agreed to commit arson, to steal goods
from interstate commerce, to obstruct justice, and to sell narcotics; rather, it is that
each agreed to participate, directly and indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise by
committing two or more predicate crimes. Under the statute, it is irrelevant that
each defendant participated in the enterprise's affairs through different, even unre-
lated crimes, so long as we may reasonably infer that each crime was intended to
further the enterprise's affairs." Id.
432. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 92 - . 9*23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose) (cited at 571 F.2d at 902).
433. 571 F.2d at 903. Moreover, Elliott noted that, since direct evidence of a con-
spiratorial agreement is unnecessary, the remote associates could be convicted as
conspirators on the basis of purely circumstantial evidence, Id.
434. Id.; cf. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(acknowledged applicability of RICO to "small fry" may be overbroad in some cases,
but found defendants not "small fry"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Atkinson,
supra note 10, at 4 (RICO can be unconstitutionally vague as applied to some indi-
viduals). If the Elliott court correctly characterized the scope of RICO, Title IX
should be closely scrutinized in view of the Supreme Court's cautionary note that "it
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained and who should be set at large." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 221 (1875); see note 138 supra.
435. 571 F.2d at 903-04. Elliott failed to reconcile this statement with its earlier
assertion that, under traditional conspiracy law, a single conspiracy could not have
been charged, "[elven viewing the 'common objective' of the conspiracy as the rais-
ing of revenue through criminal activity." hi. at 902.
436. Id. at 904.
437. Id. But see United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 834 n.52 t5th Cir. 19S0).
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2. Reaction to Elliott
Outside of the Fifth Circuit, only the Eighth Circuit has directly
considered the validity of the Elliott construction of section
1962(d). 438  Sharply criticizing the rationale of the Elliott opinion, the
Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Anderson,4 39 noted that there is
nothing in the statutory scheme to suggest that Congress intended
to discard the traditional legal precepts applied to concerted crimi-
nal activity, or that Congress intended to expand federal juris-
diction to this extent. The structure of RICO reveals a specific
orientation that does not encompass radical expansion of federal
conspiracy law.!40
Even within the Fifth Circuit, however, the status of Elliott is un-
clear. One subsequent case analyzed section 1962(d) issues and men-
tioned Elliott only in passing. 441 Another case, United States v.
Clemones,4 42 rejected a defense based on Kotteakos v. United
States,44 3 but did not acknowledge that Elliott eliminated the Kot-
teakos argument." 4 Clemones also analyzed the intent or knowledge
element of section 1962(d) in terms of more traditional conspiracy
doctrines. Although Elliott merely required knowledge that others
are engaged in repeated criminal activity for the purpose of making
money, 44 5 Clemones focused on whether the defendants knew of the
438. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980). In United States v.
Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979), the
court may have indirectly criticized the remark in Elliott that RICO reaches even
"the smallest fish." It commented that "RICO may impermissibly reach 'small
fry' with only a tangential relationship with a criminal enterprise, but in this case
neither McGowan nor Swiderski are small fry. Both had significant contacts with the
broadly-defined enterprise." 593 F.2d at 1249; see United States v. Anderson, 626
F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980) (no indication that Congress intended to permit
prosecutions of "relatively minor offenders, having no connection with organized
crime, who simply associate to commit two of the predicate crimes").
439. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
440. Id., at 1369 (citations omitted).
441. United States v Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1978), affd on
rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
Malatesta considered a challenge to an instruction requiring a finding that the "de-
fendant wilfully participated in the unlawful plan with the intention of advancing its
purpose." 583 F.2d at 759. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the instrue-
tion should have included the words "with knowledge of the plan" because this
phrase might give the impression that "specific knowledge of the entire plan was
required" rather than "Full knowledge of the general scope and purpose of the con-
spiracy," the appropriate intent standard. Id. at 759-60.
442. 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978), modified per curiam, 582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1313 (1980).
443. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
444. 577 F.2d at 1253.
445. See notes 433-37 supra and accompanying text.
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actual prostitution activities that were the major objects of the
conspiracy. 446
A third Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Diecidue,447 pur-
ported to follow the Elliott mode of analysis, but expanded an ele-
ment of the Elliott opinion that slightly mitigates the harsh impact of
imposing conspiracy liability on remote associates. The Diecidue court
emphasized Elliott's requirement that the defendant agree to commit
two or more acts 448 and reversed the convictions of several defen-
dants because the government failed to establish either that the defen-
dants participated in more than one criminal transaction or that they
knew of anv' other criminal activities constituting the enterprise. 44 9
For example, the court reversed the conviction of defendant Boni
because the only evidence against him was that he supplied dynamite
to certain members of the enterprise and bought cocaine from
another member. 450 The sale of dynamite was not a predicate of-
fense for RICO and was excluded as an object of the enterprise con-
spiracy, while the purchase of cocaine was also deemed insufficient to
constitute an agreement to join the enterprise. 451 In the absence of
other evidence that Boni "knew something about his codefendants'
related activities which made the enterprise, he could not be con-
victed of conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering." 4 5 2
Although Diecidue cited Elliott vith approval, its discussion of the
case against Boni may be difficult to reconcile with the Elliott
analysis. If Elliott stands for the proposition that the defendant need
not know of the enterprise's activities as long as he agrees to commit
446. 577 F.2d at 1255-56.
447. 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 t19S0).
448. Id. at 557.
449. Id. at 555-56, 558. 566.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 556.
452. Id. This language was quoted with approval in United States v. Northrup,
482 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 n.1 (D. Nev. 1980). In Northrup. the defendant supplied
explosive and incendiary devices to Culinary Union Local 226 employees who sought
to expand the union's jurisdiction by fire bombing restaurants not recognizing Locd
226 as the bargaining agent for its employees. Judge Claiborne interpreted Diedihw
ts requiring the Government to "prove that the defendant in question had knowledge
as to the enterprise's illicit activities." and applied this standard to deny the defen-
dant's motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). 482 F. Supp.
at 1035-36. The court held that the defendant had "knowledge of the nexus between
the firebombings and the affairs of Culinary Union Local 226." d. at 1036. The
Diecidue holding does not conflict wvith Elliott. which also reversed a § 1962d con-
viction because the defendent was onl\ marginally involved in the enterprise's ac-
tivities. Elliott conducted amphetamine transactions with a cxlefendant and becatne
peripherally involved in a stolen meat transaction, an involvement he later attempted
to conceal. The court held these acts were insufficient to show that Elliot "knowvingly
and intentionally joined the broad conspiracy to violate RICO." 571 F.2d 8m0. 907
(5th Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 953 (1978.
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two predicate offenses, 45 3 Boni's knowledge of related activities
should have been irrelevant because he was involved in only one
racketeering offense. Consequently, the Diecidue holding may mean
that a defendant is deemed to have agreed to commit two predicate
offenses by actually committing them or by committing one offense
and knowing of related activities. Alternatively, it may mean that a
knowledge requirement applies to all RICO conspiracy defendants
without regard to whether they commit one or two offenses.454
3. Analysis of Elliott
Elliott's radical departure from established conspiracy principles
was not based on any specific legislative comment referring to
changes in traditional conspiracy law. Instead, the court relied on
comments in the legislative history pointing to the need for the in-
novative remedies that RICO created. 455 One commentator has
suggested, however, that these comments probably referred to the
incorporation of antitrust remedies, such as divestiture, and novel crim-
inal forfeiture penalties. 45 6  Commentators have criticized the Elliott
doctrine because it undermines the fundamental concepts of con-
spiratorial intent and agreement by permitting a finding that a
defendant intended to join a section 1962(d) conspiracy, even though
he did not know its purposes, activities, and scope. 457  Although El-
liott does recognize the existence of a mens rea element to the extent
that it requires knowledge of the essential nature of the plan, the
453. See notes 435-37 supra and accompanying text.
454. Compare United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 304, 834 (5th Cir. 1980) with
United States v. Northrop, 482 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 n.1 (D. Nev. 1980).
455. See note 432 supra and accompanying text.
456. See Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 121-22. Another commentator has
asserted that, in view of the lack of any specific reference in the legislative history
regarding expansion of the scope of conspiracy law, it was "an extraordinary feat of
creativity on the part of the Fifth Circuit to interpret a vague remark concerning
unnecessarily limited (already existing] sanctions as concrete evidence of such in-
tent." Bradley, supra note 84, at 878 & n.227.
457. See Marcus, Co-Conspirator Declarations: The Federal Rules of Evidence and
Other Recent Developments, From a Criminal Law Perspective, 7 Am. J. Crim. L.
287, 319-21 (1979), Tarlow, Defense of a Federal Conspiracy Prosecution, 4 Nat'l J.
Crim. Def. 183, 23143 (1978); Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 124-25. Another
commentator states that, because the enterprise alleged in Elliott was not a legitimate
organization but merely a group of persons connected only by a series of criminal
acts, the conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) became in effect "a conspiracy to commit a
series of criminal acts by means of (the same) series of criminal acts." Bradley, supra
note 84, at 879. He continues that the only agreement found was "the commission of
the same series of criminal acts" or the simple participation in racketeering activity.
As a result, "[tjhe element of agreement, necessary to distinguish the conspiracy
charge from the substantive offense, is missing," and the conspiracy becomes identi-
cal to the substantive offense. Id; see United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1369 (8th Cir. 1980) (Congress intended two separate offenses).
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characterization of "the essential nature" as the making of money
from repeated criminal activity is so broad as to be meaningless. A
defendant is seemingly culpable, for example, if he engages in two
criminal acts and knows that other defendants are engaged in unre-
lated criminal activities for noncharitable purposes. 458
The Elliott doctrine has also been criticized for permitting due pro-
cess violations. 459 Kotteakos cautioned that joint trials may violate
the due process requirement that a defendant's guilt be proven to be
"individual and personal"; 460 yet, Elliott's effect is to endorse mass
conspiracy trials resulting in guilt by association because of the dif-
ficulties juries have in distinguishing the evidence against various de-
fendants. The due process problems are compounded by the rule in
United States v. Pinkerton, permitting each member of a conspiracy
to be convicted of any substantive crime committed by a co-
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.4 61 Elliott further ex-
pands the scope of this vicarious liability 'by freeing the Pinkerton
rule from the limitations set by Kotteakos. The combined effect of
Elliott and Pinkerton is that defendants may be liable for substantive
offenses even if they did not know the type of offense or the scope of
the enterprise including that offense. 46 2
4. Elliott and Legitimate Enterprises
The primary flaw in the Elliott view is the court's assumption that
the scope of a RICO substantive offense or a RICO conspiracy is de-
458. Tarlow, supra note 457, at 232-33. The absurdly broad characterization of
"the essential nature" of the conspiracy may have been compelled by Elliott's rejec-
tion of a requirement that a common objective underlv the activities of the conspir-
acv. If the government is not required to show that the defendant knew of the
common objective, the term "essential nature" must mean something broader than
the common objective. The only conceivable "essential nature" standard broader than
knowledge of a common goal is knowledge that other people are engaged in some
unrelated criminal activity for the purpose of making money. The Fourth Circuit
decision in United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 503 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1980). ap-
proved instructions requiring a more meaningful common purpose. The trial court
instructed the jury that the prosecution must show that the predominant "purpose of
the conspiracy was to violate the RICO Act." Id. See also United States v. Bright,
630 F.2d 804, 822, 834 (5th Cir. 1980). These instructions might enable defendants
to argue that their activities were not for the purpose of forming or furthering an
enterprise but were merely personal ventures conducted independently of the enter-
prise. See notes 347-48 supra and accompanying text.
459. Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 123-24.
460. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772-77 (1946). Elliott's enterprise
conspiracy theory does not, as Elliott contended, respond to due process problems
by tying the defendants together in an association organized "for the purpose of mak-
ing money from repeated criminal activity." 571 F.2d at 904. Rather, the "enterprise
conspiracy" supplies no meaningful connection because the defendants could not
know that they were participating in an enterprise and took no deliberate steps to
create one.
461. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
462. See Conspiracy Law, supra note 29, at 125.
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fined by the enterprise. The court believed that, although the
defendants must agree to commit a pattern of racketeering activity,
they need not agree to commit the same pattern as long as the de-
fendants' patterns involve the same enterprise. 463 Applying Elliott to
a legitimate enterprise, however, it is apparent that the enterprise
does not always supply a substantial connection between the activities
of the defendants.
The following hypothetical illustrates this defect in Elliott. Assume
that five police officers are charged with operating the same police
department through the following patterns: (1) Officer A makes illegal
payments in 1971 to a legislator to obtain a salary increase; (2) Officer
B receives bribes in 1973 in exchange for protecting prostitution; (3)
Officer C murders two minority citizens while arresting them in 1975;
(4) Officer D removes cocaine from the evidence locker in 1977 and
sells it with the aid of individuals he is supposedly investigating; and
(5) Officer E embezzles money from the police pension benefit plan
in 1979. All of the police officers know of, but are not involved in,
the activities of the other officers.
Under a literal application of Elliott, these parties would be part of'
a single chargeable 1962(c) or 1962(d) RICO offense solely because
their acts occurred in the conduct of the same enterprise. This pro-
duces the bizarre result that a single RICO offense may consist of
every racketeering act committed by any employee or member of a
large legitimate enterprise-such as the United States House of Rep-
resentatives, General Motors, or the Department of Housing and
Urban Development-during the many decades of the enterprise's
existence. In United States v. Cryan,4 64 the court rejected govern-
ment arguments that would have led to this absurd result. Fearing
that the scope of a RICO conspiracy to operate a large government
agency would be "potentially enormous, ' ' 46 the Cryan court re-
quired proof that each defendant either "committed or authorized the
acts" constituting the RICO offense.466
The decision in Cryan implies that the enterprise alone cannot de-
fine the scope of a RICO offense. A relationship is required between
463. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); accord, United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2(1 Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62). The Elliott
court stated that "the two or more predicate crimes must be related to the afllirs of
the enterprise but need not otherwise be related to each other." 571 F.2d at 899
n.23; accord, 624 F.2d at 1122; see notes 430-37 supra and accompanying text.
464. 490 F. Supp. 1234 (D.N.J. 1980).
465. Id. at 1243. The court distinguished Elliott on the ground that Cryan in-
volved a legitimate enterprise while Elliott involved an illegal enterprise. Id. at 1242
n.14. This distinction is not valid, however, because RICO employs a uniform defini-
tion of "enterprise." See notes 170-72 supra and accompanying text. A different law
cannot be formulated for each type of enterprise.
466. 490 F. Supp. at 1243.
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the patterns of the defendants because the mere fact that the defen-
dants operate the same enterprise does not supply a sufficient connec-
tion between them. Conspiracy principles 467 and rules of joinder 4 "
require that defendants agree to commit a common pattern of rac-
keteering activity rather than merely agree to operate a common en-
terprise through a variety of otherwise unrelated patterns.
5. Elliott and Common Scheme
Elliott's construction of section 1962(d) may be related to its rejec-
tion of the "common scheme" interpretation of 'pattern. " 4 "9  The
court assumed that the RICO substantive offense itself can connect
diverse parties and crimes without a common objective.470  This as-
sumption would be invalid in a jurisdiction that requires racketeering
acts to be connected by a common scheme or plan to establish the
"pattern" element of the substantive RICO offense. 47 1  Reconciling
Elliott with a common scheme analysis, however, presents problems,
even in those jurisdictions that do not adopt it, because that analysis
467. See pt. 1V(B) infra.
468. See pt. V(E) infra.
469. 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
470. Id. at 902.
471. The common scheme element of the substantive offense would -affect a
1962(d) offense because of the specific intent requirement of conspiracy law. S'e
generally Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy. 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941). To
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit a particular offense, the specific intent
element requires that the defendant intended to commit each of the elements of the
substantive offense. See United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1270 (5th Cir.,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979). With a § 1962(d) charge, the defendant would have
to intend to participate in the common scheme because that scheme is an element of
the underlying offense. Assuming that § 1962(d) offenses must involve a common
scheme, the defendant need not knowv of the specific acts, indeed, under pre-Elliott
law, a defendant unaware of the existence of other conspirators or their activities
could be convicted of conspiracy. Set Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539.
556-57 (1947); Chavez v. United States, 275 F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1960). The coin-
mon scheme limitation, however, would restrict the scope of the conspiracy to agreed
upon activities and to those activities that are reasonably foreseeable and committed
in furtherance of the common objective. Set Pinkerton v. United States. 328 U.S.
640, 647 (1946); United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1935). This
analysis may be modified by a broad reading of the "commnon scheme" element that
is satisfied by finding "'similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission" among the racketeering acts. 18 U.S.C. § 3575te) 1976); se' note 248
supra and accompanying text. If these relationships are the only bases for commonal-
it-,, no actual scheme or plan is involved. Consequentlh. the defendant's liability for
acts in furtherance of a common scheme cannot be assessed. On the other haned, if
the § 1962(d) offense is based on the defendant's agreement to commit offenses con-
nected by "similar results" types of relationships, the scope of the agreement sould
be limited to acts that share those relationships. See United States v Peoni, 100
F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1938) (defendants liable only for the "'fair import of the con-
certed purpose or agreement as he understands it'").
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may be inherent in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Al-
though Elliott assumed that RICO modifies the rules governing joint
trials of defendants, 472 rule 8(b) nonetheless governs the joinder of
defendants in a single trial. 473 If rule 8(b) bars joinder, Title IX can-
not authorize joinder without repealing or amending the rule. 474
Commentators interpreting the "series of acts or transactions" lan-
guage of rule 8(b) have suggested that it is similar in meaning to the
phrase, "two or more acts or transactions connected together or con-
stituting parts of a common scheme or plan," contained in rule
8(a), 475 which governs joinder of offenses against a single defend-
ant.476 A court reading the rule 8(a) language into rule 8(b) must
require that a relationship between the defendants' transactions be
established. This result is difficult to reconcile with the Elliott hold-
ing permitting joinder of defendants who have participated in unre-
lated transactions.4 77
B. Application of Conspiracy Doctrines to Section 1962(d)
If Elliott correctly concluded that RICO creates a new form of con-
spiracy, the applicability of the individual principles of traditional
conspiracy law must be determined. For example, conspiracy doc-
trines imputing the acts and declarations of a person to conspirators
may be inapplicable to an Elliott conspiracy.478 Because vicarious lia-
bility doctrines were developed when conspiracy law required that
the agreeing parties share a common objective, 479 Elliott's rejection
of that requirement undermines the basis for vicarious liability.
472. 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
473. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) permits joinder of defendants "alleged to have partici-
pated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses." See pt. III(C)(3) supra.
474. Rule 8(b) has not been explicitly repealed or amended. An implied repeal is
unlikely without a strong showing of legislative intent to repeal. See note 630 infra.
The absence of substantial support in the legislative record for the Elliott view effec-
tively eliminates the implied repeal argument.
475. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
476. United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 8 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 8.06[2], at 8-37 (2d ed. 1976); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 144, at 322 (1969).
477. See pt. III(C)(3) supra; pt. V(E) infra.
478. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The rule provides that such declarations are not
hearsay.
479. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946). These doctrines
were based on the theory that the conspiratorial agreement created an agency rela-
tionship among the parties to that agreement. Id. Although Pinkerton involved vi-
carious liability for the substantive offenses of a conspirator, the agency rationale also
underlies the concept in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) that statements of co-
conspirators that are imputed to one another are not hearsay. See United States v.
Harris, 546 F.2d 234, 2,37 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976).
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United States v. Cryan,4 0 however, indicates that RICO does not
expand conspiracy law to permit the admission of all illegal acts oc-
curring in the operation of a legitimate enterprise. In Cryan, three
employees of a sheriff's office, the enterprise, were charged with par-
ticipation in annual illegal payments to a political "slush fund." The
government alleged that, before these defendants joined the office,
other employees made a special payment in 1971 to a Democratic
Party Chairman in return for his attempts to influence a local legisla-
tive body to grant salary increases. The government contended that
the special payment and the subsequent acts of the three defendant
employees could be charged together in both section 1962(c) and sec-
tion 1962(d) counts, and that the evidence of the special payment was
admissible against the three defendants who were not members of the
sheriff's office at the time of the 1971 payment. Under the govern-
ment's view, a sheriff making illegal payments in 1975 would be liable
as a conspirator for the acts of every employee who ever made or
collected an illegal payment. 48'
Holding that the special payment and the subsequent payments
were not part of the same offense or the same section 1962(d)
conspiracy, Cryan rejected the use of the vicarious liability doctrine
on these facts and dismissed the indictment. 482 The court reasoned
that, if the government could allege all illegal acts in the operation of
a common enterprise as part of a single conspiracy, the scope of the
conspiracy would be "potentially enormous." 483
Despite Elliott's elimination of the Kotteakos principles, section
1962(d) cases have been analyzed in virtually the same manner as
other conspiracies. 4 84  One exception has been the treatment of the
480. 490 F. Supp. 1234 (D.N.J. 1980).
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1243-45; see note 271 supra: notes 464-66 supra and accompanying
text.
483. Id. at 1243; see notes 464-66 supra and accompanying text. In a different
factual context, the Third Circuit also confronted the problem of admitting prior acts
of bribery at a RICO trial. In United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979), the defendants were state court magistrates
charged with participating in the affairs of the enterprise, the Levitt Agency, through
a common scheme involving the receipt of bribes from that agency. The court held
that, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), the government could not show a common scheme
by offering evidence that the defendants had received bribes from another bail bond-
ing agency because the indictment charged a common scheme that involved only the
Levitt Agency. Id. at 1197-98. Herman is a simpler case than Cryan because the
prior acts in Herman did not involve .the affairs of the alleged enterprise. If the prior
payments in Herman had been received from the same enterprise as that alleged,
allegation and proof of those payments would be permitted under Cryan because the
defendants in Herman had actually committed those acts.
484. See, e.g., United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Malatesta, 5S3 F.2d 748
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requirement in the general federal conspiracy statute that the gov-
ernment prove an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 485  A
district court has concluded, by analogy to Sherman Act con-
spiracies, 486 that section 1962(d) does not require an overt act. 487  In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit seemingly replaces the overt act element
with a requirement that two racketeering acts be committed. 488
C. Proposed Federal Criminal Codes
Neither of the recently proposed criminal codes includes provisions
corresponding to section 1962(d) because both codes eliminate the
practice of attaching conspiracy provisions to substantive statutes. By
requiring that a conspiracy to violate the racketeering statutes be pros-
ecuted under the general conspiracy statutes in S. 1722489 and H.R.
6915,490 these bills indicate a legislative intent to create a uniform
body of conspiracy law. 4 91 This restructuring is likely to undermine
(5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 846 (1979); United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978),
modified per curain, 582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1313 (1980).
One doctrine that has survived Elliott excludes acts of concealment as independent
evidence of a conspiracy. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 907 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 358
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); see note 264 snpra. Another
conspiracy doctrine that has been applied to § 1962(d) is the rule established in
Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). Braverman held that one agreement
with multiple objects, each of which is a separate crime, is only one conspiracy and
can only be punished once. Id. at 53. This doctrine precludes the government from
charging one agreement as two or more separate conspiracy counts. The Ninth Cir-
cuit examined the Bracernan rule in the context of § 1962(d) in United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976),
and indicated that the government cannot allege two separate § 1962(d) counts based
on one agreement. Id. at 357; see notes 498-507 infra and accompanying text.
485. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
486. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This statute does not require proof of an overt act.
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 n.4 (1946).
487. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 n.2 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). The court observed that to require an
overt act would be "merely repetitious of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
371." Id.
488. United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1980). This holding seems
to conflict with the basic principle of conspiracy, law that one can be guilty of an
agreement to commit an offense even if he did not attempt to commit the offense.
See United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974). Karas fails to explain why a group of people cannot agree to commit two
racketeering acts without attempting to commit the offbuses.
489. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002 (1979).
490. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102 (1980).
491. Additionally, the code versions undermine a fundamental assumption of El-
liott. Both define "pattern" to require a relationship between the racketeering ac-
tivities, a relationship that Elliott had rejected. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §
180 7(e) (1979); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2707(6) (1980); see notes 469-70
supra and accompanying text.
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Elliott because it would be difficult to carve out a unique RICO con-
spiracy doctrine from a single conspiracy statute.
V. DEFENSES AND PRETRIAL OBJECTIONS TO RICO
INDICTMENT FORMAT
A. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations applicable to RICO prosecutions is the
five year statute for noncapital offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3282,492 which
runs from the date of the last alleged act of racketeering activity. 493
To some extent, Title IX undermines the operation of the statute of
limitations by permitting prosecutions of predicate offenses commit-
ted beyond the existing limitations period. 494 The rationale for this
undesirable result is that the predicate offenses alone are not the sub-
ject of the prosecution, but are merely part of a continuing RICO
offense that extends into the limitations period. 495
B. Double Jeopardy
1. Multiple RICO Indictments
Double jeopardy problems arise wvhen the government alleges two
or more separate section 1962(c) offenses or multiple section 1962(d)
offenses based on the same illegal conduct. Traditionally, the courts
have applied a "same evidence" test in cases involving multiple of-
fenses arising out of the same transaction.4 96 That test permits sepa-
rate prosecutions if each offense charged "requires proof of an addi-
492. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976); see United States v. Davis. 576 F.2d 1065. 1067 t3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978). United States v. Forsthe, 560 F.2d 1127,
1134 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 SD.NNY
1977), affd mer., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.). ccrt. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 T978). The
courts have held that state statutes of limitations are inapplicable when state offenses
are the predicate offenses for a RICO charge. See notes 302-10 supra and accompany-
ing text.
493. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977. aff d mew.. 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
494. See notes 302-10 supra and accompanying text.
495. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). affdl me.., 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). see United States v. Co-
hen, 444 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (in rejecting duplicity argument.
court found violations of predicate offenses within limitations period when RICO of-
fense continued into period). It has been suggested that due process should prevent
a prosecution of predicate offenses committed too far in the past to permit the defen-
dant to properly prepare a defense. Atkinson, supra note 10. at 7-8.
496. E.g., United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir.) ccrt. denied. 429
U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. McCall, 489 F.2d 359, 362-63, t2d Cir. 1973). cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974); see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932).
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tional fact which the other does not." 497  Based on the Supreme
Court opinion in Braverman v. United States, 498 certain non-RICO
cases have not strictly applied the "same evidence" test in situations
involving two or more conspiracy charges under the same conspiracy
statute.4 99 Bravernan proscribed the practice of charging multiple
conspiracies merely because one agreement contemplated the viola-
tion of several statutes. The Court established the principle that one
agreement with multiple objects involving separate substantive of-
fenses is only one conspiracy that cannot be punished more than once
under a single conspiracy statute. 500 Although Braverman precludes
the tactic of charging multiple conspiracies based solely on multiple
statutory violations, a more troublesome problem remains because
the "same evidence" test may permit the government to charge a
single conspiracy as separate conspiracies by alleging different named
conspirators and different overt acts. Recognizing this problem, re-
cent cases have sharply criticized this test 501 and have engaged in
painstaking analyses of the similarities among the charged con-
spiracies to determine whether they actually constitute a single
agreement. 502
This practical approach to multiple conspiracy indictments should
affect cases involving separate section 1962(c) indictments. 50 3  Al-
though no case has yet directly analyzed the issue, the extension of
this conspiracy double jeopardy approach to separate section 1962(c)
counts may also be a source of potential conflict. 50 4  As in the multi-
497. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United States v.
Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v.
McCall, 489 F.2d 359, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974).
498. 317 U.S. 49 (1942); see note 484 supra.
499. See United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruigomez, 576
F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978).
500. 317 U.S. at 53.
501. United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruigomez, 576 F.2d
1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978).
502. See, e.g., United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1978).
The first indictment alleged conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin from July 1
to August 20, 1976, while the second alleged conspiracy to possess and distribute
cocaine between July 12 and July 29, 1976. The similar time periods, identical per-
sonnel, and the alleged violation of identical statutes established a single agreement.
Id. at 154.
503. See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) (indictment on two counts of conspiracy criticized be-
cause based upon same agreement).
504. In United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court
refused to resolve a double jeopardy challenge to multiple § 1962(c) indictments in-
volving different racketeering activities in the conduct of the affairs of the same en-
terprise, a union representing workers in New York's fur garment manufacturing in-
dustry. The first indictment alleged that the defendants unlawfully accepted money
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pie conspiracy situation, the government can easily create two or
more section 1962(c) charges from the same conduct by charging dif-
ferent enterprises or different patterns of racketeering activity.505
However, there is no viable policy distinction between a situation
involving multiple conspiracy indictments and one involving multiple
section 1962(c) indictments. If the courts will not permit prosecutorial
pleading discretion to undermine double jeopardy arguments in con-
spiracy cases, 50 6 they should not permit this result in situations under
section 1962(c). Applying the conspiracy double jeopardy analysis to
section 1962(c) cases, a double jeopardy violation should be presumed
if the racketeering activities occur in the same general location, at the
same general time, and involve the same central figure.50 7 Further-
more, jurisdictions adopting the common scheme approach should bar
separate prosecutions of section 1962(c) offenses when those offenses
arise out of the same scheme or plan.
from manufacturers in return for permitting the manufacturers to subcontract work to
non-union labor in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The second indict-
ment alleged that the defendants threatened non-union shop manufacturers with in-
jury to person and property if these manufacturers would not stop soliciting subcon-
tract work from union shop manufacturers. Responding to the defendant's assertion
that multiple § 1962(c) offenses could not arise from the conduct of the affairs of the
same enterprise, id. at 618, the court found this issue to turn on an interpretation of
congressional intent with respect to § 1962(c), but refused to decide the question
because it was prematurely raised. Id.
505. Under existing § 1962(c) case law, the government has virtually unfettered
discretion to charge any one of the numerous enterprises existing in a particular
situation. See notes 196-200 supra and accompanying text. The hypothetical discussed
in the text accompanying notes 198-99 supra illustrates the manuer in which at least
seven separate enterprises can be created from one fact pattern. In the absence of
the double jeopardy approach used with conspiracy. this hypothetical could produce
at least seven § 1962 (c) indictments. The number of conceivable § 1962(c) indict-
ments also increases because of new charges produced by differing patterns of rack-
eteering activity. Assume, for example, that although only a single enterprise exists.
three related acts of racketeering activity, arson, bribery, and robbery, have occur-
red. Three separate § 1962(c) indictments could be drafted, an enterprise operated
through a pattern composed of arson and bribery, the same enterprise operated
through a pattern composed of bribery and robber.', and that enterprise operated
through a pattern composed of arson and robbery.
506. In United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961
(1976), the court rejected a literal application of the "same evidence" test, reasoning
that "[b]ecause the government can tailor the overt acts charged in each indictment,
prosecutorial discretion may account for a single conspiracy's being capable of proof
in several prosecutions requiring different evidence for conviction." Id. at 820. cf
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a
fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.").
507. United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied,
420 U.S. 995 (1975); accord, United States v. Innon, 568 F.2d 326, 328-33 (3d Cir.
1977); see United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Marable, 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruigonez, 576 F.2d 1149
(5th Cir. 1978).
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2. Separate Indictments of Section 1962(d) Conspiracy
and Conspiracy Charged Under Another Statute
In cases in which a single agreement results in one indictment con-
taining multiple conspiracy counts charged under different conspiracy
statutes, the existing law regarding double jeopardy analysis and the
"same evidence" test is in a state of confusion. The First50 8 and
Sixth 5 9 Circuits have prohibited separate punishment for multiple
conspiracies based on the same agreement and charged under sepa-
rate conspiracy statutes. In contrast, Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions
reach conflicting conclusions. 510 The decisions permitting separate
punishment conclude that separate charges are permissible if, as is
invariably the case, the conspiracies are not the same under the
"same evidence" test.511
.The confusion is reflected in three cases 5 12 rejecting double
jeopardy challenges to a section 1962(d) indictment that was based on
508. United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975). The defendant in Honneus was indicted on three counts alleging
identical overt acts: conspiracy to import drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970);
conspiracy to distribute and possess drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970); and conspir-
acy to smuggle under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
The court held that the evidence established only one agreement and that the defen-
dant could not be separately punished merely because different conspiracy statutes
were allegedly violated.
509. United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1973) (defendant
could not be sentenced for two conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970) and 21
U.S.C. § 963 (1970) based on one agreement).
510. In the Fifth Circuit, compare United States -v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906,
921-24 (5th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943, 950-51 (5th Cir.
1976) (barring separate sentences for two conspiracies charged under 21 U.S.C. H9
846 and 963 (1970)), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nora. Croucher v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) and United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 2,14
(5th Cir.) (defendant could not be sentenced for two conspiracies under both the
Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act, ch. 100, § 2(c)(1), 35 Stat. 614 (1909) and 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1970) on the basis of one agreement), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971)
with United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (implying that
double jeopardy does not bar separate prosecutions under separate conspiracy stat-
utes) and United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 309-11 (5th Cir.) (separate sen-
tences permitted for multiple conspiracies charged under different statutes), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978). In the Ninth Circuit, compare United States v. Noah,
475 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.) (one agreement could result in only one conspiracy
conviction), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 (1973) with United States v. Marotta, 518
F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding separate punishment for two conspiracies
charged under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963 (1970) even though only one agreement was
involved).
511. United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 309-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978);
United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1975).
512. United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143-45 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 677 (1980); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 309-11 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Meinster, 475 F. Supp. 1093,
1095 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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factual allegations similar to those that were the basis for a prior,
separate indictment and conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs
under 21 U.S.C. § 846.513 The reasoning differs sharply. In United
States v. Smith, 514 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered whether separate conspiracy indictments under the two
statutes were permissible, and disposed of the double jeopardy ar-
gument by rigidly applying the "same evidence" test. 515 Not surpris-
ingly, it found differences in the elements of each conspiracy statute
and permitted separate sentences.516
Smith is not entirely consistent with United States v. Meinster,5 17 a
subsequent opinion by a Fifth Circuit district court. Although Mein-
ster also involved section 1962(d) indictments following section 846
convictions, its analysis differed in a significant aspect. In Meinster,
the court observed and the government conceded that double
jeopardy would preclude a section 1962(d) indictment following the
section 846 conspiracy conviction. 518 The Meinster holding is in line
with two non-RICO Fifth Circuit decisions involving separate indict-
ments under different conspiracy statutes.5 19 In these cases, the
court declined to apply a strict "same evidence" test on the grounds
that to do so would "permit the government arbitrarily to split unit-
arv . . . conspiracies and to initiate as many prosecutions." 5 20 These
results cannot be reconciled with the Smith holding permitting multi-
ple conspiracy prosecutions of a single agreement. 521
The third section 1962(d) case, United States r. Solaio,522 es-
tablished a bifurcated analysis of the double jeopardy issue. In con-
sidering a pretrial challenge to the indictment, the court adopted an
orthodox "same evidence" test and rejected the double jeopardy
513. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
514. 574 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
515. Id. at 310-11.
516. Id.
517. 475 F. Supp. 1093, 1095-96 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
518. Id. at 1096.
519. United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978). United States v.
Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1978).
520. United States v. Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978). accord.
United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978).
521. 574 F.2d at 310-11. Meinster also implied that, while a conspiracy conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) bars an indictment under § 1962d) and 21 U.S.C. §
848 (1976) (continuing criminal enterprise), it does not bar a § 1962(c) indictment.
475 F. Supp. at 1095. The distinction between application of the double jeopardy
principles to § 848 and § 1962(c) is persuasive. Section 848. though not labeled a
conspiracy statute, requires an agreement among five people. Sce Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1977). A § 846 conspiracy prosectition bars a § 848 trial
because § 848 is in essence a conspiracy statute. Section 1962(c) is not it conspiracy
statute unless it is transformed into one by the common scheme interpretation of
,.pattern."
52-2. 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677 t1980).
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argument because section 846 and section 1962(c) involve different
elements. 523 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the defendant
could raise the double jeopardy issue at a later date "if it [became]
clear from the trial that [the defendant was] being prosecuted twice
for the same conspiracy." 52 4 This conclusion implies that the "same
evidence" test would not be applied on direct appeal.
3. Separate Punishment of Section 1962(c) and
Predicate Offenses
Because certain federal and state crimes constitute racketeering ac-
tivities under Title IX, double jeopardy problems may arise when
acquittals or convictions on the predicate crimes occur before or
simultaneously with the RICO litigation. Under the prevailing law,
the government may charge a defendant with both a RICO offense
and the underlying offenses in the same indictment.5 25  An appro-
priate double jeopardy analysis, however, must recognize that the law
pertaining to the allegation of separate charges may not be controlling
on the issue of separate punishment. 526
The case law governing separate punishment of section 1962(c) and
its predicate offenses has failed to recognize this critical distinction.
For example, the issue of separate punishment was subjected to a
muddled analysis by both the Second and Ninth Circuits.5 2 7  In
United States v. Rone, 528 the defendant received consecutive sen-
tences for a section 1962(c) violation and two extortion offenses that
were among the predicate offenses. Applying the "same evidence"
test, the Ninth Circuit held that double jeopardy principles were not
violated because the RICO count charged predicate offenses other
than the two extortion offenses. 529 The Rone court also noted that
the RICO statutory scheme did not suggest that Congress intended to
preclude separate convictions or consecutive sentences.5 30 The court
523. Id. at 1144.
524. Id. at 1145.
525. See Atkinson, supra note 10, at 8.
526. The government may allege the same offense in different counts of a single
indictment if separate sentences are not imposed. United States v. Honneus, 508
F.2d 566, 570 (1st Cir- 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
527. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d
1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598
F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 13,45 (1980).
528. 598 F.2d 564, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
529. 598 F.2d at 571; accord, United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677 (1980).
530. 598 F.2d at 571. accord, United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882); United
States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677
(1980). The court in Boylan stated that the RICO statute and the predicate offense
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indicated that precluding separate punishment would impermissibly
require the government to elect between prosecuting a RICO offense
and prosecuting only the predicate offenses. 531  This reasoning was
also adopted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Boylan, 532
which involved a fact pattern similar to that in Rone. Rone, however,
should not be regarded as persuasive authority because it failed to
recognize that the significant issue is not whether the offenses are
identical so that they cannot be prosecuted separately, but whether
the predicate offenses are lesser included offenses within a RICO of-
fense. 533
The Supreme Court has concluded that the double jeopardy clause
requires, at a minimum, that separate punishment of a greater and
lesser included offense be imposed only when clearly authorized by
Congress. 534  In Whalen v. United States,535 the defendant received
consecutive sentences for rape and first-degree murder. The murder
was committed during the commission of a rape, and the murder
charge was based on a felony-murder theory. Under the District of
Columbia felony-murder statute, 536 the rape was a lesser included
offense within the felony murder charge because proof of the rape
statute, 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) (1976), proscribed two different acts or tnmsactions and
implemented different congressional purposes. Therefore, it was clear that "Congress
intended to create separate crimes, separately punishable." 620 F.2d at 361; see
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980).
531. 598 F.2d at 571; accord, United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882). Oddly enough.
this statement is contradicted by the court's earlier comment that, had the § 1962(c)
allegation charged only the two extortion offenses for which separate sentences had
been imposed, there might be problems under the same evidence test. 598 F.2d at
571.
532. 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1980) (No. 79-1882).
533. Both lesser included offenses and the greater offense may be alleged sepa-
rately. See Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284. 290 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied.
340 U.S. 917 (1951); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 757 (N.D. I1. 1972).
534. Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436-37 (1980). The Supreme
Court is sharply divided on the issue whether double jeopardy bars cumulative
punishment of the same offense at a single trial even if Congress clearly intends to
permit such punishment. Many cases indicate that double jeopardy would bar mul-
tiple punishment at a single trial. See Simpson v. United States. 435 U.S. 6, 11-12
(1978); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1972); American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946). Another case states in dicta that the
double jeopardy clause forbids only cumulative punishment imposed at two trials and
does not preclude such punishment if it is imposed at a single trial. Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Other cases have barred multiple punishment after analyz-
ing only legislative intent. See United States v. Busic, 100 S. Ct. 1747 (1980); Prince
v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 325-28 (1957).
535. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980).
536. D.C. Code Encycl. § 22-2401, 11 (West 1967).
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was a necessary element of the offense.537 The Court held that
under the general rule of statutory construction, absent clear legisla-
tive intent to the contrary, Congress does not authorize consecutive
sentences if the offenses are the same under the Blockburger
test. 538 Because a lesser included offense and the greater are the
same under that test, separate punishment was barred.5 39  Obvi-
ously, the predicate offenses are lesser included offenses within sec-
tion 1962(c) because the elements of these crimes must be established
to prove the commission of a racketeering activity. 54 0 Therefore,
separate punishment of the predicate offenses and the RICO offense
is not permissible because of the absence of a clear congressional at-
thorization of consecutive sentences. 541
4. Trial on State Charges Prior to RICO
Prosecutions
A different analysis is adopted when a defendant claims that a prior
state court prosecution of the predicate offenses precludes a sub-
sequent RICO indictment. Two issues distinguishing this situation
from other double jeopardy fact patterns emerge-the role of the
dual sovereignty doctrine and a question of statutory construction
concerning the meaning of the "chargeable under state law" language
in section 1961(1)(A). The dual sovereignty doctrine, afirmed by the
Supreme Court in Abbate v. United States,542 authorizes state and
federal prosecutions of the same acts on the rationale that each
537. 100 S. Ct. at 1439.
538. Id. at 1438.
539. Id. at 1439; see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161. 169 (1977).
540. See Atkinson, supra note 10, at 9 n.65. The courts have noted that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the predicate offense is necessary to
establish a RICO violation. E.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947,
952 (3d Cir. 1979); cf. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.) (RICO
count includes any scienter element required by predicate crimes), cert. denied, ,49
U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882); United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 364 n.34, 365 n.36 (9th Cir. 1975) (each racketeering act in pattern must
violate independent statute), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). The instructions in
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, 2 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §§ 56.18 to -.34
(1977 & Supp. 1979), however, do not expressly incorporate a requirement that the
government prove each element of the predicate offense.
541. The argument that separate punishment was precluded because the predicate
offenses are lesser included within the RICO offense was rejected in United States v.
Scotto, Nos. 1131-32, slip op. at 5379 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1980). The court cited its
holding in United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 360-61 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1882), that violations of RICO
and the predicate crimes were "separate crimes, separately punishable." Set notes
528-32 supra and accompanying text.
542. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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sovereign has the inherent power to punish violations of its law.543 In
RICO cases involving prior state convictions, courts have rejected
double jeopardy arguments on this basis.544 At least one authority
has criticized this application of Abbate to RICO cases as a violation
of the double jeopardy clause.5 4 5  Regardless of the abstract merits of
the dual sovereignty view, its application to RICO is particularly
ironic. The Abbate Court upheld the doctrine because of its fear that
a contrary result "would bring about a marked change in the distribu-
tion of powers to administer criminal justice, for the States under our
federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and pros-
ecuting crimes."5 46  When the dual sovereignty doctrine is applied
to Title IX, RICO's broad reach has precisely the impact of changing
the distribution of powers by substantially extending federal jurisdic-
tion to define and prosecute crimes.5 47
The dual sovereignty principle does not conclusively resolve prob-
lems arising when the defendant faces a RICO prosecution after an
acquittal on the predicate state offenses. In these situations, the
meaning of the requirement in section 1961(1)(A) that state offenses
be "chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year" 548 may be at issue. Judge Aldisert's dissent in
United States v. Frurnento 649 reasoned that, after acquittal in state
court, the offense is "neither 'chargeable' nor 'punishable.' "550 How-
ever, the Fruniento majority rejected this interpretation and charac-
543. Id. at 194-95; United States v. Lanza. 260 U.S. 377, 382 919 -2)). In United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345
(1980), the court considered the applicability of an exception to the dual sovereignty
doctrine. That exception, implicitly acknowledged in Bartkus v. Illinois. 359 U.S. 121
(1959), prohibits a federal prosecution when the prior state prosecution is *'a sham
and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fict another federal
prosecution." 359 U.S. at 124. In Aleman, the defendant contended that the state
prosecution was a sham and cited the testimony of an FBI agent at the state trial and
the listing of a federal prosecutor as a possible state witness. 609 F.2d at 309. The
court found that these facts did not evidence "'federal 'orchestration' of state au-
thorities," but merely demonstrated cooperation between state and federal au-
thorities, and were thus insufficient to come within the Bartkus exception. Id.
544. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 t7th Cir. 1979), re'rt denied, 100
S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F,2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677 (1980); United States v. Malatesta. 5.:3 F2d 74S 757(5th Cir. 1978), affd on rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. . cert. denied,
444 U.S. 846 (1979).
545. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083. 1092-95 (3d Cir. 1977, tAldisert,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
546. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 tl 95 9 .
547. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
548. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976).
549. 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1072 t 19 781.
550. Id. at 1097.
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terized section 1961 as requiring only that the "conduct on which the
federal charge is based be typical of the serious crime dealt with by
the state statute." 551 The court observed that the list of state of-
fenses was merely definitional and necessary only to identify the
proscribed unlawful activity. 552
The Frumento majority's construction of section 1961 is suspect be-
cause it inadequately distinguished the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Mason.553 In Mason, the defendant was first acquit-
ted in state court of the murder of a federal officer and then charged
in federal court with conspiracy to obstruct federal officers and with
murder of a federal officer as part of the conspiracy. The conspiracy
statute in force at the time prescribed additional punishment attached
to certain felonies or misdemeanors "by the laws of the State" com-
mitted by a defendant during the course of the conspiracy. 5 4 The
court held that acquittal in state court barred the use of the state
offense to increase the punishment for conspiracy. 555 Fruiento char-
acterized Mason as limited to the construction of a particular statute
rather than a double jeopardy or a collateral estoppel decision. 550
Even if Mason was based upon statutory construction, however, the
Frumento court did not explain its peculiar construction of Title IX
and failed to cite any support in the legislative history or on the face
of the statute that would dictate a deviation from Mason.5 57
C. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, a principle embodied in the double jeopardy
clause, 558 bars an issue that has been determined by a valid and final
551. Id. at 1087 n.8A.
552. Id. This reasoning is similar to the cases holding that state procedural rules
are inapplicable even if they would bar prosecution in state courts. In those cases the
Third Circuit has held that "chargeable" and "punishable" refer to the time at which
the offense was committed. See notes 307-08 supra and accompanying text.
553. 213 U.S. 115 (1909).
554. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 7, 16 Stat. 1,40, 141.
555. 213 U.S. at 123-26.
556. 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
557. Distinguishing Mason is particularly difficult because of the Supreme Court's
definitive statement in Mason: "As a general rule, the Federal courts accept the
judgment of the state court as to the meaning and scope of a state enactment,
whether civil or criminal. Much more should the Federal court accept the judgment
of a state court based upon a verdict of acquittal of a crime against the State,
whenever, in a case in the Federal court, it becomes material to inquire whether that
particular crime against the State was committed by the defendants on trial in the
Federal court for an offense against the United States." 213 U.S. at 125.
558. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2.
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judgment from being relitigated by the same parties. 55 9 This doc-
trine was considered in a section 1962(c) case, United States v. Mein-
ster,560 which acknowledged that an acquittal on a prior federal aid-
ing and abetting charge precluded the government from introducing
"into evidence any fact which was necessarily resolved against the
government at the previous trial." 5 61 In contrast, acquittals in state
court on a state predicate offense have been held to have no collateral
estoppel impact in a RICO case because the United States was not a
party in the state prosecution.562
A variation on the collateral estoppel problem occurs when the de-
fendant obtains an acquittal on or reversal of a predicate offense but
is convicted on a section 1962(c) or (d) charge in the same trial. For
example, United States v. Brown563 reversed convictions on twro of
the four predicate offenses alleged in counts separate from the section
1962(c) and (d) charges. The court held that a reversal of any of the
predicate offense convictions would require the reversal of both sec-
tion 1962(c) and (d) convictions because the appellate court could not
determine which predicate offenses the jury used as a basis for the
RICO conviction. 56 4  The Ninth Circuit has construed Brown to
imply strongly "that conviction on the substantive counts which form
the basis of the RICO charge is necessary to uphold a RICO convic-
tion." 565
559. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979), 1B J. Moore,
Federal Practice 0.405[1), at 22-24 (2d ed. 1974). Collateral estoppel may estop the
government solely on issues resolved in the first trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979) (government precluded from introducing
evidence of a defendant's possession of cocaine in a conspiracy trial held subsequent
to an acquittal on a substantive possession charge).
560. 475 F. Supp. 1093, 1096-97 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
561. Id. at 1097.
562. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978) (dismissing a
collateral estoppel argument because United States not bound by results of state
proceeding to which it was not a party), aff'd on rehearing en bane. 590 F.2d 1329
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979). But cf. United States v. Mason, 213
U.S. 115 (1909) (federal court should be bound by acquittal of state charges in state
court).
563. 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
564. Id. at 669-70.
565. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 100
S. Ct. 1345 (1980). This point was made to support Rone's holding that separate
punishment of predicate offenses and of a RICO charge was permissible. Id. at 572.
Brown was distinguished in United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 399 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980), on the ground that the evidence in Huber
was sufficient to sustain all the predicate offenses. Huber, however, indicated that it
was not deciding whether it agreed with Brown's analysis. Huber's reluctance to
endorse Brown may have been based on Brown's departure from the general rule of
conspiracy law that if an indictment charges a conspiracy to engage in two or more
offenses and only one is established, the conspiracy conviction can nonetheless stand.
See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir. 1976).
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D. Duplicity and Multiplicity
1. Duplicity
An indictment is duplicitous when the government charges two or.
more distinct offenses in a single count.56 6 Duplicitous indictments
are considered prejudicial because they prevent jurors from acquit-
ting on one charge if they would convict on the other. Consequently,
on appellate review or in litigating double jeopardy arguments, a
court cannot determine whether the jury found the defendant guilty
of only one crime, or whether all twelve jurors believed the defen-
dant committed the same crime. 567
Duplicity objections have rarely been successful in RICO prosecu-
tions. 568 Two cases rejected arguments that RICO counts were du-
plicitous because they alleged a series of predicate offenses. 569  The
courts held that the mere fact that a RICO count incorporates sepa-
rate predicate offenses does not sustain a duplicity argument because
the predicate offenses and section 1962(c) and (d) constitute a single
continuing offense.5 70
Another case, however, has indicated that a RICO count may vio-
late the prohibition on duplicitous indictments in the absence of sufli-
cient procedural protections against prejudice. In United States v.
Huber,571 the defendant claimed that a section 1962(c) count was
duplicitous because it charged a series of acts through a number of'
entities. He asserted that the jury could convict even if it did not
agree on the particular predicate offenses committed. 572 Although
the court recognized the potential validity of the claim, it found that
566. United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 9.36 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Bartemio, 547 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir.
1974); Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55, 59 (8th Cir. 1973).
567. See United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
949 (1972).
568. See United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Cohen, 444 F. Supp. 1314,
1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978) United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
569. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim
that § 1962(d) count alleged two conspiracies when count alleged a wide variety of
substantive offenses), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Cohen,
444 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (rejecting duplicity argument when
RICO counts charged multiple incidents of receiving extortionate payments).
570. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Cohen, 444 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
571. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
572. Id. at 394.
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the claim was waived because it was not raised prior to trial, and the
problem was resolved, in any event, by use of special verdicts and
convictions for all separate counts alleging the predicate offenses. 5 73
2. Multiplicity
A multiplicitous indictment charges a single offense in several
counts.5 74  Multiplicity can prejudice the defendant by imposing
multiple sentences for the same offense.5 75 Multiplicity and double
jeopardy issues are ostensibly similar, the only difference being that
multiplicity involves multiple sentences for a crime charged in one
indictment while double jeopardy involves two or more separate in-
dictments for the same offense.
Despite the similarities, recent Supreme Court cases indicate that,
while it is clear double jeopardy precludes separate punishment im-
posed at separate trials of the same offense, the Court is divided on
whether, in the multiplicity situation, double jeopardy also precludes
separate sentences for the same offense at a single trial.5 76 The
primary multiplicity issue in RICO cases involves charging the RICO
offense and its predicate offenses in separate counts, an indictment
format the courts have consistently upheld. 577  These decisions are
correct within their limited scope. Permitting the government to
charge the RICO offense and its predicate crimes in separate counts
is not prejudicial unless the court also imposes separate sentences on
each count. Separate punishment, however, should be barred by the
573. Id.; see United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In
Ainato the defendant contended that the count alleging violations of two conspiracy.
statutes, § 371 and § 1962(d), was duplicitous. The court acknowledged that a guilt%
verdict would not indicate under which statute the defendant had been convicted,
but resolved this problem by imposing a sentence under the statute providing the
lesser punishment.
574. United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833. 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55, 5 (8th Cir.
1973).
575. United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
576. See note 534 supra. At a minimum, multiple punishment at a single trial can
only be imposed upon a showing of clear legislative authorization. Sce notes 534-41
supra and accompanying text.
577. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980): United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 786-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd sub nora. United States v. Weisman. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1980) (No. 80-62); United States v.
Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 800 (M.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Salvitti. 451 F. Supp.
195, 199-200 (E.D. Pa.), affd mere., 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978), United States v.
Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (E.D. Wis. 1976); United States v. Stofsk\, 409 F.
Supp. 609, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. White. 386 F. Supp. 8S2, 8S4
(E.D. Wis. 1974). These courts have pointed to the *'pattern" element of RICO, not
present in the underlying offenses.
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double jeopardy clause because of the lesser included offense status of
the predicate offenses. 578
E. Joinder and Severance
Joinder and severance of defendants and offenses in RICO cases are
frequently litigated issues that often require consideration of the
merits of both the common scheme construction of "pattern" and the
Elliott conspiracy doctrine. For purposes of this analysis, some com-
molply used terms must be understood. Joinder is the inclusion of
multiple offenses and/or multiple defendants in the same indict-
ment. 579  Misjoinder is joinder that is not proper under rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 580 Finally, prejudicial joinder
is joinder of offenses that is proper under rule 8 but improper under
rule 14 because of prejudice to the defendant.581
1. Joinder of Offenses
a, Joinder of Predicate Offenses
Joinder of offenses is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Pr6ce-
dure 8(a). 582 Because rule 8(a) controls joinder only if a single de-
fendant is tried, 58 3 it is of little practical significance in multi-
defendant RICO cases. 584 Nevertheless, its language can aid in the
interpretation of rule 8(b), the more frequently litigated rule that
governs joinder of offenses and/or defendants in a trial of two or more
defendants. 585 Rule 8(b) is more restrictive than rule 8(a) because
578. See notes 534-41 supra and accompanying text.
579. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), (b).
580. See id.
581. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8, 14. See generally United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d
789, 796-97 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Haggard v. United States, 369 F.2d 968 (8th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 386 U.S. 1023 (1967); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 144, at 223 (1969).
582. Rule 8(a) provides that "[tlwo or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each ofTense if the offenses charged
... are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions, connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
583. Id.; see United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
584. The only reported rule 8(a) decision in a RICO prosecution is United States
v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Fineman, the defendant con-
tended that an obstruction of justice count, not alleged to have been part of the
conspiracy or racketeering enterprise, could not be joined with the RICO or conspir-
acy counts. Nevertheless, speculating that the obstruction of justice may have been
intended to conceal the enterprise, the court found no misjoinder. Id. at 203.
585. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) provides that "[thwo or more defendants may
be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have partici-
pated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
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instead of permitting joinder solely on the grounds that two defen-
dants committed the same or similar type of offense,5 86 it permits
joinder of two defendants as long as they participated in the "same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses." 5 87
If the "series of acts or transactions" language requires any substantial
relationship among those transactions, a court rejecting the require-
ment of a relationship among acts constituting a "pattern" under sec-
tion 1962(c) would find it difficult to apply rule 8(b) joinder to the
section 1962(c) offense. 588
This difficulty has surfaced when defendants charged in a RICO
count have been joined with those alleged to have committed the
predicate offenses. The courts in United States v. Thevis589 and
United States v. DePalma 590 upheld joinder based on the assumption
that if the predicate offenses are part of the same RICO "pattern of
racketeering activity," they are also part of the "same series of acts or
transactions" for purposes of rule 8(b). 59' These courts dismissed as
incongruous any construction of the rule 8(b) "series of acts or trans-
actions" language that would require a closer interrelationship be-
tween the predicate offenses than does "pattern." 5 92  Significantly,
both courts also rejected any construction of "pattern" that requires a
relationship between the racketeering acts. 593
constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each
count."
586. United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States
v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1976): United States v. Marionneaux,
514 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975).
587. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b).
588. See pt. III(c)(3) supra.
589. 474 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
590. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub norm. United States v. Weisman,
624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1980) (No.
80-62).
591. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 131 (N.D. Ca. 1979) (joinder of
RICO predicate offenses involving mail fraud, possession of a destructive device,
murder, obstruction of justice); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 787-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (joinder of predicate offenses involving securities fraud, bankruptcy
fraud and obstruction of justice), affd sub nor. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d
1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62). cf.
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975) (participation in the
same pattern of racketeering activity permits rule 8(b) joinder), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976).
592. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 131 (N.D. Ca. 1979) (quoting
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). aff'd sub non.
United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir), cert denied. 49 U.S.L.W. 3249
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62)).
593. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 139 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1979). United
States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). affd sub norm. United
States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62).
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The implication of the two holdings is that the word "series" does
not connote a relationship between the acts because the word "pat-
tern" does not. Consequently, the cases reveal a dilemma. It would
seem logical to permit joinder of the RICO offense with its lesser
included predicate offenses. Yet, the phrase "same series of transac-
tions" clearly connotes some form of relationship between the of-
fenses to be joined. 594 Moreover, prior to DePalma and Thevis,
knowledgeable authorities theorized that the rule 8(b) "series of acts
or transactions" language should be construed to be equivalent to the
language "two or more acts or transactions connected together or con-
stituting parts of a common scheme or plan" in rule 8(a). 595 Permit-
ting joinder when no common scheme or other relationship underlies
the predicate offenses undermines the fundamental requirement of
rule 8 that some relationship exist between the joined offenses. 5 0
The "series of transactions" restriction of rule 8(b) can retain its
meaning in one of two ways. A "common scheme" construction of'
"pattern" would prevent the allegation of a section 1962(c) offense
composed of unrelated racketeering activities and thereby preclude
joinder of defendants involved in unrelated racketeering activities. 597
594. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1158 (7th Cir.) (interpreting "transac-
tion" in rule 8 as contemplating a series of acts depending "upon their logical rela-
tionship" (quoting Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange. 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926))),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
595. 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 144, at 322 (1969) (emphasis
added); accord, 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice 8.06[2], at 8-36 to -37 (2d ed. 1979).
596. Two unpersuasive objections to this reasoning exist. The first turns on the
language in rule 8(b) permitting joinder based on participation in the "same series of
transactions constituting an offense or offenses," and asserts that if the acts constitute
the offense, they are part of the same series of transactions. The difficulty' with this
approach is that rule 8(a) does not include any language stating that the transactions
"constitute" an offense or offenses. Rather, it states that the transactions must consti-
tute a common scheme. If rule 8(a) and (b) are to be read in pari nateria, see note
593 supra and accompanying text, the "constituting" language in rule 8(b) should not
be decisive. The second contention is that, if rule 8(b) requires a relationship between
the offenses, it is supplied by the relationship of the racketeering acts to the enter-
prise. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 139 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub
noi. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62). If an illegal enterprise is alleged, however, this
relationship requirement is meaningless because proof of the illegal enterprise con-
sists of no more than proof of the racketeering acts themselves. See note 311 supra
and accompanying text. DePalma involved a legitimate enterprise and did not con-
front this problem. See 461 F. Supp. at 781.
597. See notes 269-70 supra and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Turkette,
Nos. 79-1545, 79-1546, slip op. at 27 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1980) (rejecting illegal enter-
prise allegation because government's theory "avoids the strictures of Rule 8(b)"
by consolidating "in one indictment acts and transactions which otherwise could not
have been joined").
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A second solution is to permit the allegation of a section 1962(c) of-
fense consisting of unrelated racketeering acts, but preclude rule 8(b)
joinder of defendants involved in those acts. 598
Even if any offenses may be joined as long as they are part of the
same pattern, joinder might still be precluded if the government pros-
ecutes two or more defendants who operated the same enterprise
but were involved in different patterns. Assume, for example, that
four employees operate Hooker Chemical through a pattern of other-
wise unrelated racketeering. Employee A commits fraud in the sale of
stock in 1971; Employee B steals products being shipped to out-of-
state dealers in 1973; Employee C threatens potential witnesses to a
grand jury that is investigating corporate antitrust violations in 1975;
and Employee D bribes state legislators in 1977. Whether or not,
under United States v. Cryan, 599 the defendants may be charac-
terized as having participated in the same RICO offense, 600 a literal
application of DePalma and Thevis would bar joinder of these
employees in a single trial because they did not participate in the
same pattern.
b. Joinder of a RICO Offense and
Non-Predicate Offense
In fact patterns involving the joinder of a RICO offense and a crime
that is not an alleged racketeering activity, the courts have em-
phasized the relationship between the offenses. In United States c.
Cohen,601 the defendant, an attorney for a school board, objected to
joinder of perjury and income tax violations with a RICO offense
charging a pattern of extortion in the selection of architects for school
district work. The tax violations involved the proceeds received from
598. If neither of these solutions is adopted. the absence of an% required relation-
ship between the joined offenses in DePalba and Thetis will vastly expand the gov-
ernment's ability to join defendants. In a single trial, key members of an enterprise
could be joined with individuals only marginally related to the enterprise. A partici-
pant in only one offense who is not'alleged to be a member of the enterprise could
be joined with enterprise members even though his offense was not related to other
racketeering acts. Both DePalma and Thevis permitted joinder of a defendant
charged with a single RICO predicate offense even though that person was not
charged in the RICO count. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 130 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (defendant involved in one predicate offense, conspiracy to deprive citizens
of constitutional rights, joined with RICO defendants charged with murder, obstruc-
tion of justice, and mail fraud); United States v. DePahlna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (in RICO case involving securities fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and
obstruction of justice, defendants involved in only one of those offenses joined with
RICO defendants), aff'd sub nor. United States v. Weisman. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 80-62).
599. United States v. Crvan, 490 F. Supp. 1234 tD.N.J. 1980).
600. See notes 478-83 supra and accompanying text.
601. 444 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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the RICO violation while the perjury related to concealment of that
violation. 60 2 Joinder was sustained because the offenses arose out of
a "common scheme of racketeering activity" 60 3 and satisfied the
same series of acts or transactions" requirement.
2. Retroactive Misjoinder
If the RICO count provides the only joinder relationship between
the various predicate offenses, reversal of the RICO count may ap-
pear to create a misjoinder problem. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that if a conspiracy count supplied the joinder element, a
dismissal or acquittal of the conspiracy count during or after the trial
does not result in misjoinder.604  Rather, if defendants are properly
joined before the trial, courts will continue to find the joinder
proper.60 5 Nevertheless, in some instances misjoinder is found at
trial. One such situation occurred in United States v. Sutton, 606 in
which a Sixth Circuit panel eliminated both a section 1962(c) count
and a section 1962(d) count. The panel was then compelled to deter-
mine whether the elimination of these counts resulted in misjoinder
of the predicate offenses, fencing of stolen property and various drug
offenses. The panel held that misjoinder had occurred because the
predicate offenses were not part of the same series of transactions in
the absence of the RICO counts. 60 7  It limited the rule against ret-
roactive misjoinder to cases in which insufficient proof of the conspi-
racy or the section 1962(c) count was offered. 608 The rule was not
controlling in Sutton because the panel had eliminated the RICO
counts on the grounds that they were legally insufficient; 609 there-
fore, the panel concluded that the elimination of the RICO count
created reversible misjoinder of the predicate offenses.6 10
3. Prejudicial Joinder
If dismissal or acquittal of a count occurs during or after trial, a
severance or mistrial motion will often be considered as an issue of
602. Id. at 1317.
603. Id. A second case holds that, when an offense is not a predicate crime, it may
be joined with the RICO offense if it was intended to conceal the RICO violation.
United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (obstruction of
justice charge could be joined with RICO charge if the offense may have been in-
tended to conceal enterprise), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 945 (1978); see pt III(C) supra.
604. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960).
605. United States v Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1209-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 842 (1975).
606. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing en banc, Nos. 78-5134 to
-5139, 78-5141 to -5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980).
607. Id. at 271.
608. Id. at 272.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 271-72.
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prejudicial joinder, a problem governed by rule 14.611 The problems
commonly arising in multi-defendant RICO cases, such as conflicting
defenses 612 or the disparate quanta of evidence against various de-
fendants,613 have invariably been held insufficient to justify rule 14
severance.61 4 Acknowledging that the spirit of rule 14 is to discour-
age mass trials, the court in United States v. TheVis 615 established a
bifurcated approach to the rule 14 issue. It held that, when consider-
611. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14; see United States v. Scott, 511 F.2d 15, 18-19 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); United States v. Donawav, 447 F.2d 940,
943 (9th Cir. 1971). Although misjoinder and prejudicial joinder are both raised by a
motion to sever, the standards for granting severance are different for each. A rule
8(b) motion is, in theory, a determination of law based on the facts alleged in the
indictment. See United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1977). But see
Tarlow, supra note 457, at 288-89. A prejudicial joinder claim, a decision wvithin the
discretion of the trial court, is governed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. The court must
examine whether joinder unduly prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. See
United States v. Wright, 564 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1977): United States v. Moten,
564 F.2d 620, 628 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). Reversals of rule 14
determinations occur only when an abuse of discretion is established. See United
States v. Hefring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
734 (1980).
612. See United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1979) (defen-
dants joined in a single trial each blamed the other for fraud in obtaining loans), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980).
613. See United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797. 809-10 & n.11 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (one defendant claimed that jury improperly used against him evidence admit-
ted only against other two defendants), affd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
614. See United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1979) (defend-
ant claimed trial atmosphere preju icial because each defendant blamed the other).
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064,
1073-75 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendants unsuccessfully sought severance because of
crowded courtroom conditions, race, plethora of nicknames, and similarity of given
names among 15 defendants), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978). United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 132-33 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (court rejected arguments of dis-
parate evidence, pre-trial publicity, economic burden of joint trial); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1103 (E.D. Pa.) (defendant unsuccessfully opposed join-
der of tax counts and RICO count because of fear that evidence introduced to prove
one crime would establish defendant's criminal propensity and lead to his conviction
on other crime), aff'd mer., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1072 (1980); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 196-97 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(court rejected contention that joinder of offenses would deprive defendant of right to
testify on certain counts and remain silent on others); United States v. Frumento,
426 F. Supp. 797, 809-10 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court rejected contention that disparate
proof against each defendant requires severance), aff d, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978): United States v. Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430, 434
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (denial of severance motion based on jury's inability to distinguish
the evidence and charges against each defendant, conflicting defenses of joined de-
fendants and desire to call as witnesses, and codefendants who would not testify at
joint trial). The courts have appeared to be more preoccupied with saving court time
and taxpayers' money than with the significant problems resulting from joinder.
615. 474 F. Supp. 117, 133 & n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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ing pretrial motions, a court should balance the interest of judicial
and governmental convenience against the defendant's allegations of
prejudice. 616 Thevis cautioned against using this balancing approach,
however, when rule 14 motions based on prejudice appearing in the
record are made during the trial. Instead, in these situations the
court should analyze the weight of the evidence to determine
whether a reasonable jury with appropriate instructions could distin-
guish defendants, offenses, and the evidence. 6 17
VI. CRIMINAL FORFEITURES
A. General Structure and Scope of RICO
Forfeiture
The criminal penalties attaching to a RICO violation are delineated
in section 1963(a), which provides for forfeiture of a defendant's in-
terest in an enterprise in addition to a fine and/or imprisonment.6 18
Although the language of the two forfeiture clauses of section 1963(a)
indicates that they are generally applicable to all violations of section
1962, the clauses have been construed to apply to separate categories
of interests. Section 1963(a)(1) has thus been held to mandate forfei-
ture of interests in enterprises acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962(a) or (b),619 while section 1963(a)(2) has been held to
govern forfeiture of interests in violation of section 1962(c).6 20 This
construction of section 1963(a) fails to specify any relationship be-
tween forfeiture and violations of section 1962(d); indeed, no case has
discussed whether section 1963(a) forfeiture is an appropriate penalty
for a RICO conspiracy conviction. Obviously, for purposes of section
1963(a), the defendant's actions must proceed beyond the point of
mere agreement 62' because if no interest is actually acquired there is
nothing to forfeit.
616. Id. at 133.
617. Id.
618. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). This section provides that "[w]hoever violates any
provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United
States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and
(2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of an)
kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
section 1962."
619. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Thevis
hypothesized "that § 1963(a)(1) is directed toward the forfeiture of a minority interest
in an enterprise controlled by others." Id. at 143 n.14.
620. Id. at 143. Under this interpretation, § 1963(a)(2) reaches an interest in the
enterprise if the defendant is in control, either alone or jointly with other co-
defendants. Id. at 143 n.14.
621. It may be incorrect to conclude that § 1963(a) applies only to § 1962(a), (b),
and (c). The point made in the text is simply that a mere agreement is insuflicient to
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Section 1963(a) is a radical innovation in forfeiture law. Before the
passage of section 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 848,622 federal forfeiture
statutes authorized in rem actions against articles or contraband put
to illegal use. 623 In contrast, section 1963(a) authorizes in personain
forfeitures that automatically attach upon conviction. 624  The in per-
sonam forfeiture itself is not a new concept. At English common law,
"[t]he convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his
lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all his
support a § 1963(a) forfeiture. The analysis, however, becomes much more complex
when a defendant acts in furtherance of a § 1962(d) charge but does not violate
subsections (a), (b), or (c). For example, assume that two defendants agree to acquire
stock in a corporation through a pattern of racketeering involving two acts of mail
fraud (the sending of two letters containing misrepresentations), but the victim sells
the stock to the defendants after receiving only one letter, thus preventing the de-
fendants from completing the pattern. Ostensibly, this situation might appear to trig-
ger the operation of § 1963(a)(1) as it applies to acquisition or maintenance in viola-
tion of § 1962, which includes § 1962(d) conspiracies. The crucial issue of statutory
construction is whether the word "in" contained in the phrase "'in violation of section
1962" means "during the violation" or whether it signifies that the acquisition or
maintenance "is the violation." If "in" means "is the violation," the § 1962,d) could
not result in forfeiture because (d) punishes only agreement. not acquisition or
maintenance. If, on the other hand, it means "during the violation," § 1962(d) could
result in forfeiture because that acquisition or maintenance occurred during the con-
spiracy. The "during" construction is flawed, however, because the more appropriate
equivalent of the term "during" would be "in tile violation of." A similar problem
arises in the context of § 1963(a)(2). Assume that, in violation of § 1962(c, two defen-
dants agree to commit two acts of embezzlement from the union that employs them.
After the defendants have committed one such act they are arrested and thus pre-
vented from completing the pattern of racketeering. The government then seeks for-
feiture of their union offices under § 1963(a)(2), which applies to an interest in an
enterprise that the defendant "established, operated, controlled, conducted, or par-
ticipated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(al(2)
(1976). An enterprise, however, has not been established or operated in violation of §
1962(d) because § 1962(d) punishes agreement and not establishment or operation.
622. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976).
623. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1265 (1976) (forfeiture of banned hazardous substances
sold in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 492 (1976) (forfeiture of counterfeit money
and devices used to produce that money); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976) (forfeiture of prop-
erty used in violation of controlled substance laws); 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1976) tforfei-
ture of property used in violation of internal revenue laws). 31 U.S.C. § 1102(a)
(1976) (forfeiture of currency transported in violation of currency-reporting law); 49
U.S.C. § 781-89 (1976) (forfeiture of vehicles used to transport contraband).
624. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. te-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 n.15 (Sth Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 141 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Brigance. 472 F. Supp. 1177.
1181 (S.D. Tex. 1979). The purpose of the forfeiture remedy is "to remove the lead-
ers of organized crime from their sources of economic power [so that] liInstead of
their positions being filled by successors no different in kind, the channels of com-
merce can be freed of racketeering influence." Senate Report. supra note 48. at 80.
This statement is a further indication that, in promulgating the new RICO remedies,
Congress intended to direct them at the infiltration of legitimate businesses, not at
illegal racketeering enterprises. See pt. III(A) supra.
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property, real and personal, to the Crown." 62 5 Believing in personan
forfeitures were repugnant, the founding athers included Article
III, section 3 in the Constitution. This section prohibits all forfei-
tures of estates resulting from a conviction for treason, except forfei-
tures of estates for the lifetime of a traitor. 62 6 In addition, the First
Congress adopted a statute prohibiting forfeitures of estates resulting
from federal criminal convictions. 627 That statute remains in the fed-
eral code at 18 U.S.C. § 3563,628 which provides that "[n]o conviction
or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of es-
tate."629 Inasmuch as RICO revives common law in person am
forfeitures, it probably repeals section 3563 by implication. 30
B. RICO Forfeiture Procedure
1. Pleading Requirements
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the government
to give notice in the indictment that it is seeking forfeiture. 631 This
625. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (cita-
tions omitted). "The basis for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law
was an offense to the King's peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own
property." Id. at 682.
626. U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. This section provides that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."
Id.
627. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117.
628. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1976).
629. Id.
630. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978). This implied repeal seems likely despite the Su-
preme Court's repeated admonition that repeals by implication are not favored, United
States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 169 (1976); Morton v. Man-
cart, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974). Repeals by implication do not occur absent a "man-
ifest inconsistency or positive repugnance between the two statutes." Mercantile
Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 565 (1963). "Legislative history and congres-
sional intent are important factors in determining whether there has been a repeal by
implication." Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc. v. Pueblo of
Laguna, 542 F.2d 1375. 1376 (10th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the legislative history of
RICO and the manifest inconsistency supports repeal by implication. See United
States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Brigance, 472 F. Supp. 1177, 1180-81 (S.D. Tex.
1979). In conflict with the Fifth Circuit holding in Rubin, the Fourth Circuit has
held that § 3563 was not repealed by RICO because RICO forfeiture does not consti-
tute a forfeiture of estate. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980) (No. 80-132). Neither
RICO nor any' other legislative enactment could repeal art. III, § 3 of the Constitu-
tion. This result has the anomalous impact of gr.nting convicted traitors more protec-
tion from forfeiture than is accorded to the si-aall-time gambler convicted under
RICO.
631. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (c)(2). The enactment of the forfeiture provisions of §
1963(a) resulted in modifications of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7(c)(2), 31(c), 32(b)(2), Advisory Committee Notes.
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pleading requirement is easily satisfied. Rule 7(c)(2) does not require
a specific description of the defendant's interest in the property; it is
sufficient to claim any and all interest in a particular piece of prop-
erty. 632 Failure to satisfy this requirement, however, is a ground for
striking that portion of the indictment. 633
2. Forfeiture Verdict
The imposition of a forfeiture penalty is part of the judgm nt of
conviction. 634 The court orders forfeiture after the jury determines
whether forfeiture is permitted6 35 by means of a special verdict de-
scribing the extent of the interest or property subject to forfei-
ture. 636 To eliminate any impact on the issue of guilt, the request
for a special verdict should be submitted to the jury only after it has
returned guilty verdicts on the RICO counts. 637
632. See United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 1978) (indict-
ment sufficient when it sought forfeiture of defendant's "interest in the business and
property known as Gaetano's Restaurant, located at 3760 Tejon Street, Denver, Col-
orado"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
633. United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1975). Rule 7 applies
only if a § 1962 conviction "may" result in forfeiture. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2). In
United States v. Mevers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W. D. Pa. 1977), for example, the
court held that forfeiture could not result when the Government contended that de-
fendant no longer had any forfeitable interest on the date of the indictment. 3heyers,
however, includes a puzzling caveat that rule 7 applies if the offense charged -may
result in a criminal forfeiture,' not merely when the Government !n fact claims such a
forfeiture." Id. at 461 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d
406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1975)). It is difficult to discern how rule 7 can require the
government to describe forfeitable property if it does not claim a forfeiture. This
statement is logical only if the jury has the power to impose forfeiture regardless of
whether the government requests it.
634. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2). A forfeiture under § 1963(a) could not be imposed
absent a RICO conviction. United States v. Scharf. 551 F.2d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir.)
(dismissal of all RICO criminal counts automatically eliminates possibility of forfei-
ture), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
635. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813-14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 104 (1980).
636. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(e). The language of rule 31(e) seems to limit the special
verdict to the issue of the extent of the defendant's interest in an enterprise. In
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980), however, the court approved the submission of an inquiry requiring the jury
to specify which corporations were part of the enterprise and the percentage of the
defendant's interest in each. The defendant argued that this verdict was not au-
thorized by rule 31(e) and should be reversed under the general rule that special
verdicts are disfavored. Id. at 396. Emphasizing the complex multi-corporation na-
ture of the enterprise, the court found that the jury could not determine the extent
of the forfeitable property without first detennining the answers to the submitted
questions. Id.
637. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796. 813 (5th Cir.), cert. denmed, 101
S. Ct. 104 (1980).
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3. Mandatory v. Discretionary Forfeitures
The most significant procedural issue is the role of the trial judge
in deciding the extent of forfeitures. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly
held that trial courts have no discretion to grant remission or mitiga-
tion of forfeiture. 6.38 In conflict with this view, the Second Circuit
has concluded that trial courts have discretion to avoid "draconian
(and perhaps potentially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture
provision." 639 The court viewed the availability of this discretion as
a factor alleviating eighth amendment problems inherent in criminal
forfeiture. 640 In support of its conclusion that discretion exists, the
court cited language in section 1963(c) authorizing "the Attorney
General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited
under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall
deem proper." 641 Notably, the Fifth Circuit construed this same
language narrowly to support its holding that a trial court has no dis-
cretion to remit or mitigate forfeitures. United States v. L'Hoste 642
characterized the quoted passage as encompassing "the determination
of such administrative details as the time and place that the property
declared forfeited is to be seized by the Attorney General." 6 43
L'Hoste failed to explain why section 1963(c) would authorize the
courts to decide mere administrative details. Under a rational statu-
tory scheme, "administrative details" are decided by administrative
bodies, not by courts. 644
638. Id. at 809-14.
639. United States v Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980).
640. The Huber court observed: "We do not say that no forfeiture sanction myI
ever be so harsh as to violate the Eighth Amendment. But at least where the provi-
sion for forfeiture is kex ed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it
is in RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional to the crime.-
id.
641. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) (emphasis added). The quoted language can also
be found in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (b)(2), which governs criminal forfeitures generallv.
642. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980).
643. Id. at 811. L'Hoste relied on in rem cases construing similar provisions of the
customs laws.
644. Cf. Association of Mass. Consumers, Inc. v. SEC, 516 F.2d 711, 714 (D.C.
Cir.) (practical problems of calendaring proceedings "are housekeeping details ad-
dressed to the discretion of the agency and, due process or statutory considerations
aside, are no concern of the courts" (quoting City of San Antonio v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 374 F.2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1967)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1975). A
second criticism of L'Hoste is that its construction of "terms and conditions" is not in
accord with the common legal definition of "condition," which ordinarily indicates that
the forfeiture can depend on the occurrence of an uncertain event. See In re Las
Colinas, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 582, 601-02 (D.P.R. 1968) ("It is a well known rule of law
that in conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinction or
loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the event constituting the condi-
[Vol. 49
1980] RICO
The Fifth Circuit's analysis also focused on the following language
in section 1963(a): "Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of
this chapter shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . and shall forfeit to
the United States ...... 645 Conceding that the mere use of the
word "shall" was not controlling, 646 the court commented that "shall"
generally indicates mandatory congressional intent. 647  L'Hoste also
distinguished fines and imprisonment, which are discretionary, from
the criminal forfeiture penalty. It noted that the "criminal penalties of
fine and imprisonment are presented in the disjunctive, allowing
either fine or imprisonment or both." 6 48  In contrast, L'Hoste ob-
served that "criminal forfeiture is mentioned in the conjunctive with
the other formats of penalties, leaving the implication that forfeiture
is required." 649
By limiting its forfeiture analysis to the question of statutory con-
struction, L'Hoste failed to deal with the Second Circuit contention
that judicial discretion is needed to prevent eighth amendment viola-
tions resulting from mandatory forfeitures. 650  Although mandatory
sentences are not unconstitutional per se, the lack of sentencing flexi-
bility may be a factor in an eighth amendment analysis.6'
tion."). The use of the word "conditions" in § 1963(c) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (b)k2)
implies that the trial judge has the power to impose restrictions on governmental
seizure of forfeited property. If, as LHoste holds, the trial judge does not have the
power to remit or mitigate forfeitures, it is unlikely that the court could enforce any
condition, even one relating to an "'administrative detail," that might so restrict the
government.
645. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
646. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 810 (5th Cir., cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980). This concession may have been compelled by the use of the word
"shall" in connection with fines and imprisonment, said by L'tloste to be matters of
discretion. Id. In addition, § 1963(b), which L'Hoste characterized as granting discre-
tion to the trial court, also contains the word "shall." Id.
647. Id. at 812. The court compared § 1963(a) to 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1976).
Section 1955(d) uses the term "may'." and thus indicates permissive rather than man-
datorv forfeiture. The use of both words in the Organized Crime Control Act w%-as
considered an indication that if Congress had intended nonmandatorv forfeitures
under § 1963(a) it would have used the word "may." 609 F.2d at 812.
648. Id. at 810.
649. Id. L'Hoste rejected a second argument that the trial court has discretion
under the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976). Under § 3651, a
district court has the power to suspend the imposition or execution of jail sentences
and fines. The court held that § 3651 does not grant the power to suspend the
imposition or execution of a forfeiture: rather § 3651 is silent on forfeitures. 609 F.2d
at 814. A forfeiture, however, is not similar to a fine or imprisonment as it w%-as
designed for more than punitive purposes. Id. Forfeiture was intended to implement
a policy of depriving those engaged jn racketeering activity of their economic base so
that they cannot easily continue illegal activities. Id.
650. See note 640 supra.
651. See notes 724-29 infra and accompanying text. L'Hosfe also omits any discus-
sion of the constitutional problem inherent in depriving innocent persons of judicial
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C. Forfeitable Interests
Although RICO revives common law in personam forfeitures, the
scope of a forfeitable interest under RICO is significantly different. At
common law, the convicted felon or traitor forfeited all property.65 2
Section 1963(a), on the other hand, reaches only the defen ant s in-
terest in the enterprise. 653 In this respect RICO resembles the tra-
ditional in rem action because it is limited to illegally acquired in-
terests or property rights put to 'an illegal use under section 1962.654
In section 1962(c) cases, for example, the government may not seek
forfeiture of an entity owned by a defendant if the entity's affairs are
not conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. 655
access prior to the criminal judgment authorizing forfeiture. The lesson of recent
Supreme Court decisions is that due process requires a hearing before an individual
can be deprived of property. See notes 763-74 infra and accompanying text. If no
judicial discretion exists to protect innocent parties, the jury's issuance of a forfeiture
judgment aggravates the due process problem in a RICO context. See notes 679-95
infra and accompanying text.
652. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974).
653. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The enter-
prise itself is protected from over-extensive forfeiture in that the government cannot
forfeit all the assets of a corporation unless the defendant owned all those assets. See
United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978) ("the Government
had not offered any evidence to show that Weatherspoon owned all the assets of the
beauty college, which therefore would have subjected the assets to forfeiture under
18 U.S.C. § 1963").
654. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The Justice
Department emphasized the limited type of in personam forfeiture authorized by §
1963. See Letter of Deputy Att'y Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to Sen. John L.
McClellan (Aug. 11, 1969), reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime,
supra note 36, at 406.
655. For example, in United'States v. Huber, 603 F 2d 387, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980), the government sought forfeiture of the defen-
dant's interest in several corporations selling hospital supplies. The defendant used
those corporations to defraud hospitals and government medical health programs
through a series of cost-plus contracts, the prices for which he obtained by filsifying
invoices and misrepresenting costs. The defendant argued that the instructions er-
roneously "permitted the jury to find that the various entities were part of the enter-
prise if it found that defendant owned them all even if he conducted the afliirs of
only one of them through the pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 394. The gov-
ernment conceded, and the court held "that such a connection alone would not sup-
port application of RICO's forfeiture sanction to enterprises whose affairs were not
conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity. [The instructions adequately
informed the jury that] it could not include a particular entity in the enterprise un-
less its affairs were found to have been conducted through the pattern of racketeering
activit,." Id. at 394-95: see United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) ("If the government carries its burden and shows that each of Fidelity's
assets were contributed to or utilized by the association to forward its goals, then
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) would be proper.").
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The "interest" forfeited under section 1963(a)(2) is broadly de-
fined 656 as "any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any
enterprise." 657 An interest need not be a formal contribution of cap-
ital evidenced by a stock certificate or a security agreement; informal
contributions to an association that is not a legal entity are also for-
feitable.6 58 Moreover, one court has described section 1963(a)(2) as
reaching only a continuing source of control over the enterprise, not
one that influenced the enterprise on a single occasion. 659
A limitation on the scope of section 1963(a) is that the interest must
exist on the date of the indictment, forfeiture extends neither to an
interest terminating before the indictment, 660 nor to an interest ob-
tained after the indictment. 66 1  The latter type of interest was in-
volved in United States v. Rubin ,662 in which the government at-
tempted to prohibit the defendant from seeking a union office in the
future and sought section 1963 forfeiture in perpetuity of his right to
hold a union office.66 3  The court refused to permit this forfeiture
and restricted the ambit of section 1963 to presently-held in-
terests.
664
656. Objections to the terms "'interest" and "property or contractual right of any
kind" on vagueness grounds were considered in United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 141-44 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The court found that the terms were not vague.
ambiguous or overbroad, and held that "interest" referred to capital interests rather
than income acquired in violation of § 1962(a) or (b) and that "'property or contractual
right" referred to property acquired in violation of § 1962(c) -affording a continuing
source of power within the enterprise. id.
657. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1976).
658. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
659. Id. at 143, 144 n.16. Thetis applied this broad construction of § 1963tal to
contract rights held by defendants over other members of the enterprise. hd. at 145.
It observed that these contracts were forfeitable because theyt afforded "'one defen-
dant a source of influence over another defendant" and in turn afforded "a source of
influence over the association-enterprise of which they are both members." Id. The
"'source of influence" language could limit forfeiture in some circumstances. For
example, a defendant may use an automobile to transport stolen goods in a fencing
enterprise. The auto could be regarded as a forfeitable informal contribution. The
auto, however, might not be regarded as a source of power or influence although it
is, in a broad sense, a contribution to the enterprise. See Taylor, Forfiiture under 1
U.S.C. § 1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 379, 39-2
(1980) (criticizing application of RICO to forfeit instrumentalities of crime
660. United States v. Mevers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (\.D. Pa. 1977.)
661. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990-93 t5th Cir. 1977., racatcd and
remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
662. Id.
663. Id. at 992-93.
664. Id.
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1. Forfeiture of Third Party Interests
a. Complete Transfer of Defendant's Interest
A significant and rarely discussed issue of RICO forfeiture law is
whether a conviction can result in the forfeiture of an interest owned
by parties not charged with that crime. If, for example, prior to the
indictment, a defendant assigns or transfers a potentially forfeitable
interest to a person not involved with the enterprise, the government
may attempt to forfeit the interests held by the defendant's heirs,
successors, and assigns. United States v. Thevis, 665 however, held
that the interest of uncharged heirs, successors, and assigns could not
be forfeited because mandatory forfeiture can occur only upon convic-
tion and unindicted parties cannot be convicted. 666
If Thevis is correct, an important distinction exists between RICO
criminal forfeiture law and the doctrines established by in rein cases.
Under many in rein statutes, the government can obtain forfeiture of
property used for criminal purposes even though the owner was not
criminally culpable. 667 Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the inno-
cent party purchased the property before forfeiture proceedings were
instituted. 668 In Simons v. United States,66 9 the Ninth Circuit held
that
[tihe forfeiture statute takes effect immediately upon the commis-
sion of the illegal act. At that moment the right to the property
vests in the United States, and when forfeiture is sought, the con-
demnation when obtained relates back to that time and avoids all
intermediate sales and alienations, even as to purchasers in good
faith. 670
665. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
666. Id. at 145. Permitting forfeiture of an uncharged party's interest violates the
fundamental principle that in personan forfeiture of a person's property is dependent
upon conviction. United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir.) (dismissal of
all RICO counts automatically eliminates the possibility of forfeiture), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977); see notes 624, 672 infra and accompanying text. In the context
of in rein forfeiture statutes, the Supreme Court has noted that forfeiture stat-
utes are not directed at innocent parties. United States v. United States Coin &
Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 712-22 (1971) ("When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in
their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon
those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." (footnote omitted)).
667. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926).
668. See, e.g., United States v. One 6.5 mm Mannlicher Carcano Military Rifle,
250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1966). This case involved forfeiture of the gun allegedly
used to assassinate President Kennedy and which had been purchased by a
speculator before the forfeiture proceeding. Even though the government made no
allegation that the speculator was not a bona fide purchaser, the rifle was forfeited to
the government. Id. at 415.
669. 541 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1976).
670. Id. at 1352 (citation omitted).
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This "relation back" principle is inapplicable to RICO in personam
forfeitures because the doctrine is grounded in the essential nature of
in rem forfeiture actions. In those actions, the innocence of the owner
is irrelevant because the thing to be forfeited is considered the of-
fender.67 1  Thus, the "relation back" doctrine cannot be employed in
an in personam action in which forfeiture is dependent on the guilt of
the former owner. Accordingly, because RICO established an in per-
sonam forfeiture procedure, the innocence of the present owner must
control if the defendant does not retain an interest in the prop-
ertv.6
72
Although the "relation back" doctrine should not affect the rights of
third parties, the government may nonetheless contest the validity of
any sales, conveyances, gifts, or assignments to third parties. 673  For
671. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The
Supreme Court explained that the innocence of the property owner is irrelevant
under in remi law because the property is treated as the offender in these actions. id.
at 685. On this point, the Court extensively quoted, wvith approval, Justice Story's
opinion in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), distinguishing in rem actions,
in which the innocence of the owner is irrelevant, from in personam forfeitures. 416
U.S. at 683-84. In The Palmyra, Justice Story noted that "'at the common law, in
many cases of felonies, the part. forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The
forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a
consequence, of the judgment of conviction. .. . [T]he [Crown's right to the goods
and chattels] attached only by the conviction of the offender. But this doctrine
never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem. cognizable
on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing, and this, whether
the offence be maluin prohibitum, or malum in se. . .. [Tihe practice has been, and
so this Court understands the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands indepen-
dent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam. " 416 U.S. at
684 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1. 14-15 (1827)).
672. The § 1963(b) procedure permitting the gnvernment to obtain a court order
to prevent the defendant from transferring forfeitable property and therefore render-
ing the forfeiture illusory also discourages the adoption of a "'relation back" doctrinc
in RICO prosecutions. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir. 1980).
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980); see notes 671-72 supra and accompanying text;
730-32 infra and accompanying text. Apparently, a temporary restraining order may be
issued against these transfers upon a showing that the defendant is attempting to
transfer the property. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724 (S.D. Cal.
1979). If the "relation back" principle is applied to RICO. § 1963(b) would be super-
fluous. If potentially forfeitable property could be recovered from innocent purchas-
ers, the government's interest in that property would never be threatened by pre-
conviction transfers, and a court order would never be necessary.
673. United States v. Currency Totalling M.48318.08, 609 F.2d 210, 213-15 (5th
Cir. 1980). The court held that "'relation back" did not apply to an in rein forfeiture
statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1976). The prior assignment was invalid, however, be-
cause it did not satisfy state assignment law requiring that the assignment be per-
fected by giving notice to the United States before the institution of forfeiture pro-
ceedings. 609 F.2d at 213-14. The court provided no guidance as to how this notice
could be given and to whom it should be given.
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example, an assignment to an attorney may be a security interest
under certain circumstances. 674 If it is, failure to perfect by filing
may result in the subordination of the assignment to the forfeiture
claim of the government. 675 If the government is considered a sub-
sequent creditor, it may also attack a conveyance or assignment on
the ground that the transfer was made to defraud.6 76 If, however,
the property is conveyed prior to conviction by a valid, non-
refundable assignment for attorneys fees, the Thevis holding pre-
cludes forfeiture. 6 77
674. Tarlow, Criminal Defendants and Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1191, 1207 (1975). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
assignment must be collateral guaranteeing the client's promise to pay, not an abso-
lute transfer in payment of services. U.C.C. §§ 1 -20113); 9-105(1)(c),-203(1). If the
property is conveyed for attorney's fees prior to conviction by a valid, nonrefundable
assignment, Thevis precludes forfeiture. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
675. Tarlow, supra note 674, at 1207 & n.121.
676. The law of the state in which the conveyance occurred is controlling when
federal taxing agencies attempt to set aside a taxpayer's transfer of property before
the assessment. Hall v. United States, 403 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 958 (1969); United States v. Hickox, 356 F.2d 969, 973 (5th Cir.
1966). Although I.R.C. § 6901 permits the government to directly assess the property
of the transferee, the applicable state law determines the liability of the transferee.
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 350(9th Cir. 1941); Nutter v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 290 (1970). The government must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was made with fraudulent
intent. United States v. De Martini, 53 F. Supp. 162. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1943). The
burden of proof would shift to the transferee when the property is conveyed to rela-
tives. United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661, 664-65 (D. Del. 1969). The govern-
ment may attempt to employ the "constructive fraud" provision of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4 under which actual fraudulent intent is irrelevant.
This provision provides that "every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors
without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is
incurred without a fair consideration." Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4. In
addition to the difficulties in establishing inadequacy of consideration and the existing
or potential insolvency of the transferor, the major obstacle to employment of this
provision is that the complaining party must have been an existing creditor at the
time of the conveyance. See Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Fitch,
63 F. Supp. 989, 991 (W.D. Ky. 1946); Dubia v. Ebeling, 30 F. Supp. 992, 993
(N.D. I11. 1939). If the assignment occurs before a RICO indictment, however, the
government cannot claim that it was an existing creditor at the time of the transfer,
as it becomes a creditor only on indictment of the defendant. Tcherepnin v. Franz,
457 F. Supp. 832, 838-39 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (tort claimant became creditor within
Fraudulent Conveyance Act when suit was filed). Therefore, the government can set
aside the conveyance only if it can show actual fraudulent intent. Hartman v.
Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Fish v.
East, 114 F.2d 177, 182-83 (10th Cir. 1940). But see Taylor, supra note 659, at 388(if transfer is bona fide, it cannot be set aside even if defendant intended to avoid
forfeiture by means of the transfer).
677. See notes 665-66 supra and accompanying text.
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b. Forfeiture of Property in Which Defendant
Owns Only Part Interest
A more complex problem arises when both the defendant and the
innocent party have interests in forfeitable property. The applicable
statute, section 1963(c), provides that "the United States shall dispose
of all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons." 678  A simple, but po-
tentially unfair, interpretation of this language was adopted by the
court in United States v. L'Hoste,679 which concluded that a trial
judge has no discretion to remit or mitigate forfeitures to protect in-
nocent parties holding an interest in the forfeited property. 680 Con-
struing section 1963(c) as placing sole responsibility for protecting in-
nocent parties on the United States, the court concluded that the
only remedy of innocent parties was to petition the Attorney Gen-
eral.68 1  The manner in which the Attorney General is to discharge
this dutv, however, is not clear. Section 1963(c) does not require the
Justice Department to promulgate regulations governing procedures
for the recovery of forfeited property. Furthermore, although some
courts have reviewed abuses of discretion, 682 many in rein cases have
held that the courts have no power to review the Attorney General's
actual decision on remission and mitigation of forfeiture. 683 These
holdings indicate that an innocent party -affected by a RICO forfeiture
may be entitled only to a limited appellate review.
A major flaw in the L'Hoste view is that it permits the government
to acquire an interest in the forfeited property greater than that
owned by the defendant. This flaw becomes apparent in situations
such as L'Hoste, in which the defendant's wife had a comnunity
property or other marital interest in the forfeited property. The de-
fendant could not transfer the entire property without his wife's con-
sent but could convey only his own interest in the propertv. 68" Yet,
L'Hoste permitted forfeiture of the entire propert'. 686  If the wife's
678. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
679. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 101 S. Ct. 104 19S0).
680. Id. at 812; see notes 642-49 supra and accompanx ing te'.t.
681. 609 F.2d at 812.
682. E.g., United States v. One 1974 Mercur\ Cougar. 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1329-
32 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
683. See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 6th Cir.
1964); Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (D. Colo. 1973). affd. 49LS
F.2d 968 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1069 (1974).
684. A recipient of property cannot take an interest greater than that owned by
the transferor. Sauget v. Villagoinez, 228 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1955.
685. See Gantner v. Johnson, 274 Cal. App. 2d 869. 876-77, 79 CAd. Rptr. 3S1,
386 (1969).
686. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980).
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petition to the Attorney General is denied and the decision is not
reviewable, the United States may obtain a greater interest than the
defendant had.6 87
Even if the L'Hoste court correctly denied the district court any
power to remit or mitigate a lawful forfeiture, it failed to distinguish
the issue of discretion from the question whether a forfeiture is in-
valid as to innocent parties. This distinction was recognized in Wiren
v. Eide,68 in which the court noted that, "[w]hile the remission or
mitigation of lawful seizures and forfeitures .is a matter committed to
agency discretion, . . . the determination of the propriety of the sei-
zures and forfeitures themselves is not." 689  Under this view, the
recognition of a wife's property rights does not pose an issue of remis-
sion or mitigation of a lawful seizure. Rather, the issue is one of the
propriety of the forfeiture itself, and is not a matter within the discre-
tion of the Attorney General. 690  The L'Hoste view also renders
RICO forfeiture procedures unconstitutional on due process grounds.
Because there are no statutory procedures permitting an innocent
person to plead his case, 69' the holding that a court issuing a forfei-
ture order has no power to protect such a person deprives him of his
right to some form of hearing prior to a forfeiture.6 92 Consequently,
687. A similar problem arises when the defendant acquires title to the innocent
party's interest or property through extortion or fraud in violation of § 1962(b). For-
feiture of this property may violate the due process rights of the victim. In Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), the court characterized
prior Supreme Court cases as implying "that it would be difficult to reject the con-
stitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken
from him without his privity or consent." Id. at 689. See also Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch.) 347, 363-64 (1808); United States v. Almeida, 9 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir.
1925); United States v. One Saxon Auto., 257 F. 251, 252 (4th Cir. 1919). Certainly,
the fraud or extortion causing the uncharged party to transfer property vitiates any
consent to the transfer. Moreover, the government should not be permitted to forfeit
property that a defendant does not own because it was acquired through fraud or
extortion; a defendant who commits the tort of conversion has no title in the property
until the victim receives a judgment or settlement against the defendant that is satis-
fied in full. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1 (1865); Atwater v.
Tupper, 45 Conn. 144, 147-48 (1877); cf. United States v. One Saxon Auto., 257
F.2d 251, 252 (4th Cir. 1919) (no in rein forfeiture attaches to property taken by
trespasser or thief because owner retains title). A RICO forfeiture would, therefore,
unlawfully deprive the victim of converted property to which he still holds title.
688. 542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976).
689. Id. at 761 (footnote omitted).
690. The forfeiture of an uncharged party's property is improper. See note 666
supra and accompanying text.
691. In addition to the silence of Title IX on the matter, the traditional rule pro-
hibits intervention in criminal cases by persons who are not parties to the action. See
Bankers' Mortgage Co. v. McComb, 60 F.2d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1932); United States
v. Widen, 38 F.2d 517, 518-19 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
692. In in rein forfeiture cases, the courts have interpreted the due process clause
to require a hearing for the owner of property that is subject to an in rein forfeiture
action. See United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer Vehicle, 563 F.2d 1386 (9th
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a situation in which an innocent party's rights are affected demands
either that the district court have the power to restrict forfeiture to
the defendant's interest in the property, or that the third party have a
right to challenge the forfeiture before a jury693 in an ancillary pro-
ceeding to the criminal case 694 or in a civil action.6 95
Cir. 1977); Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 761 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
One 1951 Douglas DC-6 Aircraft, 475 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); cf. Com-
missioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630-33 (1976) (due process violation found when
jeopardy assessment and subsequent levy on taxpayer's assets occurred without
prompt hearing to establish tax liability). In Chevrolet, the government brought a
forfeiture action against a vehicle used to transport contraband firearms. The legal
title to the automobile was in the name of Charles Brandon. However, Steven Bran-
don asserted that he was the actual or equitable owner of the property and filed an
answer to the complaint as a third party claimant. The district court granted sum-
mar,' judgment for the government without giving Steven Brandon an opportunity to
show that he was the owner of the automobile and that he had done everything he
reasonably could to avoid having the automobile put to unlawful use. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that it was error to deny appellant a hearing on his owner-
ship claims. 563 F.2d at 1391. Moreover, there is no RICO procedure by which the
innocent owner of the property is notified of a pending forfeiture proceeding against
the property. Therefore, the due process requirement of notice prior to forfeiture is
violated. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38. 39-40 (1972) (per curiam).
693. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.
1980). In this case the court held that, in an in ren forfeiture action against his
property, an owner is entitled to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the seventh
amendment guarantee of jury trials except in equity or admiralty cases applies to all
cases in which legal rights are to be ascertained, embracing "all suits, which are not
of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they
may assume to settle legal rights." Id. at 457 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830)). Rejecting the contention that a statutory forfeiture resein-
bles a suit in equity, and asserting that an admiralty action would apply only to a
seizure of property taking place on water, the court held that an in rein forfeiture of
property seized on land does not fall within either of the two seventh amendment
exceptions. Id. at 458-59. This holding should be extended to permit a jury trial for
an innocent party who wishes to contest a RICO forfeiture of his property. A RICO
forfeiture action does not resemble an equity suit to any' greater extent than does an
in ren action. Additionally, the admiralty' exception to the seventh amendment is
probably inapplicable because the location of the seizure is irrelevant for purposes of
Title IX.
694. The first alternative may not be wholly satisfactory because the third part%
could present its case only bv intervening in the criminal case. This procedure woull
contravene the general rule prohibiting intervention in criminal cases by persons who
are not parties to the action. See note 691 supra. This problem, however, may be
avoided by considering the interests of third parties at a post-trial hearing. Taylor,
supra note 659, at 396. At such a hearing, the jur's forfeiture verdict would not be
binding on third parties as they were not parties to the criminal trial giving rise to
the verdict. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100. 110
(1969) ("It is elementarv" that one is not bound by a judgment in persoaana resulting
from litigation in which he is not designated as a part' or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process."). A more difficult question is whether the gov-
ernment has the burden of proving that the defendant had title to the property or
whether the third party must prove his own title. A general rule of property law is
that the burden of proving title is on the party alleging it. Goodwin v. Home Buying
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2. Forfeiture of Profits
Whether income derived from violations of section 1962(c) is a for-
feitable interest is the only issue of RICO forfeiture law in which the
government's position has been repeatedly rejected. Cases holding
that income obtained from a pattern of racketeering activity is not
forfeitable unless it is invested in violation of section 1962(a) have
sharply restricted the scope of forfeiture. 696 These cases have ruled
that profits derived from racketeering are not forfeitable unless they
are invested in an enterprise. Profits invested in consumer goods or
within the one percent stock exception of section 1962(a) can never
be forfeited. 697 The courts have interpreted the term "interest" in
section 1962(a)(2) as connoting a capital contribution similar to corpo-
rate stock. 698
In the seminal case, United States v. Marubeni America Corp.,699
the rejection of forfeiture of section 1962(c) profits was primarily
Inv. Co., 352 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.D.C. 1973). Because the government's allegation
in the indictment that the property is forfeitable implicitly alleges that the indicted
defendant owned the property, the government should have the burden of proof in
the subsequent hearing. Moreover, unless a third party is required to file a pleading
alleging ownership before receiving a post-trial hearing, he will never have an oppor-
tunity to allege title. Consequently, the third party should not have the burden of
proof.
695. If the forfeiture is unlawfully applied to the property of an uncharged party,
he may file an action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). See Si-
mons v. United States, 497 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1974), affd, 541 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1976). This remedy often would be inadequate because the claim may not exceed
$10,000 in this type of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976).
696. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766-70 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States
v. Mevers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977). In Thevis, the government was
rebuffed in its attempt to forfeit property allegedly obtained from or purchased with
racketeering profits. 474 F. Supp. at 144. The principle that profits are not forfeitable
has been criticized in Blake) & Goldstock, supra note 4, at 349 n.64. The commen-
tators remarked that "Marubeni appears to be wrongly decided [because] [t]he stat-
ute states that 'all property or other interest' is to be forfeited." Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1963 (1976)). Notably, however, the quoted language the authors relied
upon to justify their assertion refers only to the authority of the Attorney General to
seize "all property or other interest declared forfeited.' 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976)
(emphasis added).
697. See cases cited note 696 supra.
698. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141-42 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United
States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
699. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). In Marubeni the government attempted to
forfeit profits from the defendant corporations' alleged acts of racketeering. The de-
fendant manufactured and sold electrical cable and was bidding on contracts to sup-
ply Anchorage Telephone Utility with telephone cable. The government contended
that the defendants bribed a utility official to obtain confidential bidding information
and artificially lowered their bids by offering some types of cable at depressed prices.
The bribed official then used his position to ensure that the utility would purchase
higher priced cable rather than the underpriced cable. Id. at 763-64.
[Vol, 49
grounded in the court's analysis of the relationship between sections
1962(a) and 1963(a). The court noted that the forfeiture of income
derived from a pattern of racketeering in violation of section 1962(c)
cannot be reconciled with the legislative intent underlying section
1962(a) expressly governing the investment of income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity. 700 If Congress had intended to per-
mit forfeiture of all racketeering income, it would not have permitted
investments of such income in corporate stock. 70 1 Therefore, .1art-
beni concluded that forfeiture of capital interests, rather than of prof-
its, would fulfill the congressional design of separating racketeers
from the enterprises they own. 70 2
The Congressional intent can also be determined by comparing sec-
tion 1963(a) with another section of the Organized Crime Control Act,
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A). 703 Section 848 explicitly provides for
forfeiture of profits obtained from a continuing criminal enter-
prise. 70 4 The omission of similar explicit language in section 1963(a)
indicates that Congress did not intend to permit forfeitures of income
from illegal activity except as permitted by section 1962(a).70 5
3. Forfeiture of Government or Union Offices
Forfeiture of government or union offices raises serious questions
concerning the scope of the term "'interest" and the power of the
federal government. One objection to such forfeiture is that a defen-
dant does not seem to have a property interest in an office. 706
Nevertheless, this type of forfeiture has been permitted, the forfeited
interest being the defendant's "entitlement under the organic docu-
700. Id. at 766-67.
701. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976)). Marubeni does not discuss the effec-
tive elimination of § 1962(a) prosecutions resulting from the existing broad construc-
tion of § 1962(c). See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
702. 611 F.2d 763, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1980). M1arnbeni found further support for its
conclusion in statements in the legislative history, hd. at 767-68. An earlier version of
RICO, S. 1861, plainly called for forfeiture of any interest in an enterprise by provid-
ing that "[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this Chapter . .. shall
forfeit to the United States all interest in the enterprise engaged in, or the activ ities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. ,
1963(a), 115 Cong. Rec. 9569 (1969). Remarks in the legislative historv also indicate
that forfeitures were intended to be limited to forfeiture of interest .'in the enter-
prise." House Report, supra note 154, at 35, reprinted in [19701 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 4010; Senate Report, supra note 48, at 160. ManLbeni characterized
the modifying word "'in an enterprise" in S. 1861 as evidencing Congress' intent to
exclude forfeiture of income. 611 F.2d at 769.
703. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A) (1976).
704. Id.
705. United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp.. 611 F.2d 763, 766 ni7 (9th Cir. 19S0,;
United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456. 461 1. 18 \W.D. Pa. 1977.
706. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 691 (7th Cir. 19791 tS%\ gert, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980).
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ments of the various entities to serve the remainder of his terms of'
office." 707 Constitutional provisions, however, may bar the courts
from issuing orders stripping the defendant of a government office.
For example, forfeiture of a congressional seat would conflict with
Congress' exclusive power under article 1 of the Constitution to im-
peach its members. 70 8 Moreover, forfeiture of state offices would
violate the Supreme Court's holding in National League of Cities v.
Usery 709 that Congress has no authority under the commerce clause
to regulate integral state government functions.
710
D. Eighth Amendment Problems of Section 1963(a)
In addition to constitutional problems of substantive11 and pro-
cedura1712 due process, the forfeiture provisions of Title IX are vul-
707. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
inanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978). The court reasoned that the congressional intent to
separate racketeers from their enterprises applied to defendants operating a union
through racketeering. Id. The government forfeited the defendants' offices including
those of the trustee of labor trust funds, the President of Concrete Products and
Material Yard Workers Local No. 666, the Business Manager of Local No. 478, and
the President of Southwest Florida Laborers' District Council.
708. U.S. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3. Section 2, cl. 5 of article 1 refers to the "sole
Power of Impeachment" residing in the House, while § 3, cl. 6 contains similar
language pertaining to the Senate.
709. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
710. Id. at 852-53. Depriving a person of a state office under Title IX would im-
permissibly infringe on state sovereignty by depriving it of "the authority to make
those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance
of these functions must rest." Id. at 851. See also Atkinson, supra note 10, at 13
n.108 (observing that issue would be moot in most instances since convicted felons
are usually automatically removed from office).
711. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 1,11-44 (N.D. Ga. 1979), for
example, considered objections to the term "interest" in § 1963(a)(1) and the lan-
guage "property or contractual right of any, kind" in § 1963(a)(2) and found that these
terms were not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad. It held that the term "interest" in §
1963(a)(1) is limited to capital interests (rather than income) acquired in violation of' §
1962(a) or (b), id. at 141-42, and that the § 1963(a)(2) language is limited to property
acquired in violation of § 1962(c) that is a continuing source of power within the
enterprise. Id. at 143 n.14, 144. One commentator has criticized the vagueness of §
1963(a), concerning forfeiture of property acquired in violation of § 1962(a) with both
racketeering income and legitimate money. Atkinson, supra note 10, at 5. He raises
the following questions: "[H]ow far should the term 'acquired' and 'maintained' be
stretched? If a person takes the cash proceeds of racketeering activity and mixes
them with money, derived from legitimate sources and then that common fund is
used to operate a legitimate business, should all, or any, part of, the legitimate busi-
ness be subject to forfeiture? What if the money, acquired in violation of section 1962
changes form several times before forfeiture proceedings begin? Should the court
order forfeiture of assets only, in such proportions as the assets were derived from
racketeering activity?" Id Atkinson suggests that there "be a reasonably foreseeable
or intentional link between the racketeering activity and the interest subject to forfei-
ture," and that the court prohibit "forfeiture if the interest is too remote from the
racketeering activity." Id. Although these concerns are valid, the criticisms are more
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nerable to an eighth amendment challenge when imposed concur-
rently with the already severe penalties of imprisonment and
fines. 713 While the Fourth Circuit 7 14 and a district court in the Fifth
Circuit 715 have rejected eighth amendment arguments, the Second
and Ninth Circuits have acknowledged that in some circumstances
the forfeiture sanction may be unconstitutionally harsh. 716 The court
in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., for example, refused to
decide the issue explicitly, but noted that section 1963(a) might im-
pose "shockingly disproportionate" penalties. 717 To illustrate, it de-
appropriately directed at the substantive statute, § 1962(a), which fails to clarify the
requisite relationship between the investment and the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text. The forfeiture provisions merely
incorporate flaws inherent in § 1962(a). The vagueness problems inherent in the ap-
plication of the Title IX liberal construction clause, see notes 55-64, 138 supra and
accompanying text, have not appeared in RICO forfeiture decisions. Paradoxically,
two courts have held that § 1963 must be strictly construed even though the substan-
tive criminal statute is not. See United States v. Rubin. 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978): United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979). This view is inexplicable bec-ause § 1963(a) is a
remedial provision and as such should be subject to the liberal construction clause.
See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
712. See notes 691-92 supra and accompanying text: 763-74 infra and accompany-
ing text.
713. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court in
dicta recently questioned whether the eighth amendment prohibits prison sentences
that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, the court was discussing
only the problem of length' prison terms. Runmel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139
(1980). Forfeitures constituting excessive punishment are still subject to an eighth
amendment challenge. See 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
714. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cirl, cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980) (No. 80-132).
715. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134. 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
716. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980). Forfeiture can be unduly severe in fact patterns similar to that in
Huber. Huber involved forfeiture of a defendant's interest in parent corporations. the
affairs of whose subsidiaries were conducted through racketeering activit.. Although
in the course of a scheme to defraud the defendant used seven corporate entities,
some of which were subsidiaries of the others, the court permitted this forfeiture
because it found that the entities were "'sufficientlv intertwined in the mail fraud to
be deemed part of the RICO enterprise." Id. at 396. This finding was based on
"evidence of continuous manipulation of the form of the business and the transfer of
large sums among the corporations." Id. The court cautioned that "'in some cases a
pattern of racketeering activity in the conduct of a subsidiary's itihirs may not be
attributable to the parent." Id. For example, courts would be understandably reluc-
tant to forfeit General Motors on the basis of two acts of bribery by a snmall sub-
sidiarv. Forfeiture may also be excessive in the situation under § 1962(a) which
makes "maintaining" an enterprise with illegal nmoney a violation. For example, if the
violation arises from the simple use of racketeering funds to purchase janitorial
supplies, forfeiture should pose an eighth amendment problem. Sce note 67 vupra
and accompanying text.
717. 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
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scribed the "shopkeeper who over many years and with much honest
labor establishes a valuable business [but] could forfeit it all if, in the
course of his business, he is mixed up in a single fraudulent
scheme." 718 This hypothetical reveals a significant defect in Title IX.
The forfeiture provisions do not specify the extent to which the rack-
eteering activity must contribute to the success of the enterprise.
Consequently, racketeering activity that is only a small part of an
overall business operation and produces miniscule benefits in relation
to total revenue can result in the loss of the defendant's entire in-
terest in the business. 719
RICO forfeiture also violates the mandate that the punishment may
not be unusual. The plurality in Trop v. Dulles 720 held that the term
"unusual" signifies punishment that is "different from that which is
generally done," 721 and characterized all forms of punishment outside
the bounds of the traditional penalties (fines, imprisonment, and
execution) as "constitutionally suspect." 722 Under this standard, the
in personain forfeiture in section 1963(a) is unusual punishment be-
cause it is not one of the traditional penalties mentioned in Trop and
is certainly different from general practice. 72 3
718. Id.
719. Taylor, supra note 659, at 389-91. The author cites as an example United
States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in which the indictment charged
the defendants with conducting a pornography enterprise through racketeering. The
alleged "enterprise" was an association formed for the purpose of operating the por-
nography business through illegal means. The government sought forfeiture of illegal
and legitimate portions of the entire pornography business, but did not prove that
the racketeering contributed to the success of the business. Perceiving constitutional
problems, the court limited the enterprise to the association formed to conduct a
pornography business illegally. Since there was no evidence that the illegal acts con-
tributed to the success of the legitimate pornography business, only assets used to
further the business' alleged illegal goals were forfeitable. 474 F. Supp. at 140-42.
720. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
721. Id. at 100 n.32.
722. Id. at 100.
723. In personam forfeitures were unknown in the United States from 1790 to
1970; in fact, they were prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1976). It cannot be argued.
as it was in Thetis, that forfeiture is a traditional criminal punishment. See notes
622-30 supra and accompanying text. In both United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d
1026 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1980) (No. 80-
132) and United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), the courts
misconceived the issue when they cited in rein forfeiture statutes in support of their
conclusion that § 1963 is not an unusual penalty, 620 F,2d at 1039; 474 F. Supp. at
141, because the eighth amendment deals only with criminal punishment. See San-
telises v. INS, 491 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (2d Cir.) (eighth amendment not applicable to
deportation proceeding because proceeding is civil in nature and does not impose
punishment), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); Cortez v. INS, 395 F.2d 965, 967-68
(5th Cir. 1968) (same). In contrast, in rein forfeitures are civil penalties imposed in
civil actions. See Glup v. United States, 523 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. One 1969 Buick Riviera Auto., 493 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Amore, 335 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 1964).
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Another factor affects the validity of section 1963(a) under the
eighth amendment. In Woodson v. Nkorth Carolina,7 2 4 the Supreme
Court held that a North Carolina death penalty statute violated the
eighth amendment, partly because of the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty. 725 While the Court commented that discretionary
penalties are not constitutionally mandated in non-capital cases, 726 it
noted that an "enlightened policy" of justice generally calls for dis-
cretionary sentences. 727 Therefore, the absence of sentencing discre-
tion may be a factor rendering section 1963(a) deficient under an
eighth amendment analysis if, as stated in L'Hoste, the trial judge is
deprived of discretion io remit or mitigate forfeitures. 728  Addition-
ally, this deficiency is exacerbated by the RICO jury's lack of discre-
tion to consider all of the circumstances of the offense when imposing
forfeiture because it is given only a narrowly drawn special verdict
concerning the facts of the crime. 729
E. Section 1963(b) Orders
1. Procedure for Granting Order
Section 1963(b) authorizes the district court to protect the govern-
ment's interest in forfeitable property by entering restraining orders
and prohibitions and by accepting satisfactory performance bonds.73 0
Designed to prevent defendants from avoiding forfeiture by disposing
of property, 73' a section 1963(b) order may remain in effect until the
end of the trial.732
724. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
725. Id. at 303-05.
726. Id. at 304.
727. Id. The Court remarked that "'[flor the determination of sentences, justice
generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime
was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender.'" Id. (quoting Pennsyl-
vania ex rel Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
728. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980).
729. See notes 635-37 supra and accompanying text.
730. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). Section 1963(b) provides that "i]n any action
brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to
take such other actions, including, but not limited to. the acceptance of satisfactory
pefformance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to for-
feiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.'
731. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980).
732. RICO contains no language limiting the duration of a § 1963(b) order, nor any
procedure providing for a preliminary injunction hearing upon the expiration of such
an order. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). In contrast, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) limits the
duration of a civil temporary restraining order to 10 days afler entry. 20 days if good
cause is shown. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S.
423, 4.'3S (1974). In addition, rule 65(b) provides that a preliminary injunction must
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In contrast to its holding regarding the ultimate forfeiture sentence
imposed after conviction, United States v. L'Hoste 733 grants the trial
court discretion to issue a section 1963(b) order. 734 The nature of the
pre-order hearing and the requisite showing to obtain the order,
however, are issues that have not generally been considered or defin-
itively resolved. Although a few courts have considered the question,
disagreement exists as to the type of hearing required prior to the
issuance of the order. The Eighth Circuit has indicated in dicta that,
when the indictment is returned, a district court can issue an order
without holding an adversary hearing. 735 On the other hand, the
district court in United States v. Mandel 736 held an adversary pro-
ceeding, although it refused to issue the order.737 At a pre-order
hearing, the government should be required to establish that it can
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 738 that the
property allegedly subject to forfeiture belongs to the defendant, and
that a nexus exists between the property and the racketeering activ-
ity.
In Mandel, the standard for issuing a section 1963(b) order was
determined by reference to the standard for issuing a civil prelimi-
nary injunction. 739 The court focused on: (1) whether the govern-
ment has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the
merits at trial; (2) whether the government has demonstrated that
failure to grant relief will cause irreparable harm; (3) whether the
issuance of the injunction will substantially harm other parties in-
issue if the effect of the temporary restraining order is to continue. Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b). This distinction precludes the application by analog)' of the cx parte hearing
procedure of rule 65(b). Section 1964(b) authorizes "restraining orders" in RICO civil
cases, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1976); one case applied § 1964(b) in a manner indicating
that an evidentiarv heanng is required. See United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp.
295, 296-97 (N.D. Ii. 1976).
733. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980).
734. Id. at 811.
735. United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 434
U.S. 824 (1977). See also United States v. Rittenberg, No. 80-0256-S (S.D. Cal. April
22, 1980) (temporary restraining order); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Stipp. 134
(N.D. Ga. 1979). In Rittenberg, at the time of the indictment, the government ob-
tained an ex parte order preventing transfer of assets. It apparently made no eviden-
tiary showing, offered no affidavits, and gave no prior notice to defendant's counsel or
interested third parties. In a case involving a prosecution tinder 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1976), an order similar to one under § 1963(b) was issued after an Cx parte hearing.
See United States v. Meneley, No. 79-0365 (S.D. Cal., indictment filed Aug. 2, 1979)
(temporary restraining order).
736. 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1975).
737. Id. at 682; United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. III. 1976)
(in considering request for a civil restraining order under § 1964(b), the court held
evidentiary hearing and testimony was taken).
738. See Taylor, supra note 659, at 395.
739. 408 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D. Md. 1976).
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terested in the proceeding; and (4) whether the public interest is
served. 740
The court held that the first factor, likelihood of success, militated
against the issuance of a pretrial section 1963(b) order because it re-
quired a determination "incompatible with the presumption of inno-
cence defendants enjoy until such time, if ever, as a jury finds them
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 741 Proof of irreparable harm was
considered satisfied by a showing that the defendants were transfer-
ring or attempting to transfer property that might be subject to forfeit-
ure.7 42  The question of harm to other parties focused on whether
persons other than named defendants owned interests in the enter-
prise and whether a section 1963(b) order would impair the value of
their interest. 743 Finally, the fourth element, public interest consid-
erations, was characterized by Mandel as requiring the determination
of whether failure to enter tle order "would defeat the Congressional
objective of removing legitimate business interests from criminal
hands." 744 Like the first factor, however, the court regarded this
element as entailing a determination of criminal involvement that the
court believed should not be made before trial. 745 Consequently,
Mandel denied the Government's petition for the order, but held that
in some circumstances an order could be obtained. 746
A subsequent case, United States v. Bello, 747 sharply criticized the
Mandel approach and concluded that Mandeli" refusal to make pre-
trial determination of guilt "emasculates" section 1963(b) and "renders
it nearly useless." 748 Bello rejected the Mandel assertion that a sec-
tion 1963(b) order stripped the defendant of the presumption of inno-
cence, and responded that "[tihe restraining order does not make a
determination that defendant is a racketeer, but only freezes those
assets to prevent dissipation pending a determination of guilt or inno-
cence." 749 In contrast to the Mandel standard, Bello indicated that a
section 1963(b) order can issue upon a show ing that the assets are
740. Id. at 682-83.
741. Id. at 683. The court recognized that even a hearing on this issue would
prejudice the defendants as they would be compelled "to defend themselves against
the government's allegations. If they choose to speak, what they say ma% later be
used against them at trial. If they choose to remain silent, that silence may be taken
by the public as an admission of guilt, rather than as the mere exercise of the right to
force the government to prove its charges without aid from the defendants.- Id.
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 684.
747. 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
748. Id. at 724.
749. Id. at 725: see United States v. Scalzitti. 408 F. Supp. 1014. 1015 O\V.D. Pa.
1975), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 197M.
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allegedly subject to forfeiture and that the defendant is attempting to
transfer that property.750 The court's interpretation of the require-
ments for granting a section 1963(b) order, however, was overly nar-
row. A determination that property is subject to forfeiture necessarily
incorporates a finding of guilt inasmuch as a RICO forfeiture occurs
only upon a showing of guilt and of involvement of the property in
the criminal activity. The government will probably attempt to finesse
the problem of establishing the two elements mentioned in Bello by
contending that the grand jury indictment establishes probable cause
as to both. 751 If this unpersuasive argument prevails, as it did in
Bello,752 the government will have to prove only that the defendant is
750. 470 F. Supp. at 724-25. Bello concluded that the government made a sufli-
cient showing by contending "that the assets which are the subject of the restraining
order are those used by Bello in connection with MB Financial, Inc. and would be
subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) were Bello found guilty of the rac-
keteering charges." Id. at 724. The court also noted "that the grand jury's indictment
provides probable cause to believe Bello was involved in criminal activity [and that]
Bello is attempting to transfer certain property in payment for attorney fees." 1d.
751. If a post-order adversary hearing is constitutionally mandated, see notes
763-74 infra and accompanying text, the government must show probable cause that
the property in question is forfeitable. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In holding that a Georgia prejudgment garnish-
ment statute violated due process, the Court noted that one defect in tile statute was
that "[tihere is no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would be
required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment." Id. at 607; ef.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (at parole revocation hearing, due
process requires that government establish that there is "probable cause or reasona-
ble ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would consti-
tute a violation of parole conditions"). Probable cause that the property in question is
forfeitable, however, cannot be established by the existence of a grand jury indict-
ment. See notes 752-53 infra and accompany text. Grand jury findings are suspect in
view of the general rule that indictments cannot be challenged on the ground that
there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury. Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). Additionally, the grand jury proceeding is
not the adversary proceeding mandated by due process. In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 ',D. Minn. 1979). The accused
has no right to present a case before the grand jury. United States v. Donahey, 529
F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v, Tallant,
407 F. Supp. 878, 883 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Although grand jury findings could support a
pre-order showing, they are immaterial at a post-order adversary proceeding. See
Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1972) (due process
violated when finding of fact against party is made without adversary hearing), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (striking
down statute suspending driver's license on civil complaint, without hearing to de-
termine whether driver would be liable on that complaint). The Bell Court noted
that "[s]ince the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's
determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently
with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing." Id. at
541.
752. 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979); see note 750 supra.
[Vol. 49
1980] RICO
transferring or attempting to transfer the assets. 753 This result would
thus confirm Bello's assertion that guilt is not at issue in a section
1963(b) hearing. 754
If an ex parte pre-order hearing is deemed sufficient, the Bello
holding might authorize an order based solely on an affadivit stating
that the defendant is attempting to transfer assets and that no third
parties would be harmed by the order, 755 although Bello did not
decide what type of hearing is required. This procedure would work
no fundamental unfairness if, like a civil temporary restraining order,
a section 1963(b) order were merely of short duration. 75 6  Upon the
expiration of the order, the government would be required to obtain
the criminal equivalent of a preliminary injunction as it must after the
expiration of pre-trial civil orders. 757  Because a full hearing must be
conducted before the granting of a civil preliminary injunction, 75 8 a
RICO defendant, by analogy, would receive a full hearing before the
issuance of a permanent section 1963(b) order. Section 1963(b) orders,
however, may continue until the date of the jury's verdict. 759 Issu-
ing an order that freezes the defendant's assets for months or possibly
years without a full pre-order or post-order hearing would infringe on
the due process right of every citizen to a hearing prior to the depri-
vation of property. 760
753. In distinguishing Mandel, the Bello court implied that it would also consider
harm to a third part' caused by the granting of the § 1963(b) order. 470 F. Supp. at
725. In United States v. Rittenberg, No. 80-0256-S (S.D. Cal. April 22. 1980), the
government obtained a temporary § 1963(b) order without showing a transfer or at-
tempted transfer.
754. 470 F. Supp. at 724-25.
755. Id. at 724; cf. United States v. Meneley, No. 79-0365 (S.D. Cal., indictment
filed Aug. 2, 1979) (temporar" restraining order) (similar procedure applied in pro-
secution under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976)).
756. Civil temporary restraining orders are issued after an ex parte hearing under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). In United States v. Rittenberg, No. 80-0256-S (S.D. Cal. April
22, 1980) (temporary restraining order), the government obtained only a temporary
restraining order under § 1963(b). An order to show cause was issued requiring the
defendant to appear in court to show why the order should not continue until -after
the criminal trial.
757. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
758. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) has been construed to require a full
hearing prior to the granting of a civil injunction. Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v.
National Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, (5th Cir. 1971).
759. See note 732 supra.
760. See Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976); North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). To obtain a hearing, the defen-
dant might be required to make a minimal showing that there are litigable issues to
be considered at the § 1963(b) hearing. This burden could be satisfied by offering
affidavits or by setting forth specific factual allegations in the moving papers. See
Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 760-61 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897
(1967).
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The applicability of due process was rejected in United States v.
Scalzitti 761 when the court indicated that a section 1963(b) order did
not deprive the defendant of his property but merely maintained the
status quo. 7 62 Scalzitti, however, failed to comprehend the full scope
of the constitutional protection. Due process is violated by freezing
assets as well as by outright seizure. For example, in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,7 63 the prejudgment garnishment of a civil de-
fendant's wages without notice or a prior hearing was held to consti-
tute a taking of property in violation of due process. 764
A subsequent Supreme Court decision observed that a temporary
freezing of assets is protected by the due process clause. 76 5 In
Commissioner v. Shapiro,76 6 the Sniadach analysis was applied to a
jeopardy assessment levy that prevented a defendant from posting
bail. The Supreme Court held that the government could not seize a
taxpayer's assets without providing some form of administrative hear-
ing to determine the probable validity of the government's claim. 767
761. 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.
1977).
762. Id. at 1015.
763. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
764. Id. at 340-42.
765. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975).
Although the garnishment in Sniadach affected the defendant's ability to remain fi-
nancially solvent, the impact of § 1963(b) is no less significant because the § 1963(b)
order affects the defendant's ability to post bail, obtain counsel, and finance a de-
fense. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc., the Court dismissed the argument that
Sniadach's construction of the term "taking" was limited to garnishment of wages. It
stated that all substantial deprivations of use of property were within due process
protections. Id. at 608 In construing a prior case, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), the North Georgia Finishing court commented "[tihat the debtor was dc-
prived of only the use and possession of the property, and perhaps only temporarily,
did not put the seizure beyond scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 'The Four-
teenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day depri-
vations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the
purview of the Due Process Clause.' Although the length or severity of a deprivation
of use or possession would be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate
form of hearing, it was not deemed to be determinative of the right to a hearing of
some sort."419 U.S. at 606 (citation omitted).
766. 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
767. Id. at 630-32. In response to Shapiro, Congress amended the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to expedite administrative and judicial review of jeopardy
assessments. 26 U.S.C. § 7429 (1976). Within five days after the jeopardy assess-
ment, the I.R.S. must give the taxpayer a written statement of tile information on
which it bases the assessment. Id. § 7429(a)(1). Within the next 30 days the taxpayer
may ask the I.R.S. to review the property of its assessment action. Id. § 7429(a)(2).
After that request, the I.R.S. must undertake an administrative review within 15
days. Id. § 7429(b)(1)(B). If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the results of the ad-
ministrative review, the taxpayer can bring an action in federal district court to re-
view the I.R.S. determination. Id. § 7429(b)(1). He has 30 days from the time of the
review determination in which to file suit. Id. Within 20 days after the action is filed,
The combined impact of Sniadach and Shapiro is that the absence
of a meaningful adversary hearing prior to or after the section 1963(b)
order violates due process. 768  Moreover, the holding of a prior ex
parte hearing does not satisfy due process in the absence o a post-
order adversary hearing because the term "hearing" refers to the af-
fected party's right to be heard. 76 9  The filing of affidavits is not an
adequate substitute for a full hearing at which the defendant can con-
front witnesses and present testimony, documentary evidence, and
arguments. 770  Although the formality and procedural requisites for
hearings required by due process can vary "depending upon the im-
portance of the interests involved," 771 the Supreme Court requires
an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses when
"important decisions turn on questions of fact. " 772  Factual ques-
the district court must determine whether the jeopardy assessment is reasonable and
whether the amount assessed is appropriate. Id. § 7429(b)(2). At the judicial review
stage, the I.R.S. has the burden of proving that the use of the jeopardy assessment
procedure was reasonable, id. § 7429(g)(1), and the taxpayer has the burden as to the
reasonableness of the amount assessed. Id. § 7429(g)(2).
768. Due process does not require a full hearing prior to the issuance of the §
1963(b) order. Prior notice and hearing might encourage the defendant to dispose of
assets before the hearing or perhaps flee the jurisdiction. After notification that a §
1963(b) order has been issued, however, no persuasive policy considerations justify
denying a prompt post-order hearing. Cf. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614,
630 n.12 (1976) (Court implied that persuasive policy considerations might exist but
found none on the facts): Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 761 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976) ("On
the other hand, once seizure is accomplished, the justifications for postponement
enumerated in Calero-Toledo evaporate, . .. and due process requires that notice
and opportunity for some form of hearing be accorded swiftly, and, in any event,
prior to forfeiture." (citation omitted)).
769. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972): cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (absence of presequestration hearing did not violate
due process where defendant received a full hearing immediately afterward).
770. The Supreme Court has defined a "'full hearing" as a hearing in which ever%
party has "the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence,
to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination s may be re-
quired for a full and true disclosure of the facts.- United States v. Storer Broadcast-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1956); accord. The New England Divs. Cases, 261 U.S.
184, 200 (1923); see New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon. 362 U.S. 404 1960). A
hearing based upon affidavits is inadequate in cases involving factual disputes. The
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have noted that affidavit hearings lack the
flexibility of oral presentations and prevent a party from molding his argument to the
issues that the decision maker regards as important. Sec Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 345-46 (1976): Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135. 142-43 (9th Cir. 1976).
771. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
772. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). Specifically. the right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental element of due process when the
issues are such that the credibility and veracity of witnesses are critical. Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959): sec Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,
428-29 (1969). In such situations, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses are
essential elements of a meaningful hearing because cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested. D5avis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
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tions, such as proof of the defendant's guilt, are central to the section
1963(b) decision. 773  Moreover, this determination is "important" to
the extent that assets are frozen for a considerable period of time; this
can affect the defendant's ability to defend the criminal prosecution
and to pay personal expenses.
A hearing is also inadequate if the government is only required to
show a threatened transfer of allegedly forfeitable property. Shapiro
mandates a hearing "at which some showing of the probable validity
of the deprivation must be made." 774
The absence of a meaningful hearing requirement encourages gov-
ernment abuse of the section 1963(b) order. For example, Bello
apparently sanctioned such abuse when it granted a section 1963(b)
order to prevent the transfer of defendant's assets to an attorney to
obtain representation. 775  This tactic allows the government to dis-
773. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1969) (due process required
cross-examination and presentation of evidence when a Louisiana Labor-Management
Commission of Inquiry found that specific individual was guilty of a crime and
suggested criminal prosecution). See generally Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974) (full hearing required when a state garnishment statute requires a showing
of "fault" on the debtor's part). For a writ ne exeat republica, which is similar to a §
1963(b) order, a decision on the merits of the case is required after a full adversary
hearing. This writ is often used to protect the government's tax claims against a
defendant. Prior to judgment on tax litigation, the government can obtain a writ nt
exeat republica to prevent a defendant from leaving the United States or moving
from one state to another. See United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Robbins, 235 F. Supp. 353, 355-57 (E.D. Ark. 1964). Like
the § 1963(b) order, a temporary ne exeat writ may be issued on the basis of an ex
parte application. United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d at 10; Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,
126 F.2d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1942). The temporarT writ however, can authorize no
more than a brief period of initial restraint and can be extended only after a full
evidentiary hearing. United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d at 10; Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,
126 F.2d at 14-15; United States v. Robbins, 235 F. Supp. at 357. At this hearing,
due process requires the government to satisfy its burden "of proving probable suc-
cess on the merits of its underlying claim by evidence other than a mere jeopardy
assessment." United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d at 10
774. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629 (1976) (footnote omitted); see
note 767 supra and accompanying text. See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975) (pretrial garnishment statute defective
where there was "no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would be
required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment"). A pretrial
hearing to determine which property is forfeitable may also be essential to protect
the defendant's right to post bail. Some cases have hell that even when a corporate
surety bond is posted, the court can refuse to accept it if the court does not approve
of the source of the security providing the collateral for the bond. See United States
v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Ellis DeMarchena, 330
F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (S.D. Cal. 1971). A defendant who cannot obtain a hearing to
determine which property is forfeitable may be deprived of the ability to post an
acceptable bond or even pay the premium to a bondsman.
775. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979). The Bello
holding may encourage the government to allege the broadest possible forliture of
property and obtain a § 1963(b) order precluding transfer of those assets. The def'n-
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courage competent attorneys from undertaking the defense of indi-
viduals charged with RICO violations. If the order covers most of the
defendant's assets, the attorney either cannot be paid or risks con-
tempt by receiving payment.776  Furthermore, the risk of contempt
is substantial. Although the attorney may not know the source of the
defendant's payments, the prosecution can later contend that the at-
torney knew or should have known that the assets were subject to
forfeiture. Even if a lawyer risks contempt and accepts payment from
an apparently permissible source, the government can wait until all
legal services are performed and then demand return of the funds. 777
The use of a section 1963(b) order to deprive the defendant of
funds with which to prepare a defense also violates the sixth amend-
ment right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. "' 771
Judge Enright, the author of the Bello opinion, asserted that this right
was not compromised because the order did "not deprive Bello of
counsel, but only of the attorney of his choice [and] Bello will still be
entitled to court-appointed counsel if he has no means to hire an
attorney." 779 This novel analysis fundamentally distorts the scope of
the sixth amendment guarantee. It is firmly established that the sixth
amendment right is " 'broader than . . . the bare right to legal rep-
resentation . . .' and encompasses the right to retain counsel of one's
own choosing." 780 In non-RICO situations similar to Bello, courts
dant is then deprived of assets with which to defend the criminal case or to challenge
the § 1963(b) order. If he persists in attempting to obtain representation and uses
assets subject to the order, the defendant and the attornev can be held in contempt.
See, e.g., United States v. Menelev, No. 79-0365 (S.D. Cal., indictment filed Aug. 2,
1979). In Meneley, the defendant sold a house in Costa Rica and discounted outstand-
ing short term loans to pay $60,000 to an attorney. The assets, allegedly those of a
Costa Rican corporation, had been frozen by an order issued untder 21 U.S.C. §
848(d) (1976). After defendant pleaded guiltN. to the § 848 offense, the government
filed a contempt action against defendant.
776. See note 775 supra.
777. See note 775 supra.
778. U.S. Const. amend. VI, cl. 3.
779. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
780. People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 86, 588 P.2d 765, 770, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625,
630 (1978) (quoting People v. Byoune, 65 Cal. 2d 345. 348, 420 P.2d 221, 224, 54
Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1966)): accord, United States v. Burton, 5S4 F.2d 4S.3, 489
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v. Co%, 5S0 F.2d
317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 1075 (1979). United States '.
Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 396 U.S. 825 t1969 ); Releford v.
United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1961). In Holland. the defendant sought
the return of his life savings seized by the police at the time of his arrest because he
wished to retain a private attorney rather than be represented b% a competent
court-appointed public defender. The court held he had been deprised of his sixth
amendment rights. 23 Cal. 3d at 89, 588 P.2d at 771-72. 151 Cal, Rptr. at 631-32.
The Supreme Court has frequently recognized the right of the accused to "a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
(1932); accord, Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954) (court reversed conv'ic-
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have found that the defendant was deprived of this constitutional
right when the government stripped him oF funds to secure coun-
sel. 781  For example, the district court in United States v. Brod-
son 782 dismissed an indictment for tax evasion when a jeopardy
assessment by tax authorities deprived him of funds to hire an ac-
countant to assist him in preparing for trial.
The section 1963(b) situation produces an even more substantial
sixth amendment problem than the one in Brodson, in which a taxing
agency rather than the prosecution levied an assessment on the de-
fendant's assets. 783 A Ninth Circuit case recognized this distinction
when it upheld a lower court's denial of an injunction against an
I.R.S. levy on the defendant's assets. 784  Noting that the actions of
the prosecution, unlike the actions of the I.R.S., could be en-
joined, 78 5 the court indicated that the district court was empowered
to prevent a bad faith attempt by the prosecution to deprive the de-
fendant of all funds to obtain representation. 78 6
2. Forfeiture and Discovery
One of the few advantages of the in personam forfeiture procedure
of RICO is that it simplifies discovery. Complex discovery problems
occur when forfeiture is accomplished through a separate in rein civil
action filed prior to or during a related criminal action. 787  In these
cases, the defendant often attempts to use civil discovery to obtain
tion because trial court denied defendant's request for continuance to procure ser-
vices of an attorney).
781. See United States ex. rel. Ferenc v. Brierley, 320 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa.
1970); People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 588 P.2d 765, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1978). In
Brierley, the defendant sought the return of money seized at the time of his arrest to
retain counsel. After concluding that the government had no justifiable claim to ap-
proximately $600 of that money, the court held that the defendant was deprived of'
his sixth amendment right to counsel of his own choice. 320 F. Supp. at 408-09, The
California Supreme Court has required that the defendant's rights to seized property
be determined prior to trial, if that property will be used to obtain the counsel of his
choice. People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 588 P.2d 765, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1978).
782. 136 F. Supp. 158, 161, 165 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241
F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957). The Court of Appeals noted the possible prejudice but
concluded that the lower court should have tried the case and then ascertained
whether the trial was unfair. 241 F.2d at 109-11.
783. 136 F. Supp. at 162.
784. United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 923 (1976).
785, Id. at 1353-55.
786. Id. at 1355 ("If a defendant could show that the prosecution was party' to a
conspiracy which deprived him of all finds to hire counsel of his choice, the court
would not be powerless to take appropriate action.").
787. Similar problems arise when a defendant in a pending criminal case files a
separate civil action against the government for return of property seized or levied
upon by a jeopardy assessment.
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information that would not be discoverable under the more restrictive
discovery rules of criminal proceedings. 78 8  Similarly, the govern-
ment may attempt to use civil discovery as a ruse to compel disclosure
of matters that, in a criminal action, would be privileged under the
fifth amendment. 78 9  Although the courts often stay civil discovery"
directed at the government until the disposition of the criminal
case, 79 0 the results are less consistent when discovery is sought
against the defendant. While some cases indicate that the defendant
is not subject to civil sanctions for refusing to comply with disco'-
ery,7 9 1 other cases reach a contrary conclusion. 792  Because Title IX
incorporates forfeiture into the criminal action, it is likely that disco%,-
ery problems are governed by the restrictive standard of pre-trial
criminal discovery so that the government cannot force the defendant
to disclose privileged matters.
Section 1963(b) hearings may pose other discovery problems. Al-
though the rules of criminal discovery do not grant the defendant a
general right to discover the government's case, 793 the government
would be forced to disclose much of its evidence at a hearing held
after a section 1963(b) order is issued. At such a hearing the govern-
ment can satisfy its burden of proof only by offering testimony that
tends to establish the defendant's guilt of the substantive offense. 794
The defendant, however, must be permitted to present evidence es-
tablishing that the property is not subject to forfeiture by calling the
investigative agents and other essential government witnesses. The
government may choose to abandon its attempt to obtain a section
1963(b) order rather than reveal its evidence at the hearing.
CONCLUSION
The present overbroad application of Title IX with its accompany-
ing severe penalties has resulted fiom an abrogation of responsibility
788. Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962). cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963); United States v. One 1964 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 41 F.R.D. 3.52,
352-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), United States v. $2,437.00 United States Currency. 36
F.R.D. 257, 258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). The scope of discover\ in criminal prosecution
is narrower than it is in civil cases. United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 t5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); United States v. Hancock, 441 F,2d 1285,
1287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
789. Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), De Vita %. Sills,
422 F.2d 1172, 1178-79 (3d Cir. 1970); de Antonio v,. Solomon, 42 FR.D. 320,
322-23 (D. Mass. 1967).
790. See cases cited note 788 supra.
791. See Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586-87 (2d Cir.). cert. denied,
396 U.S. 986 (1969); de Antonio v. Solomon. 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967).
792. See Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970); De Vita s.
Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1181 (3d Cir. 1970).
793. McSurelv v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970. United States v.
Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 535-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 350 U.S. 876 (1955).
794. See notes 747-54 supra and accompanying text.
1980] RICO
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at all stages of the criminal justice system. Congress has promulgated
a vague statute that gives no clear warning of the proscribed ac-
tivities. The courts have broadly interpreted it in derogation of their
obligation to narrowly construe criminal statutes. The actions of the
prosecuting authorities have belied their public pronouncements that
they would not "power rape nickel and dime cases." 795 This situa-
tion can only be remedied by legislative action to clarify and revise
the statute and by increased sensitivity of the courts directed toward
protecting defendants from unfair and unconstitutional applications of
Title IX.
795. See note 53 supra.
